Sentencing re: Unlawful Entry, Aggravated Unlawful Entry, Housebreaking and Criminal Trespass

HB16-09 : THE STATE vs TICHAWANDA FAMABI
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

The accused person was convicted of eighteen counts of unlawful entry into premises.,. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment on each count, resulting in a total of seventy-two years. Of that total, ten years was suspended on the usual conditions of good future behavior and thirty-six years on condition the accused pays restitution. From ...

HB16-09 : THE STATE vs TICHAWANDA FAMABI
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

Whichever way one looks at it, a sentence of twenty-six years (assuming the accused affords restitution) or sixty-two years, if he fails to pay restitution, is manifestly excessive and is in excess of the outer limit our courts would ordinarily impose for offences of dishonesty. In., McNALLY JA remarked: "How does one begin to measure the outer ...

HH83-09 : THE STATE vs MORISHA MAHOVE & ANOR AND ELEVEN OTHER MATTERS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and KUDYA J

The above cases were all presided over by the same trial magistrate. In cases one to eleven, the accused persons were convicted of the crime of unlawful entry into premises and theft. In case twelve, the accused was convicted of the crime of theft. The accused were all convicted on their own pleas of guilty. The convictions ...

The above cases were all presided over by the same trial magistrate.

In cases one to eleven, the accused persons were convicted of the crime of unlawful entry into premises and theft. In case twelve, the accused was convicted of the crime of theft.

The accused were all convicted on their own pleas of guilty. The convictions were proper, and are thus confirmed.

I, however, have misgivings on the sentences imposed in each case.

In all the cases of unlawful entry into premises and theft, each accused was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Where there were two or more counts, the accused was sentenced to two years imprisonment for each count.

For the theft case, the accused was also sentenced to two years imprisonment.

The uniform sentence of two years was regardless of the circumstance of each case.

No portion of the sentence was suspended on any condition despite the fact that all the accused were first offenders who readily pleaded guilty. In many cases, the accused were youthful first offenders aged between nineteen and twenty-two years who deserved a chance to reform.

In some cases, all the stolen property was recovered whilst in others part of the property was recovered. There were also cases where no property was recovered.

In his reasons for sentence, the trial magistrate referred to the case of S v Mururo & Anor HH98/2000 as his authority for imposing the sentences of two years imprisonment.

The magistrate clearly misunderstood what the judge said in that case.

Upon perusal of that case, I did not understand the judge to be laying down a foundation for not suspending a portion of the sentence, or for that matter, treating young first offenders the same as mature first offenders. At page one of the..., judgment, the Judge said:

“House-breaking normally attracts sentences of two or three years' effective imprisonment, even where no unusual aggravation is present.”

That, in my view, did not mean that invariably anyone convicted of house-breaking offences had to be imprisoned for two years with no other conditions, irrespective of the individual circumstances of each case.

HH83-09 : THE STATE vs MORISHA MAHOVE & ANOR AND ELEVEN OTHER MATTERS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and KUDYA J

Whilst confirming the convictions in all the above cases, I am unable to do the same with the sentences. Due to the areas of misdirection pointed to..., the sentences will set aside. Accordingly, the sentences are hereby set aside, and are substituted by the following sentences – 1. S v Morisha Mahove Anor CRB D119-20/09 The two ...

Whilst confirming the convictions in all the above cases, I am unable to do the same with the sentences.

Due to the areas of misdirection pointed to..., the sentences will set aside.

Accordingly, the sentences are hereby set aside, and are substituted by the following sentences –

1. S v Morisha Mahove & Anor CRB D119-20/09

The two counts as one for sentence; twenty four months imprisonment of which four months imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence involving dishonesty for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

2. S v Evans Chikonya CRB 135/09

For three counts of unlawful entry and theft; each count, two years imprisonment. Total six years imprisonment of which one and half years imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence of which dishonesty is an element and for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

3. S v Elizabeth Chaora & Anor CRB 152/09

Each accused; twenty-four months imprisonment of which six months imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence of which dishonesty is an element and for which he/she is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

4. S v Moses Sande CRB 116/09

Eighteen months imprisonment of which six months imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence of which dishonesty is an element and for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

5. S v Finish Dzinzi CRB 1581/08

Eighteen months imprisonment of which four months imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence of which dishonesty is an element and for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

6. S v Rodrick Sumburero CRB 1621/08

Twenty-four months imprisonment of which six months imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence of which dishonesty is an element and for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

7. S v Prosper Mangororo CRB D1515/08

8. S v Patrick Baranda & Anor CRB D1571-2/08

Each accused; twenty-four months imprisonment of which four months imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence of which dishonesty is an element and for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

9. S v John Mangare & 3 Ors CRB D1550-3/08

10. S v Brian Chinengundu & Anor CRB D1569-70/08

Each accused; twenty-four months imprisonment of which six months imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence of which dishonesty is an element and for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

11. S v Luckson Kapesa CRB D111/09

Count One; eighteen months imprisonment.

Count Two; four months imprisonment.

Total; twenty-two months imprisonment of which six months imprisonment is suspended for five years on condition that the accused does not, within that period, commit any offence of which dishonesty is an element and for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

S v Standrech Chirinda He was sentenced to four years imprisonment, of which one year was suspended for five years on conditions of good behaviour.

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

The distinction between unlawful entry during which the accused person steals the complainant's property, or destroys, or damages, property, or the entry is aggravated by circumstances mentioned in subsection (2) of section 131 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23], and a simple unlawful entry, is relevant when the court considers the ...

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

I must now proceed to assess the appropriateness of the sentences imposed in S v Standrech Chirinda, S v Muketiwa Munemo, and S v Langton Murozvi because those sentences were imposed under the mistaken belief that the convicted persons had been convicted of unlawful entry and theft. This means the sentences took into consideration ...

