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HH165-11 - EUSEBIA BUTAU vs LEONARD BUTAU

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Procedural Law-viz pleadings re amendment to pleadings.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re amendment to pleadings iro amendment to declaration.
Family Law-viz division of the assets of the spouses re pre-divorce divorce disposal of matrimonial assets prejudicial to a spouse.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re amendment to pleadings iro Rule 132.
Procedural Law-viz rules of court re High Court Rules iro Rule 132.
Procedural Law-viz High Court Rules re Rule 132 iro amendment to pleadings.
Procedural Law-viz costs re interim proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz costs re interlocutory proceedings.

Pleadings re: Amendment to Pleadings, Summons, Declaration and Draft Orders iro Approach

The applicant instituted proceedings in this court seeking an order to amend her declaration and plea to the defendants claim in reconvention….,.

The High Court Rules 1972, as amended, set out in what circumstances pleadings may be amended. Order 20 Rule 132 provides as follows:

"Subject to rules 134 and 151, failing consent by all parties, the court or a judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all such amendment shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.”

The leading case on this issue is the case of Horne v Hine 1947 (4) SA 757 (SR) which  sets out what should be taken into account by a court or judge in determining whether or not to grant the amendment to pleadings in terms of the above Rule. It seems to me that the court is enjoined to consider two points. The first point to be considered is whether the plaintiff has any prospects of success on the issue upon which the amendment is sought. The second issue is whether or not an injustice would be occasioned to the defendant which cannot be remedied by an appropriate order of costs.

I will deal with the two points raised.

It was the argument by counsel for the applicant that the sole purpose of seeking the amendment was to show that the applicant should be entitled to a larger share of the existing matrimonial estate when it is distributed as the respondent had already benefited when he sold the other property which they owned. Indeed, it was conceded by the respondent, both in his opposing affidavit and in the heads of argument, that these were issues which would have to be dealt with in evidence.

Counsel for the respondent, in his submissions, advanced two main arguments as why the amendment should not be granted. Firstly, he argued that the applicant knew of this property prior to the issuance of summons and that she could not seek to include the property at this stage of the proceedings.

It is clear from a reading of the above-cited Rule that pleadings may be amended at any stage of the proceedings. The authors HERBSTEIN and VAN WINSEN in "The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa" 4th edition…, state the court has a discretion to allow a party to amend his pleadings, or, in the case of an application, to file further affidavits, at any time prior to judgment. Thus, the grant or refusal of an application for an amendment to pleadings is a matter of discretion of the court which is to be exercised judiciously taking into account all the circumstances before it.

The applicant explained, in her founding affidavit, the reason why she omitted the property in question from her declaration. The explanation offered is satisfactory and I have found no reason to disbelieve her on that point. In the case of Macduff & Co (in liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd 1923 TPD 309 the court stated as follows:

"However negligent or careless may have been the first omission and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs."

It therefore seems to me that the fact that the applicant was aware of the property prior to issuing of summons should not be a bar to her application for an amendment unless it can be shown that there would be prejudice to the respondent.

Secondly, counsel for the respondent stated that there was nothing that would stop the court, in considering the award to be made in terms of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:11], to take into account the property which the applicant seeks to be included in her amendment. He submitted that all that the applicant would need to do is to lead evidence during the trial with regard to the property in question. In his opinion it was not necessary to seek an amendment to the pleadings to enable the applicant to lead such evidence.

It seems to me that there is no dispute as between the parties that evidence in relation to the property which the applicant seeks to include in the amendment is relevant to the court when it makes a determination on their proprietary rights. Whilst it is quite clear that the court, in determining the matter, cannot distribute the property as it was sold, it has a wide discretion in making an award which would ensure that there is an equitable distribution between the parties. The object of pleadings is to define issues. In my view, it would be difficult for the applicant to lead evidence on this property if it was not part of her pleadings and this would obviously prevent full inquiry into the dispute.

The applicant submitted that there would be no prejudice to the defendant if the application was granted. Indeed, counsel for the respondent did not seek to argue that the respondent would be prejudiced in the event that the application was allowed.

