The
appellant was convicted for contravening section 114 of the Criminal
Law (Codification
and Reform) Act [Chapter
9:23],
on 14 February 2013, and sentenced to the minimum mandatory sentence
of nine (9) years after the learned presiding magistrate found no
special circumstances to warrant a lesser sentence.
This
appeal is against both conviction and sentence.
In
his notice of appeal the ...
The
appellant was convicted for contravening section 114 of the Criminal
Law (Codification
and Reform) Act [Chapter
9:23],
on 14 February 2013, and sentenced to the minimum mandatory sentence
of nine (9) years after the learned presiding magistrate found no
special circumstances to warrant a lesser sentence.
This
appeal is against both conviction and sentence.
In
his notice of appeal the appellant has laid basically three grounds
of appeal, viz;
(i)
That the learned magistrate failed to appreciate the existence of the
defence of mistake or ignorance of 'facts', whatever was
intended.
(ii)
The second ground of appeal is given as that the learned magistrate
misdirected himself when he convicted the accused person when such
conviction was not supported by evidence.
(iii)
Finally, it was contended that the court a
quo
misdirected itself by failing to give reasons for the conviction of
the appellant.
As
regards sentence, the point taken is that the learned magistrate
grossly misdirected himself in that he failed to adequately and
properly explain the issue of special circumstances before the
appellant was sentenced.
The
learned magistrate was also attacked on his sentence for allegedly
paying lip service to the appellant's issues in mitigation, and, in
particular, in failing to properly explain the issue of special
circumstances before sentence.
The
respondent's position is that the conviction cannot be faulted and
that it need not be interfered with.
It
is on sentence that the respondent felt constrained to support it.
Counsel for the respondent felt that there was merit in the argument
that no special circumstances were explained to the appellant. The
respondent suggested that this court considers the remittal of the
case back to the court a
quo
for purposes of having the issue of special circumstances further
canvassed.
It
might well be true that at the time the appellant's counsel perused
the court record the written reasons were not there but I find it
inconceivable that the appellant's counsel would have come to the
conclusion that when the magistrate convicted the appellant he just
did that with no reasons at all.
In
any event, the proper procedure to have adopted if indeed there were
no reasons for judgment would have been for the appellants counsel to
file an application for review for such a procedural irregularity. An
appeal could only have been an attack on the reasons for judgement,
which, incidentally, the appellant's counsel did which pre-supposes
that there must have been reasons somewhere which led to the framing
of the grounds of appeal.
The
irony is that the reasons for judgement given by the learned
magistrate properly fit into the evidence that was led at trial
making it highly improbable for one to imagine that those reasons
were manufactured or created after the conviction of the appellant.
The
judgment, as crafted by the learned magistrate, clearly shows that
the appellant crucified himself by projecting himself as the owner of
the complainant's beast to whoever he interacted with.
According
to the evidence of Evson Chakamba, it was the appellant who
personally approached him to hire his motor vehicle to ferry the
beast forming the subject matter of these proceedings.
The
appellant disclosed to the witness that he wanted to sell the beast
to T.M. Supermarket, but, somehow, the slaughtered animal ended up
being taken to Dzonzai Butchery. No meaningful challenge was given to
the evidence of this witness, meaning the appellant was substantially
in agreement with the evidence of this witness.
The
evidence of Blessing Chakamba corroborated that of his father Evson
Chakamba in all material respects in further cementing the guilt of
the appellant.
The
young man's uncontroverted evidence was that the appellant claimed
ownership of the beats which was subsequently slaughtered at the
abattoir before the carcass was taken to Dzonzai Butchery in
Chipinge. The witness confirmed that, throughout, the appellant was
firmly in charge of the beast.
The
witness further disclosed to the presiding magistrate that throughout
his interaction with the appellant, the appellant disclosed that the
beast was his. Not only that but that the appellant personally
exhibited fake clearance papers for the animal.
The
learned magistrate made a very careful analysis of the evidence that
was presented including the rejection of the evidence by the
appellant where he attempted to paint the picture that the animal
belonged to his accomplice.
In
my view, the learned magistrate's finding on the guilt of the
appellant was beyond reproach. It cannot be faulted and need not be
interfered with by this court.
The
guilt of the appellant did not even need one to invoke the provisions
of sections 205 and 206 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform)
Act [Chapter
9:23].
This is so because all indications are that the attempted disowning
of the beasts,
which only assumed prominence during the defence case, must have been
an after-thought. This explains why this was not suggested to
witnesses who actually dealt directly with the appellant. If indeed
the beast belonged to his brother, as he stated in his Defence
Outline, he would have disclosed this to all the witnesses he dealt
with....,.
Accordingly,
the conviction is confirmed...,.