I must now proceed to assess the appropriateness of the sentences imposed in S v Standrech Chirinda, S v Muketiwa Munemo, and S v Langton Murozvi because those sentences were imposed under the mistaken belief that the convicted persons had been convicted of unlawful entry and theft. This means the sentences took into consideration convictions for theft for which the convicted persons had not been charged.

In S v Peter Gunura Chasara, the canvassing of theft elements under unlawful entry means the magistrate took into consideration the conviction for unlawful entry and theft, even though the theft charge had been withdrawn.

The fact that section 131(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] provides that the value of the stolen property determines the fine, if double the value of the stolen property is greater than the fine imposable under level thirteen, means if the convicted person is convicted of both unlawful entry and theft, his punishment would be the same, or almost the same, as that for unlawful entry as defined in section 131(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23].

It is, in my view, clear that the Legislature, in enacting section 131(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23], did not intend to create the former offence of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft, but that of an aggravated unlawful entry.

It is, therefore, important, to note that a convicted person can be sentenced using the value of the stolen property without first being convicted of theft as defined in section 113(1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. All that is required, in terms of section 131(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23], is for him to admit it as an aggravating factor, the most important factor being his admission of the value of the property.

It is, therefore, in my view, possible to consider the appropriate sentences in these cases, even though the convicted persons convictions under section 131(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] purported to be convictions for unlawful entry and theft.

The amendment of the charges to confine them to the crime of unlawful entry does not affect the sentences imposed by the magistrates unless the sentences were not appropriate for other reasons. This..., means the magistrate, and prosecutor, in S v Peter Gunura Chasara, were within their rights when they treated the theft charge as an alternative, and withdrew it after securing a conviction for unlawful entry. This is so because the punishment for theft is taken into consideration under section 131(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23].

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

The sentence, in each case, must, therefore, be reviewed to assess its appropriateness. If it is appropriate, it will be confirmed, if not, it will be set aside and be substituted by an appropriate sentence. 1. S v Standrech Chirinda The convicted person is a first offender, who pleaded guilty to contravening section 131(1) of the Criminal ...

1. S v Standrech Chirinda

The convicted person is a first offender, who pleaded guilty to contravening section 131(1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23]. He is twenty-seven years old.

The magistrate took into consideration the fact that he is a first offender who pleaded guilty. The value stolen during the unlawful entry is US$140, of which property valued at US$15 was recovered. The accused, therefore, benefitted to the amount of US$125.

He was sentenced to four years imprisonment of which one year was suspended on conditions of good behaviour. The magistrate said a fine, or community service, would trivialize this otherwise serious offence. The Legislature provided for a fine not exceeding level thirteen, or a fine not exceeding double the value of the property stolen during the unlawful entry, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding fifteen years.

In this case, the convicted person merely forced a key open. His manner of breaking into the premises was not out of the ordinary to deserve four years imprisonment. In my view, the sentence imposed on this first offender who should, ordinarily, be kept out of prison, is so severe as to warrant the interference of this court.

The Legislature provided for a fine not exceeding level thirteen, as the starting point, and fifteen years imprisonment, for the worst offence. It was, therefore, aware of the seriousness of the crime of unlawful entry but gave the courts a very wide discretion in considering the appropriate sentence. This must be because unlawful entry can be for various purposes, and can cause damage, and destruction of property. The facts of each case must, therefore, be carefully considered in arriving at an appropriate sentence.

In this case, the only damage the accused person may have caused could be to the key he forced open. The offence is further aggravated by his entering a dwelling house during the night. See section 131(2)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23].

In my view, while a fine may have the effect of trivializing the offence, there are other sentencing options which would suit this offence, and the offender, without having to send him to prison for a long time. The ill-gotten gains can be disgorged against a suspended term of imprisonment. His future conduct can be guided by a suspended term of imprisonment. The sentence of four years imprisonment is too severe, and cannot be allowed to stand.

A sentence in the region of two years would be appropriate.

The sentence imposed by the magistrate is set aside and is substituted by the following:

“Two years imprisonment, of which one year is suspended for five years on condition that the convicted person does not, during that period, commit any offence involving unlawful entry for which he will be imprisoned without the option of a fine. A further eight months imprisonment is suspended on condition the convicted person restitutes the complainant in the sum of US$125 by 30 October 2009 through the Clerk of Court, Chivhu Magistrates Court.”

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

2. S v Muketiwa Munemo The convicted person was sentenced to thirty-six months imprisonment, of which twelve months were suspended on conditions of good behaviour. Both counts were treated as one for sentence. He is a seventeen year old first offender, who pleaded guilty. He, on 3 June 2009, unlawfully entered two premises without the owners' consent. The ...

2. S v Muketiwa Munemo

The convicted person was sentenced to thirty-six months imprisonment, of which twelve months were suspended on conditions of good behaviour. Both counts were treated as one for sentence.

He is a seventeen year old first offender, who pleaded guilty.

He, on 3 June 2009, unlawfully entered two premises without the owners' consent. The fact that he unlawfully entered two premises on the same day portrays him as a persistent offender who has to be dealt with firmly, even though he is a juvenile first offender. He has clearly started from the deep-end. He has to be dissuaded from the life of crime by an effective sentence.

He, in count one, stole property whose value was not established when the State accepted his limited plea that he had only stolen the property he stated. In the absence of proof of the value stolen, and the fact that property worth US$15 was recovered out of the original total value of US$50, the value not recovered can be deemed to be negligible. He, therefore, did not benefit from the crime he committed in count one. In count two, he stole property worth US$40, of which property worth US$15 was recovered. He gained US$25.