I can find no prejudice which would be occasioned to the defendant. In fact, the amendment will allow a full ventilation of all the issues which are between the parties….,. Accordingly, I make the following order:

1. The application be and is hereby granted.

Division of Assets of the Spouses re: Prejudicial Disposal, Alienation or Concealment of Assets & Marital Property Regime

The brief facts which have given rise to this matter may be summarized from the applicants founding affidavit as follows.

The applicant in this matter is the plaintiff in case number HC4981/07 wherein she is seeking an order for divorce and ancillary relief. The respondent is the defendant in that matter. During the course of her marriage to the respondent they acquired various movable and immovable properties. She alleges that some of the property was sold by the defendant for his exclusive benefit prior to the institution of the divorce proceedings. Following advice, she did not include the property which had been sold by her husband as marital assets which should be considered when making an award at divorce in her declaration. The applicant, however, still feeling aggrieved by the matter, sought to amend her pleadings at pre-trial conference stage before MUSAKWA J. 

When the respondent opposed her Notice to Amend she decided to institute these proceedings.

In terms of the Notice, which was filed with this court on 29 March 2010, the applicant seeks to amend paragraph 8 of the declaration by adding four items which include a motor vehicle, sewing machine, building materials and sewing materials. It also seeks to add a new paragraph 10 and 11 which give a monetary value on the items and seek a half share of the value. The Notice also seeks to claim a half share of the rent the defendant charged and received for an immovable property which they jointly own between June 2005 and June 2009. The Notice also seeks to add the same claim to her plea to the defendant's counter-claim.

The respondent opposed the application and filed an opposing affidavit. It was his argument that the property claimed had been sold during the subsistence of the marriage for the mutual benefit of the family. He further stated, in his affidavit, that some of the property was not matrimonial property as same was stolen during the subsistence of the marriage. He then goes on to explain what happened to the proceeds in respect of each item claimed by the applicant in the Notice to Amend.

In my view, it is not for this court to determine the circumstances of the sale of the property. The sole issue before me is whether or not the applicant can amend her pleadings.

Costs re: No Order as to Costs or No Costs Order iro Approach

The applicant has been successful and costs would ordinarily follow the cause.

However, in view of the fact that the defendant has been put to the expense of opposing the application which could have been avoided had the applicant included everything in her declaration I will penalize her by denying her costs in this matter….,.

1. …,.

2. There shall be no order as to costs.

GUVAVA J: The applicant instituted proceedings in this court seeking an order  to amend her declaration and plea to the defendants claim in reconvention. The brief facts which have given rise to this matter may be summarized from the applicants founding affidavit as follows.

            The applicant in this matter is the plaintiff in case number HC 4981/07 wherein she is seeking an order for divorce and ancillary relief. The respondent is the defendant in that matter. During the course of her marriage to the respondent they acquired various movable and immoveable properties. She alleges that some of the property was sold by the defendant for his exclusive benefit prior to the institution of the divorce proceedings. Following advice, she did not include the property which had been sold by her husband as marital assets which should be considered when making an award at divorce in her declaration. The applicant however still feeling aggrieved by the matter sought to amend her pleadings at pre-trial conference stage before MUSAKWA J.  When the respondent opposed her notice to amend she decided to institute these proceedings. In terms of the notice which was filed with this court on 29 March 2010 the applicant seeks to amend para 8 of the declaration by adding four items which include a motor vehicle, sewing machine, building materials and sewing materials. It also seeks to add a new paras 10 and 11 which give a monetary value on the items and seek a half share of the value. The notice also seeks to claim a half share of the rent defendant charged and received for an immoveable property which they jointly own between June 2005 and June 2009. The notice also seeks to add the same claim to her plea to the defendant's counter-claim.

            The respondent opposed the application and filed an opposing affidavit. It was his argument that the property claimed had been sold during the subsistence of the marriage for the mutual benefit of the family. He further stated in his affidavit that some of the property was not matrimonial property as same was stolen during the subsistence of the marriage. He then goes on to explain what happened to the proceeds in respect of each item claimed by the applicant in the Notice to amend.

