The
Russian-trained psychiatrist, one of the very few in the whole country, Dr
Elena Poskotchinova, concluded her affidavit as follows:
“In
my opinion there is no evidence of mental illness, or mental retardation, at
present. He was mentally stable at the time of crime and responsible for
his action, probably he got head trauma in 2007 ...
The
Russian-trained psychiatrist, one of the very few in the whole country, Dr
Elena Poskotchinova, concluded her affidavit as follows:
“In
my opinion there is no evidence of mental illness, or mental retardation, at
present. He was mentally stable at the time of crime and responsible for
his action, probably he got head trauma in 2007 [result of EEG confirmed
moderate to high amplitude posterior dominant alpha]
and had psychotic behaviour in 2007 - 2008. But since 2010, there is no
evidence of mental disorder (OPD cards confirm only pain on old suture line by
doctor from United Bulawayo Hospital).”
However,
the psychiatrist was not called to give viva voce evidence -
her evidence being just formerly and routinely admitted into the
record. After her evidence was read into the record, the learned trial
Judge just expressed gratitude to the psychiatrist and proceeded straight away
to judgment in which he observed in this regard as follows:
“The
court referred the accused to be examined by a psychiatrist to ascertain his
mental state in the light of the bizarre manner in which the murder was
committed. Dr. Elena Poskotchinova's report was produced as Exhibit
8. The psychiatrist concluded that there was no evidence of mental illness
or mental retardation at present on accused. The accused was mentally
stable at the time of the crime and responsible for his action. He is fit
to stand trial. The accused waited for deceased to fall asleep. He
sharpened the axe and then struck deceased, firstly, on the head, followed by
several blows on the neck to the extent of chopping the head off to ensure that
he was dead. The accused is therefore guilty of murder with actual
intent.”
It
was submitted that it was incumbent on the court a quo
to conduct an inquiry through calling of oral evidence from the psychiatrist
who examined the appellant.
I
agree.
It
was necessary to hear viva voce evidence
from the psychiatrist, from the mother of the appellant, and any other relevant
person. The psychiatrist would have had to explain to the court the basis for
her affirmative finding that from 2010 onwards the appellant no longer suffered
from any mental illness especially in the light of the fact that she accepted
that the appellant had suffered from some “psychotic disorder” between 2007 and
2008. There are more questions which remained unanswered because of this
oversight such as whether considering the lapse of seven months between being
seen by the two doctors and the appellant's assessment by the psychiatrist,
evidence of mental defect that had been observed by the doctors could have
disappeared? Whether in the light of the two doctors' observation in 2011,
the psychiatrist's affirmative assessment that from 2010 onwards the appellant
suffered no mental illness was sustainable? What was it that the two
doctors observed post 2010 which necessitated the referral to a psychiatrist if
not some mental defect?
And
as regards the appellant's previous mental infirmity, the psychiatrist could
have helped shed light on whether the possibility existed for an illness
induced by the noted head injury to recur - even be it only temporarily.
Section
278 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act allows the production of medical
reports from doctors in affidavit form. However, the court has the
discretion, in terms of section 280 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act,
to order that the doctor be summoned to give oral evidence at the
trial. The court may also send written questions to the expert who is enjoined
to reply thereto. As was observed in G. FELTOES's Judges' Handbook for Criminal Cases, 1st ed,
2009, Legal Resources Foundation…,.;
“It
will be necessary to use the power to ask the doctor to give oral testimony
when the original affidavit is inadequate and the court is unable to arrive at
a just decision on the basis of this report. If the information is very
scanty or vital information is omitted, or the information in the report seems
to be contradictory, this power should be exercised. But if it contains
all the necessary information there will be no need to summon the doctor. Anock 1973 RLR 154 (A); Sibanda A – 10 - 72
Melrose 1984 (2) ZLR 217 (S).”
The
interrogation, through oral testimony, of expert evidence given on affidavit is
necessary to avoid the error of treating such evidence as gospel truth or
divine revelation.
Expert
opinion evidence is admitted to assist the court to reach a just decision by
guiding the court and clarifying issues not within the court's general
knowledge. In Mandy v Protea Assurance Co. Ltd
1976 (1) SA 565…, it was stated that it was not the mere opinion of the expert
witness which is decisive but his or her ability to satisfy the court that,
because of the special skill, training and experience, the reasons for the
opinion expressed are acceptable. However, in the final analysis, the court
itself must draw its own conclusions from the expert opinion and must not be
overawed by the proffered opinion, and simply adopt it without questioning or
testing it against known parameters.
In
S v Zuma 2006 (2) SACR 257…, the court held that the
expertise of a professional witness should not be elevated to such heights that
sight is lost of the court's own capabilities and responsibilities in drawing
inferences from the evidence. And, in my view, the court can only do this
well if it requires the expert witness to give oral evidence in the
clarification and elucidation of an affidavit that is otherwise technically
dense and incomprehensible, contradictory, or inadequate in all respects except
the conclusion.
A
court errs when it merely adopts the conclusions of an expert report without
exercising its mind on it by, for example, calling for oral testimony or
drawing the necessary inferences from the evidence.
Did
the court a quo, therefore misdirect itself in
accepting the expert evidence of the psychiatrist in the manner it did?
It
appears to me that the court below did err in this regard. However, I am
of the considered view that the misdirection was not of such a magnitude as to
vitiate the conclusion that it reached on conviction. The psychiatrist's
affidavit, taken in its totality, shows that an Assistant Clinical Psychologist,
N. T. Mpofu, who examined the appellant, also concluded that the “patient does
not show any sign of mental illness, and was stable at the time.” The same
conclusion was reached when the appellant was examined at a clinic as an
outpatient in July 2010. The mother's quoted evidence also shows that when
she took the appellant to hospital on suspicion of mental illness the doctors
discounted it and instead treated him for an ordinary headache. The
psychiatrist also set out cogent reasons for her conclusion, thus:
“When
examined by me, the accused appeared to be free from any acute psychotic
symptoms. He was full oriented in all aspects, calm, cooperative. Denied
any type of hallucination and did not display any symptom of delusional
behaviour nor decline in memory or intellect. Denied alcohol abuse in
past. Admitted his crime of killing his brother; said the brother had
spanked him like a child early morning on the day of the crime. He
complained that accused was eating too much peanuts. “I was angry and
after that axed him as punishment.” He has insight into his mental
illness. According to staff report: No evidence of unpredictable behaviour
since admission.”
Accordingly,
the court a quo's
decision on conviction cannot be interfered with….,.
The
conviction of murder with actual intent is upheld.