The convicted person is, however, a juvenile, whose parents are deceased. He stays with a friend. He should have been sentenced to corporal punishment, in terms of section 353 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] plus a suspended sentence, instead of the long term of imprisonment imposed by the magistrate. The magistrate, therefore, misdirected himself by failing to consider corporal punishment.

In view of his having started at the deep-end, a prison term is called for, but should be suspended on conditions of good behaviour, and restitution.

The convicted person is in the business of buying and selling, raising an income of 400 rands per month. He has assets valued at 1500 rands. He is, therefore, able to pay restitution to the complainant in count two.

The convicted person was sentenced on 12 June 2009. He has, therefore, spent more than a month and a half in prison.

It is, in my view, no longer necessary to subject him to corporal punishment when he has already felt the sting of imprisonment. The period he has served should be equated to the corporal punishment which should have been imposed. He is, therefore, entitled to his immediate release from prison.

....,. The sentence imposed by the magistrate is set aside and is substituted by the following:

“Both Counts Being Treated as One

Fourteen months imprisonment, of which ten months is suspended for five years on condition the accused does not, during that period, commit any offence involving unlawful entry for which he will be imprisoned without the option of a fine. A further two months is suspended on condition the convicted person pays restitution to the second complainant in the sum of US$25 by 30 October 2009 through the Clerk of Court, Chivhu Magistrates' Court.

As the convicted person has already served for more than one and a half months, he is entitled to his immediate release from prison.”

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

3. S v Langton Murozvi The convicted person was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment, of which eight months were suspended on conditions of good behaviour. The sentence is within the magistrate's discretion. The proceedings in that case will, after the amendment of the charge sheet, be allowed to stand.

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

4. S v Peter Gunura Chasara The convicted person stole property valued at US$225, of which property valued at US$37 was recovered. He stole a considerable amount of property, most of which was not recovered. The magistrate took all the factors into consideration and sentenced him to thirty-six months imprisonment, of which eight months was suspended on conditions of good ...

HB88-09 : ALBERT COSTA CHATIRA vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J

He was sentenced to a total of nineteen (19) years imprisonment, of which four years were suspended on the usual conditions of good future behaviour. I have carefully looked at the facts, the reasoning of the learned trial magistrate, and the ultimate sentence imposed. It is clear that the trial court treated some counts as one ...

HB31-11 : MPHOKUHLE NCUBE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

This appeal was heard on 14 February 2011 and the following order was granted: ''The appeal succeeds to the extent that the sentence of 5 years imprisonment of which 1½ years imprisonment was suspended on the usual conditions imposed on the 18/5/10 be and is hereby set aside and is substituted by the following: 2 ...

This appeal was heard on 14 February 2011 and the following order was granted:

''The appeal succeeds to the extent that the sentence of 5 years imprisonment of which 1½ years imprisonment was suspended on the usual conditions imposed on the 18/5/10 be and is hereby set aside and is substituted by the following:

2 years imprisonment of which 1 year imprisonment is suspended for 5 years on condition appellant does not during that period commit any offence of which unlawful entry and/or dishonesty is an element for which upon conviction is sentenced to imprisonment without option of a fine.

Effective: 1 year imprisonment.”

We undertook to give full reasons for the said decision. This judgment contains the said reasons.

The appellant, aged 19 at the time, together with his three co-accused, were charged with one count of unlawful entry and another of theft. They pleaded guilty were duly convicted and sentenced as follows:

''Each accused persons count (i) 2 years imprisonment. Count (ii) 3 years imprisonment, of the 5 years 1½ years is suspended for each accused person for 3 years on condition that each within that period does not commit any offence involving unlawful entry into premises/ dishonesty as an element for which upon conviction he is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine.''

The allegations against them is that on the 16 May 2010 they broke into Eagle Supermarket and stole an assortment of groceries, R5,250= and $375= cash. Of the total goods stolen, $200=, R4,213= and all groceries were recovered.

It is the appellant's argument, through his legal representative, that there was a misdirection by the court a quo by its failure to impose a non-custodial sentence in this matter. His argument is premised on the ground that the trial magistrate should have imposed a fine or community service….,.

Count 2 is actually the continuation of section 131(1) of the Act, that is, the unlawful entry, of which sub-section (2) reads:

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of sub-section (1) the crime of unlawful entry into premises is committed in aggravating circumstances if, on the circumstances on which the crime is committed, the convicted person -

(a) …,.

(b) …,.

(d) …,.

(e) Committed or intended to commit some other crime.”

The appellant committed this offence in aggravated circumstances as premised under subsection 2 of the said Act.

HH242-10 : THE STATE vs WALTER GARANEWAKO
Ruled By: MUTEMA J

He was sentenced to eight (8) months imprisonment wholly suspended on condition he performed 280 hours of community service at Kunaka Hospital in Dema. The maximum sentence being a custodial term of imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months - not the eight months that was meted out.

HB92-10 : INNOCENT CHIVERE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHEDA J and NDOU J

The appellant was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment of which 3 months were suspended on the usual conditions of future good behavior. The pith and marrow of the appeal is that the appellant should have been considered for a sentence of community service. It is trite that the trial magistrate did not consider whether or not the ...

HB96-10 : THE STATE vs INNOCENT NGWENYA
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

The court treated both counts as one for the purpose of sentence and sentenced the accused to five (5) years imprisonment of which two (2) years imprisonment was suspended for five (5) years on the customary conditions of future good behavior. In addition, the suspended sentence of twelve (12) months imprisonment suspended on 17 ...