            In my view it is not for this court to determine the circumstances of the sale of the property. The sole issue before me is whether or not the applicant can amend her pleadings. The High Court Rules 1972 as amended, set out in what circumstances pleadings may be amended. Order 20 Rule 132 provides as follows:

"Subject to rules 134 and 151, failing consent by all parties the court or a judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all such amendment shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties”

 

The leading case on this issue is the case of Horne v Hine 1947 (4) SA 757 (SR) which  sets out what should be taken into account by a court or judge in determining whether or not to grant the amendment to pleadings in terms of the above rule.  It seems to me that the court is enjoined to consider two points. The first point to be considered is whether the plaintiff has any prospects of success on the issue upon which the amendment is sought. The second issue is whether or not an injustice would be occasioned to the defendant which cannot be remedied by an appropriate order of costs. I will deal with the two points raised.

It was the Ms Woods argument for the applicant that the sole purpose of seeking the amendment was to show that he applicant should be entitled to a larger share of the existing matrimonial estate when it is distributed as the respondent had already benefited when he sold the other property which they owned. Indeed it was conceded by the respondent both in his opposing affidavit and in the heads of argument that these were issues which would have to be dealt with in evidence.  Mr Mandevere in his submissions advanced two main arguments as why the amendment should not be granted. Firstly, he argued that the applicant knew of this property prior to the issuance of summons and that she could not seek to include the property at this stage of the proceedings.

            It is clear from a reading of the above cited rule that pleadings may be amended at any stage of the proceedings. The authors Herbstein and Van Winsen in "The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa" 4th edition at p 514 state the court has a discretion to allow a party to amend his pleadings or in the case of an application, to file further affidavits at any time prior to judgment.  Thus the grant or refusal of an application for an amendment to pleadings is a matter of discretion of the court which is to be exercised judiciously taking into account all the circumstances before it.

The applicant explained in her founding affidavit the reason why she omitted the property in question from her declaration. The explanation offered is satisfactory and I have found no reason to disbelieve her on that point. In the case of Macduff & Co (in liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd1923 TPD 309 the court stated as follows:

"However negligent or careless may have been the first omission and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs."

 

It therefore seems to me that the fact that the applicant was aware of the property prior to issuing of summons should not be a bar to her application for an amendment unless it can be shown that there would be prejudice to the respondent. 

 Secondly, Mr Mandevere stated that there was nothing that would stop the court, in considering the award to be made in terms of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Cap 5:11], to take into account the property which the applicant seeks to be included in her amendment. He submitted that all that the applicant would need to do is to lead evidence during the trial with regard to the property in question. In his opinion it was not necessary to seek an amendment to the pleadings to enable the applicant to lead such evidence. It seems to me that there is no dispute as between the parties that evidence in relation to the property which the applicant seeks to include in the amendment is relevant to the court when it makes a determination on their proprietary rights. Whilst it is quite clear that the court in determining the matter cannot distribute the property as it was sold, it has a wide discretion in making an award which would ensure that there is an equitable distribution between the parties. 

            The object of pleadings is to define issues. In my view it would be difficult for the applicant to lead evidence on this property if it was not part of her pleadings and this would obviously prevent full inquiry into the dispute.

The applicant submitted that there would be no prejudice to the defendant if the application was granted. Indeed Mr Mandevere did not seek to argue that the respondent would be prejudiced in the event that the application was allowed. I can find no prejudice which would be occasioned to the defendant. In fact the amendment will allow a full ventilation of all the issues which are between the parties.

The applicant has been successful and cost would ordinarily follow the cause. However in view of the fact that the defendant has been put to the expense of opposing the application which could have been avoided had the applicant included everything in her declaration I will penalize her by denying her costs in this matter.

            Accordingly I make the following order:

 

1.      The application be and is hereby granted.

2.      There shall be no order as to costs.

 

 

 

Atherstone & Cook, applicant's legal practitioners

Mbidzo, Muchadehama & Makoni, respondent's legal practitioners
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