This is an appeal against refusal of bail pending appeal by the High Court (the court a quo). The application is in terms of Rule 67 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2018 as read with section 121(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]....,.This Court's approach to matters ...
This is an appeal against refusal of bail pending appeal by the High Court (the court a quo). The application is in terms of Rule 67 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2018 as read with section 121(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]....,.
This Court's approach to matters of this nature was stated in S v Chikumbirike 1986 (2) ZLR 145 (SC)…, where BECK JA said the following:
“The next matter to be decided is whether this Court, in hearing the appeal, should treat it as an appeal in the wide sense, that is to say, that it is to be treated as if it were a hearing de novo. Once again, that matter has been decided by the case of The State v Mohamed 1977 (2) SA 531 at 542B-C where TROLLIP JA said that, in an appeal of this nature, the court of appeal will only interfere if the court a quo committed an irregularity or misdirection or exercised its discretion so unreasonably or improperly as to vitiate its decision.”
The same point was subsequently made by this Court in Aitken & Anor v Attorney-General 1992 (1) ZLR 249 (S)..., as follows:
“While the Judge President, in considering the appeal, was at liberty to substitute his discretion for that of the magistrate on the facts placed before the latter, the present appeal is one in the narrow sense. The powers of this Court are, therefore, largely limited. In the absence of an irregularity or misdirection, this Court has to be persuaded that the manner in which the Judge President exercised his discretion was so unreasonable as to vitiate the decision reached.
See State v Barber 1979 (4) SA 218 (D) at 220E-G; State v Chikumbirike 1986 (2) ZLR 145 (S) 146F-G.
The principle is therefore well established.
It follows, that, in the present appeal, for the decision of the learned judge to be reversed, it must be shown that the learned judge committed an irregularity or misdirection, or that the manner in which he exercised his discretion was so unreasonable as to vitiate the decision made.”