HB108-10 : EMMANUEL MURAMBIWA vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHEDA J and MATHONSI J

This is an appeal against sentence only….,. He pleaded guilty to the charge, was convicted and sentenced as follows: “Count 1 – 7 years imprisonment. Count 2 – 8 years imprisonment. Total 15 years imprisonment 3 years imprisonment is suspended for 5 years on condition each accused does not within that period commit any offence involving unlawful ...

HB121-10 : THE STATE vs INKEN NYAMAHA
Ruled By: CHEDA J

The courts have always regarded housebreaking as a very serious offence, which, by and large, attracts a custodial sentence, a court should have a good and sufficient reason for departing from this time honoured legal principle.

HB04-13 : JORAM NGWENYA and CLEOPAS MOYO vs FADZAI MTHOMBENI N.O. and THE STATE
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

Accused 1 and 3 were each sentenced to undergo 10 years imprisonment of which 3 years imprisonment was suspended for five years on the customary conditions of future good behaviour.

HB51-13 : TAFADZWA RAWURA vs GLORIA TAKUNDWA N.O. and THE STATE
Ruled By: MAKONESE J

The applicant was duly sentenced to three years imprisonment for both counts, with one year suspended for five years on condition he did not commit an offence involving dishonesty and for which he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.

HB78-11 : DENNIS DUBE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

The conviction in Count 4 is confirmed. The sentence imposed by the court a quo is set aside and substituted by a sentence of 3 years imprisonment.

HB177-11 : THE STATE vs WATMORE CHARUMA
Ruled By: CHEDA J and NDOU J

The courts are…., urged to bear in mind the provisions of section 131(2) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act 2004 with regards to sentence.

HH293-14 : THE STATE vs OLAUSHEAS JOHN MAIMBA
Ruled By: MAWADZE J and TAGU J

On the same date, 10 March 2011, all the 5 counts were treated as one for sentence and the accused was sentenced as follows; “5 years imprisonment of which 6 months imprisonment is suspended on condition accused restitute Methulisi Dube the sum of $70=, Ziwakaya in the sum of $25= and Abel Charangiwa in the sum ...

On the same date, 10 March 2011, all the 5 counts were treated as one for sentence and the accused was sentenced as follows;

“5 years imprisonment of which 6 months imprisonment is suspended on condition accused restitute Methulisi Dube the sum of $70=, Ziwakaya in the sum of $25= and Abel Charangiwa in the sum of $20= through the Clerk of Court Harare on or before 30 /05/ 2011 by 4pm. 4 years 6 months effective.”…,.

In respect of sentence, it is clear that even if the accused had been convicted in respect of all the 5 counts, the overall sentence of 5 years imprisonment induces a sense of shock. The total value of the property allegedly stolen in all the 5 counts is US$735= only. There would be no reason to visit the accused, who is a first offender, with such a harsh penalty, moreso when property valued at US$620= was recovered. The actual prejudice in all the 5 counts would be a paltry US$125=.

In view of the verdict now entered, I can only consider the appropriate sentence in respect of Count 1 and 5. I believe a sentence of 8 to 10 months in each Count would be appropriate with a part suspended on the usual condition of good behaviour and part on condition of restitution if the property had not been recovered.

An effective sentence of 8 to 10 months imprisonment would meet the justice of the case in Count 1 and 5.

I am, therefore, unable to correct the sentence in respect of Counts 1 and 5 in view of the inordinate delay involved to the extent that it would benefit the accused. However, in order to correct the accused's criminal record, this court should consider the sentence in Count 1 and 5. All the property was recovered hence there is no need to suspend part on the sentence on condition of restitution.

The sentence imposed by the trial court is set aside in its entirety and substituted with the following;

“Count 1 - 10 months imprisonment.

Count 5 - 10 months imprisonment

Total : 20 months imprisonment of which 10 months imprisonment are suspended for 5 years on condition the accused does not commit within that period any offence involving dishonesty for which accused is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine.”

HMA15-17 : THE STATE vs MUNDONDO ZAVA
Ruled By: MAWADZE J and MAFUSIRE J

While the offence of unlawful entry into premises in aggravating circumstances remains a serious offence, the trial court should not lose sight of the value of the property stolen in each Count in assessing the appropriate sentence.

HB113-16 : THE STATE vs MATHIAS MUNIKWA
Ruled By: TAKUVA J and MOYO J

The facts are that the accused resides at Stand number 69, Village 1, Pauldale, Kwekwe and is employed at Mahamara Mine as a Chrome Miner. The complainant, on the other hand, resides and works at Mapiravana Farm in Lalapanzi. The accused and the complainant are not related. On the 19^th day of December 2015, at approximately 18:30 hours, and at Mapiravana Farm, Lalapanzi the accused unlawfully entered the complainant's house through an unlocked door without authority.

In respect of Count Two, the accused unlawfully took the property mentioned in the charge sheet. It is valued at US$626= while property valued at US$560,= was recovered.

The accused appeared before a magistrate and pleaded guilty to both counts. He was duly convicted. The conviction is proper and I hereby confirm it - however, the same cannot be said about the sentence.

After considering mitigating and aggravating factors, the court a quo sentenced the accused as follows:

“Count 1: 18 months imprisonment.

Count 2: 24 months imprisonment of which 4 months are suspended on condition accused restitutes Nzane Muchengeti $66= through the Clerk of Court by 30 January 2016 at 4pm.

Effective 38 months.”

On 2^nd March 2016, I addressed a query to the magistrate in the following terms;

“Why were the two counts not treated as one for purposes of sentence?”

The magistrate responded as follows:

“I refer to the above matter and wish to apologize for an oversight on my part. After also going through S v Chidziva 2009 (2) ZLR 82 I appreciate my error.

May I be guided accordingly.”

It is my fervent hope that the magistrate has not only read but has understood the principles set out in that case. However, I am perturbed by the fact that the court a quo cited the accused's name as Chidziva instead of Chirindo & Ors. Be that as it may, the trial court concedes her error. Unfortunately this is not the only error she made.

Firstly, she misdirected herself when she found as an aggravating factor that the accused “was in a position of trust,” because he “knew what happened at the premises and therefore his moral blameworthiness is high.”

I am not sure I understand what this means.

I suspect, however, that this finding is anchored on the erroneous fact that the accused and the complainant reside at the same place, or, at the very least, that the accused knew the set up at the complainant's home. Assuming this to be the case, it does not put the accused in a position of trust, legally speaking, as he does not owe the complainant a duty of care. The facts reveal that the two are not related and one wonders on what legal basis the accused would be said to be in a position of trust vis-à-vis the complainant's proprietory interests? This finding is a clear misdirection in my view.

Secondly, the court a quo found, again, as an aggravating factor that the accused “broke the locks” to gain entry. This is incorrect in that the facts, as outlined in the Statement of Agreed Facts, indicate that the “accused unlawfully entered the complainant's house through unlocked door without authority.”…,.. This is the other misdirection.

The effect of these misdirections is that the court a quo sentenced the accused on wrong facts and wrong legal principles. While it is appreciated that magistrates in most cases deal with many “plea” cases hurriedly, sight should not be lost of the care and attention they should devote to the question of assessing an appropriate penalty in each case.

In casu, I am at large as regards sentence in view of the misdirections alluded to supra. In assessing an appropriate sentence, I will consider the following mitigating factors;

(a) The accused is a 26 year old family man with two children aged 7 and 2 years respectively;

(b) He is employed as a miner earning $20= per tonne of chrome;

(d) He pleaded guilty to both counts;

(e) Of the total value of stolen property, only property valued at $66= was not recovered;

(f) The accused is a first offender.

As against these mitigating factors, I find the following aggravating circumstances;

(a) Unlawful entry is inherently a serious crime as it violates citizens' privacy and proprietary rights.

(b) The offence is aggravated where theft is then committed in the process like in casu.

At the end of this weighing process, I come to the conclusion that imprisonment is warranted.

In line with the legal principle in S v Chirindo & Ors 2009 (2) ZLR 82, I will sentence the accused as follows:

The sentence imposed by the court a quo be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following sentence;

Both counts as one for sentence - 15 months imprisonment of which 6 months imprisonment is suspended for 5 years on condition accused is not convicted of unlawful entry or dishonesty and for which accused will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine. A further 4 months imprisonment is suspended on condition accused restitutes Nzane Muchengeti the sum of $66= through the Clerk of Court by 31^st May 2016.

Effective 5 months imprisonment.

The court a quo is directed to recall the accused and explain this sentence to him.

HH116-15 : THE STATE vs FELIX PHIRI
Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J and TAGU J

In this case, the sentence imposed was fourteen months, of which four months were suspended for 5 years on condition of good behavior, another four months was suspended on condition of restitution and a six month custodial sentence imposed….,. In the case of S v Simon Ngulube HH48-02, it was emphasized that the sentencing court, in deciding upon the appropriate punishment, must strive ...

In the case of S v Simon Ngulube HH48-02, it was emphasized that the sentencing court, in deciding upon the appropriate punishment, must strive to find a punishment which will fit both the crime and the offender. The sentence must be fair and just instead of excessive, savage and draconian. See 'A Guide to Sentencing in Zimbabwe' by G. FELTOE…,.

The punishment must fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to the State and to the accused, and be blended with a measure of mercy – see Sparks and Another 1972 (3) SA 396 A.

In light of those sentencing principles, it was said to be essential that magistrates should equip themselves with sufficient information in any particular case to enable them to assess sentence humanely and meaningfully and to reach a decision based on fairness and proportion. The needs of the individual and the interests of society should be balanced with care and understanding' - see S v Moyo HH63-84. It was also said that:

“…, pre-sentencing information is very important. Whilst the age, marital and family status, employment, savings and assets are important aspects in the assessment of sentence, magistrates should always bear in mind that the reason why the accused committed the offence and the circumstances of the offence is of equal importance. In some cases, the reason is evident from the facts of the case. In other cases, it is not. In such cases, the magistrates must canvass these aspects with an unrepresented accused. Generally, all the mitigatory and aggravating factors must be canvassed…,.”

The record does not show that the magistrate was aware of the need to canvass aggravatory circumstances, as part of the essential elements of the offence, or even as part of the sentencing procedure….,.

The conviction stands because the trial court satisfied itself that the essential elements of unlawful entry into premises were proved beyond a reasonable doubt and meted out an appropriate sentence.

HH187-15 : THE STATE vs DAVID CHIUDZU
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J and MUSAKWA J

After a full trial, the accused was convicted of the offence and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment which was wholly suspended for five years on condition that he did not, during that period, commit an offence involving dishonesty for which, upon conviction, he would be sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine….,. The other anomaly raised ...

HH220-15 : THE STATE vs EMMSON MOYO
Ruled By: MWAYERA J and TAGU J

The record of proceedings was placed before me for review by the Provincial Head, Mashonaland East Province. The Provincial Head uplifted the record during routine CRB checks.

The accused was convicted on 7 October 2014 of one count of unlawful entry as defined in section 131(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23].

The State adduced evidence to show that the accused was not a first offender.

The trial magistrate did not make an inquiry on whether or not the suspended prison term should be brought into effect. Further, the State did not apply to have the suspended prison term brought into effect. The trial court, in sentencing the accused, brought into effect the suspended prison term.

The accused was not given any chance to give input on the suspended prison term. It is also not clear from the record if the bringing into effect of the suspended prison term was taken as the sentence for the current offence.

The Provincial Head was right in detecting the anomaly and bringing the record for review.

A perusal of the record shows that the accused was not sentenced for the current offence and that the suspended prison term was unprocedurally brought into effect. The prosecutor did not apply for it to be brought into effect and the accused did not give any input on the suspended prison term.

The sentence by the trial court, in the premises, cannot stand as it is irregular. It is set aside. However, given the delays in bringing the matter for review, the court will take judicial notice of the fact that the accused has already finished serving the suspended prison term which was brought into effect; to then seek to further suspend that prison term would not only be prejudicial to the accused but unduly harsh. The suspended sentence has already been served.

The accused was not sentenced for the current offence.

It is our considered view that, given the mitigatory factors on record, and circumstances of the case, a wholly suspended prison term will meet the justice of the case. The accused is sentenced as follows:

One month imprisonment wholly suspended for three years on condition the accused does not within that period commit any offence involving dishonesty for which he is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine.

The accused to be recalled and advised of the suspended sentence.

HMA03-19 : STATE vs JOHANIS MUKWENA
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J and MAWADZE J

An integral part of the adjudication process is the exercise of discretion. It is done judiciously.

Whim, caprice, impulse, irrationality, excitability, emotion, and all the other negative urges or passions of that nature have no role.

There are many instances when the court is called upon to exercise its discretion. But, it is mostly in sentencing, in criminal matters, that that function is so pronounced.

Ordinarily the doctrine of stare decisis ensures, that, like cases are treated alike. In appropriate situations, a precedent set in one case should be followed in all other subsequent cases of a similar nature. But, this is only to a degree. Every case is judged in accordance with the peculiarities of its own facts and circumstances; and strictly speaking, there are no two cases that are exactly alike.

That is why, in sentencing, for example, penalties may differ from case to case despite the similarities on the face of them. It is because of the subtle differences that may exist between seemingly similar cases and the exercise of judicial discretion by the trial court.

Because of that, the Appeal Court or Review Judge, exercises the greatest of restraint before interfering with the decision of the lower court. There are times when the Appeal Court or Review Judge feels that he could have imposed a different penalty from that of the trial court, but, nevertheless, refrains from interfering because of the realisation that the lower court is reposed with the power to exercise its own discretion. Only in instances where the exercise of that discretion by the lower court was not judicious would the Appeal Court or Review Judge interfere.

This particular case is a good example of an injudicious exercise of discretion.

It was an ordinary case of unlawful entry and theft. The accused was 21 years old. He “broke into” the complainant's residence. He did not “break in” in the sense of using force to break down any barrier. He simply pushed open the door and walked in. It was unlocked.

That was Count 1: “Unlawful entry into premises” as defined by section 131(1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] (“the Code”).

Inside the complainant's residence, the accused stole 5 kilogrammes of mealie meal, a pack of potatoes, a t-shirt, and a pair of shorts. The total value of all the items stolen was $53. The short was recovered. It was worth $10. Thus, $43 was the actual value of the prejudice to the complainant.

That was Count 2 of the charge: “Theft” as defined in section 113(1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] (the Code).

The accused pleaded guilty to both counts. He was duly convicted. The conviction is proper. It is hereby confirmed.

On sentence, the trial court took both Counts as one.

The accused was sentenced to 16 months imprisonment; 4 months were suspended for 5 years on the usual condition of good behaviour; a further 2 months were suspended on condition the accused paid the complainant $40 restitution (it should have been $43).

That left him with an effective 10 months imprisonment.

An effective 10 months imprisonment for unlawful entry into premises and theft of items to the value of $53 seemed unduly excessive.

Ordinarily, offenders in similar circumstances escape with community service.

So, the record attracted my attention. I sought to find out what it is that had led the trial court to be so harsh. What could have been the peculiar circumstances of the case?

I found nothing other than plain misdirection by the court. Below are the details.

The accused was a first offender. The trial court made no mention of this.

He was married and had one child. The trial court said nothing about this either.

He was a pushcart operator earning $60 per month on average. His savings or assets amounted to just $15 and 5 goats. Asked why he stole, he said he had no money. Asked where he had put the items that he had stolen, he said he had used/consumed them, but, that he was willing to pay compensation.

By all accounts, the accused was a poor man. He stole the food items to eat. The clothes, he wore them. It was the pair of shorts that gave him away. He was putting them on when he was arrested. He had just been 8 months in the business of cart pushing.

Poverty does not justify crime.

If you are poor and you steal to feed or clothe yourself you are offending. The law will convict you. It will judge you. It will punish you.

But, your sentence should fit you and your crime. That is where judicial discretion comes in. That, partly explains why one sentence in one case may differ from the other in another case seemingly of a similar nature.

It was clear the accused did not steal out of greed or malice. He stole out of need. The problem is that the trial court took no account at all of any of his personal circumstances. Not in the least did it comment on them. So, there is no telling to what extent its sentence was influenced, if at all it was, by the fact that the accused was a first offender; that he had several mouths to feed; that he had pleaded guilty and saved time, and, above all, that he had shown contrition by offering to pay the complainant compensation.

That was part of the misdirection by the court a quo.

The other and more serious misdirection by the court a quo is what it took into account in arriving at the sentence.

Without commenting on the personal circumstances of the accused, the trial court went straight to express what should amount to its personal prejudices or whims. It said:

“The offence of unlawful entry is a threat to the security of home owners. Burglars are dangerous criminals. For unlawful entry, even first offenders can be sent to imprisonment. It's an offence which takes so much courage to commit. The complainant lost $40 worth of goods. It was only out of good fortune that he lost less. But, this does not take away the fact that accused must be sent to jail.”

The next bit of the court's judgment is rather shocking.

The accused was sent to prison because the court thought the approaching festive season would be so tempting for him as to re-offend. It said:

“The approach of [the] festive season is a time where most homes will be left unattended. During the festive season, the accused must be away from the neighbourhood. The court simply feels imprisonment is the most appropriate sentence.”

There is no principle like that.

It was wrong for the court to allow itself to be influenced by such a consideration, especially given, that, neither had there been any evidence of such placed before it, nor of the prosecutor having made such a submission.

Ordinarily, community service is to be considered in appropriate cases where the court imposes an effective prison term of 24 months or less.

The court a quo did consider it.

But, it ruled against it for reasons alien to precedence. The court thought community service is for immature juvenile offenders only. It said:

“I would have considered community service had the accused been 18–19yrs old. At the age of 21, the accused could not be said to be immature.”

That was wrong.

Community service is not determined by the age of the offender. Courts should follow precedence.

In conclusion, the court went back to its favourite theme of the approaching festive season. It said:

“The court has also taken note of the prevalence of the offence in this district. Deterrence is called for. Accused must be removed from society during this festive so that homes and homeowners property are safe; the accused may repeat offend during this festive season which is a tempting period for burglars.”

The wrongness of such an approach sticks out. There is no need to belabour the point. It is hoped the court a quo learns something from this.

Its sentence in this matter has to be quashed.

Even the sixteen months was excessive to begin with.

Admittedly, Count 1 (unlawful entry into premises) was committed in aggravating circumstances in the sense, that, the accused entered a dwelling house (section 131(1)(a) of the Code, as read with subsection (2)(a)) and that he committed some other crime, theft (section 131(1)(a) of the Code, as read with subsection (2)(e)).

The Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (the Code) prescribes a sentence of a fine not exceeding level thirteen ($3,000), or not exceeding twice the value of any property stolen, destroyed, or damaged by the accused (in this case, $43), whichever is the greater; or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years, or both.

For Count 2 (theft), the prescribed penalty is a fine not exceeding level 14 ($5,000), or, twice the value of the property stolen, whichever is the greater, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 25 years (section 113(1) of the Code).

However, the court is empowered to suspend the whole or any part of the sentence of imprisonment on condition that the accused restores the property stolen by him or pays the complainant compensation.

In its discretion, the court a quo treated the two Counts as one for the purposes of sentence. It could properly do that.

Admittedly, the top ends of the prescribed penalties for both of these offences are very heavy. But, that is to cater for all the possible ranges of unlawful entry and theft.

Prison should not have entered the court's mind.

One cardinal principle of sentencing is to keep first offenders out of jail where possible, especially youthful ones such as the accused was.

And, as pointed out above, the court had the discretion to suspend the whole of the sentence for theft on condition of restitution.

Furthermore, where a statute allows the payment of a fine for an offence should be the starting point for the court.

Having combined the two Counts for the purposes of sentence, and given the value involved, and given all the other mitigating circumstances such as the accused's age; his family responsibilities; the fact that he pleaded guilty; that he was a first offender; and the contrition that he showed, the appropriate sentence should have been no more than 6 months imprisonment, with 3 suspended on condition of good behaviour, 2 suspended on condition of restitution and the remaining 1 month converted to community service.

Up to the time of this judgment, the accused had already served a month of his sentence. He should be entitled to his immediate release.

In the circumstances, it is hereby ordered and directed as follows:

(i) The conviction of the accused is hereby confirmed.

(ii) The sentence of the court a quo is hereby quashed and substituted with 6 months imprisonment, of which 3 months imprisonment is suspended for 5 years on condition that within that period, the accused is not convicted of an offence involving unlawful entry into premises, or dishonesty for which upon conviction he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine. A further 2 months imprisonment is suspended on condition that the accused pays the complainant restitution in the sum of $43 within 30 days of the date of this judgment.

(iii) Having already served one month of the prison sentence, the accused is entitled to his immediate release.

(iv) The court a quo is hereby directed to summon the accused and put into effect the aforesaid altered sentence.

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Law Portal
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Sentencing re: Unlawful Entry, Aggravated Unlawful Entry, Housebreaking and Criminal Trespass

HB16-09 : THE STATE vs TICHAWANDA FAMABI
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HB16-09 : THE STATE vs TICHAWANDA FAMABI
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HH83-09 : THE STATE vs MORISHA MAHOVE & ANOR AND ELEVEN OTHER MATTERS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and KUDYA J

HH83-09 : THE STATE vs MORISHA MAHOVE & ANOR AND ELEVEN OTHER MATTERS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and KUDYA J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HB88-09 : ALBERT COSTA CHATIRA vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J

HB31-11 : MPHOKUHLE NCUBE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HH242-10 : THE STATE vs WALTER GARANEWAKO
Ruled By: MUTEMA J

HB92-10 : INNOCENT CHIVERE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHEDA J and NDOU J

HB96-10 : THE STATE vs INNOCENT NGWENYA
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

HB108-10 : EMMANUEL MURAMBIWA vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHEDA J and MATHONSI J

HB121-10 : THE STATE vs INKEN NYAMAHA
Ruled By: CHEDA J

HB04-13 : JORAM NGWENYA and CLEOPAS MOYO vs FADZAI MTHOMBENI N.O. and THE STATE
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

HB51-13 : TAFADZWA RAWURA vs GLORIA TAKUNDWA N.O. and THE STATE
Ruled By: MAKONESE J

HB78-11 : DENNIS DUBE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HB177-11 : THE STATE vs WATMORE CHARUMA
Ruled By: CHEDA J and NDOU J

HH293-14 : THE STATE vs OLAUSHEAS JOHN MAIMBA
Ruled By: MAWADZE J and TAGU J

HMA15-17 : THE STATE vs MUNDONDO ZAVA
Ruled By: MAWADZE J and MAFUSIRE J

HB113-16 : THE STATE vs MATHIAS MUNIKWA
Ruled By: TAKUVA J and MOYO J

HH116-15 : THE STATE vs FELIX PHIRI
Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J and TAGU J

HH187-15 : THE STATE vs DAVID CHIUDZU
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J and MUSAKWA J

HH220-15 : THE STATE vs EMMSON MOYO
Ruled By: MWAYERA J and TAGU J

HMA03-19 : STATE vs JOHANIS MUKWENA
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J and MAWADZE J

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Law Portal Zimbabwe

Sentencing re: Unlawful Entry, Aggravated Unlawful Entry, Housebreaking and Criminal Trespass

HB16-09 : THE STATE vs TICHAWANDA FAMABI Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HB16-09 : THE STATE vs TICHAWANDA FAMABI Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HH83-09 : THE STATE vs MORISHA MAHOVE & ANOR AND ELEVEN OTHER MATTERS Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and KUDYA J

HH83-09 : THE STATE vs MORISHA MAHOVE & ANOR AND ELEVEN OTHER MATTERS Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and KUDYA J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HB88-09 : ALBERT COSTA CHATIRA vs THE STATE Ruled By: NDOU J

HB31-11 : MPHOKUHLE NCUBE vs THE STATE Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HH242-10 : THE STATE vs WALTER GARANEWAKO Ruled By: MUTEMA J

HB92-10 : INNOCENT CHIVERE vs THE STATE Ruled By: CHEDA J and NDOU J

HB96-10 : THE STATE vs INNOCENT NGWENYA Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

HB108-10 : EMMANUEL MURAMBIWA vs THE STATE Ruled By: CHEDA J and MATHONSI J

HB121-10 : THE STATE vs INKEN NYAMAHA Ruled By: CHEDA J

HB04-13 : JORAM NGWENYA and CLEOPAS MOYO vs FADZAI MTHOMBENI N.O. and THE STATE Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

HB51-13 : TAFADZWA RAWURA vs GLORIA TAKUNDWA N.O. and THE STATE Ruled By: MAKONESE J

HB78-11 : DENNIS DUBE vs THE STATE Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HB177-11 : THE STATE vs WATMORE CHARUMA Ruled By: CHEDA J and NDOU J

HH293-14 : THE STATE vs OLAUSHEAS JOHN MAIMBA Ruled By: MAWADZE J and TAGU J

HMA15-17 : THE STATE vs MUNDONDO ZAVA Ruled By: MAWADZE J and MAFUSIRE J

HB113-16 : THE STATE vs MATHIAS MUNIKWA Ruled By: TAKUVA J and MOYO J

HH116-15 : THE STATE vs FELIX PHIRI Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J and TAGU J

HH187-15 : THE STATE vs DAVID CHIUDZU Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J and MUSAKWA J

HH220-15 : THE STATE vs EMMSON MOYO Ruled By: MWAYERA J and TAGU J

HMA03-19 : STATE vs JOHANIS MUKWENA Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J and MAWADZE J

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Law Portal
Zimbabwe

HB16-09 : THE STATE vs TICHAWANDA FAMABI
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HB16-09 : THE STATE vs TICHAWANDA FAMABI
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HH83-09 : THE STATE vs MORISHA MAHOVE & ANOR AND ELEVEN OTHER MATTERS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and KUDYA J

HH83-09 : THE STATE vs MORISHA MAHOVE & ANOR AND ELEVEN OTHER MATTERS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and KUDYA J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HH87-09 : THE STATE vs STANDRECH CHIRINDA AND MUKETIWA MUNEMO AND LANGTON MUROZVI AND PETER GUNURA CHASARA
Ruled By: UCHENA J and BHUNU J

HB88-09 : ALBERT COSTA CHATIRA vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J

HB31-11 : MPHOKUHLE NCUBE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HH242-10 : THE STATE vs WALTER GARANEWAKO
Ruled By: MUTEMA J

HB92-10 : INNOCENT CHIVERE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHEDA J and NDOU J

HB96-10 : THE STATE vs INNOCENT NGWENYA
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

HB108-10 : EMMANUEL MURAMBIWA vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHEDA J and MATHONSI J

HB121-10 : THE STATE vs INKEN NYAMAHA
Ruled By: CHEDA J

HB04-13 : JORAM NGWENYA and CLEOPAS MOYO vs FADZAI MTHOMBENI N.O. and THE STATE
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

HB51-13 : TAFADZWA RAWURA vs GLORIA TAKUNDWA N.O. and THE STATE
Ruled By: MAKONESE J

HB78-11 : DENNIS DUBE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: NDOU J and CHEDA J

HB177-11 : THE STATE vs WATMORE CHARUMA
Ruled By: CHEDA J and NDOU J

HH293-14 : THE STATE vs OLAUSHEAS JOHN MAIMBA
Ruled By: MAWADZE J and TAGU J

HMA15-17 : THE STATE vs MUNDONDO ZAVA
Ruled By: MAWADZE J and MAFUSIRE J

HB113-16 : THE STATE vs MATHIAS MUNIKWA
Ruled By: TAKUVA J and MOYO J

HH116-15 : THE STATE vs FELIX PHIRI
Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J and TAGU J

HH187-15 : THE STATE vs DAVID CHIUDZU
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J and MUSAKWA J

HH220-15 : THE STATE vs EMMSON MOYO
Ruled By: MWAYERA J and TAGU J

HMA03-19 : STATE vs JOHANIS MUKWENA
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J and MAWADZE J