Criminal
Appeal (Reasons for Judgment)
MUZENDA
J:
On
22 January 2020 we dismissed the appeal in this matter after hearing
counsel and indicated that our reasons would follow; these are they.
On
15 July 2019 the appellant was convicted and sentenced to 10 years
imprisonment for contravening section 89(4)(b) of the Post and
Telecommunication Act [Chapter
12:05],
it being alleged that on 6 December 2018 and near PG Safety Glass
Workshop, along Vhumba Road, Mutare, appellant without lawful cause
cut and stole 20.06 kilogrammes of underground telecommunications
line belonging to or used by a communication licence holder.
Secondly
appellant was also convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment
which was to run concurrently with the ten years in count one for
contravening section 40(1) of the Criminal Law (Codification and
Reform) Act, [Chapter
9:23]
for possession of articles for criminal use, the state alleged that
on 14 December 2018 at house No. 6 Lister Road, Hospital Hill,
Mutare, the appellant without lawful excuse had in his custody or
possession articles for criminal use in theft that is 2 bolt cutters,
hacksaws, 1 unfunctional pellet gun and an electric shocker.
The
appellant noted an appeal against both conviction and sentence in
Count 1.
He
outlined the grounds of appeal thus:
“1.
Ad
Conviction
1.1
The Learned Trial Magistrate erred and misdirected herself at law
when she accepted the evidence of Christopher Tsuro an accomplice
witness who testified without being warned in terms of the law.
1.2
The Learned Trial Magistrate further erred and misdirected herself at
law and fact when she convicted the appellant on circumstantial
evidence which was susceptible of many deductive and possible
inference.
1.3
The Learned Magistrate further erred and misdirected herself when she
accepted the evidence of Detective Mavhengere in as far as it related
to the search and recovery of items from No. 6 Lister Road Hospital
Hill, Mutare. The search and seizure was undoubtedly without warrant
and was in clear violation of the law and the appellant's rights.
1.4
The Learned Magistrate further erred and misdirected herself when she
convicted the appellant when it was clear from objective evidence
that appellant had not “wilfully damaged or interfered with the
telecommunication lines and apparatus.”
2.
Ad Sentence
2.1
The Learned Magistrate erred and misdirected herself when she failed
to interrogate or investigate the existence or otherwise of special
circumstances.
2.2
The Learned Magistrate further erred and misdirected herself when she
failed to accept and recognise the existence of special circumstances
in the case. In particular, among other things the mere fact that
appellant was an accessory after the fact was sufficient to find the
existence of special circumstances.
2.3
The Learned Magistrate, further erred and misdirected herself when
she totally injudiciously forgot and ignored sentencing the appellant
for his conviction on count two.”
Facts
On
6 December 2018, near PG Safety Glass Workshop, along Vhumba Road,
Mutare the appellant in the company of three other outstanding
accomplices, used a bolt cutter, cut and stole about 58 metres of
underground telecommunication copper cables.
Appellant
proceeded to hire Christopher Tsuro's motor vehicle which he
directed to the same to ferry the stolen cables.
Upon
arrival at the scene, the appellant and his accomplices loaded the
cables into the boot of the vehicle.
They
were disturbed by the passer-by and left some of the stolen cables at
the scene.
The
appellant ferried the cables to No. 6 Lister Road, Hospital Hill,
Mutare.
On
the same date detectives recovered 4 x 2 metres of black copper
cables which were left by the appellant at the scene.
Christopher
Tsuro led the detectives to the appellant's residential house and
found appellant inside the house.
The
detective made a search inside appellant's house and recovered 3
small pieces of copper wire, 2 bolt cutters, 1 shifting spanner, 1
spanner and 2 weighing scales.
The
detectives also recovered shells of red and black telecommunication
copper cables packed in one blue and white sack which were placed on
the backyard of the rented house.
The
recovered cables were weighed at Zimpost and weighed 20.06kgs. The
value of the stolen telecommunication cables was given as $2,500-00
and cables value at $400-00 were recovered.
According
to the appellant's defence outline, he denied wilfully damaging,
interfering or stealing the telecommunication lines and apparatus. He
stated that he did not have knowledge about the alleged damage, theft
or interference.
He
only received a call from one Courage to find a taxi so that Courage
would ferry his property home. Courage never revealed to appellant on
what exactly the property was.
He
denied being in possession of the stolen cables.
On
count two of possession of articles of criminal use, he stated that
they did not belong to him and hence was not in possession of those
articles. There were so many people who resided at No. 6 Lister Road,
so it might be possible that one of those people might be the owner
of the articles.
On
the date of hearing Mr Nldovu
for the appellant submitted that the trial court erred and
misdirected itself when it accepted the evidence of Christopher
Tsuro, whom the defence labels an accomplice witness in terms of
section 267 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act and such
failure to do so by a Magistrate would amount to a misdirection and
consequently should lead to a conviction being set aside by an appeal
court.
A
number of cases
were cited by appellant's counsel to move the court to decide on
the aspect of failure by a trial court to warn a suspect witness.
Christopher
Tsuro was the driver of the Honda Fit, the taxi, which was hired to
ferry the cables by the appellant.
When
Tsuro led the detectives to the appellant, the State chose to
exonerate him and made him its witness who provided a link between
the cables and the appellant.
A
taxi driver provided transport to his clients and like an ambulance
driver his task is endowed with confidentiality and privacy in
protecting his stainless customers, but where a customer is
implicated in a criminal activity, the taxi driver has a noble duty
to assist the State in resolving an investigation.
The
appellant upon his arrangement did not implicate the taxi driver, he
confirmed Christpher Tsuro's version about the hiring of the Honda
Fit by the appellant to ferry the luggage to its destination.
We
cannot therefore describe Christopher Tsuro as an accomplice and we
are satisfied that there was no legal basis by the court a
quo
to warn Christopher as an accomplice witness.
The
appellant further submitted that the trial court erred and
misdirected herself at law and fact when it convicted the appellant
on the basis of circumstantial evidence when it was clear from the
objective evidence that appellant had not wilfully damaged or
interfered with the telecommunication lines and apparatus.
Appellant
added that there was no link between the recovered cables and the
cables from the scene of the theft, or alternatively with the cables
which were damaged or vandalised. There was no witness who was called
by the State to state that he saw appellant cutting off the cables.
The
argument by the appellant is speculative in our view.
Christopher
Tsuro told the court what happened on the day in question, he was
hired to go with the appellant to the place where the cables were
loaded. The appellant actively assisted his colleagues and paid for
the hire, he used the money from his pocket, when the taxi driver
demanded a top up, appellant paid him $9-00 more.
When
the detectives were led to the appellant's residence they found the
cut cables which were positively identified by an officer from
Tel-One.
Appellant
had in his possession all tools akin to the cutting and weighing of
cables for sale. The logical reasoning by the Learned Magistrate
pertaining to this aspect is beyond reproach in our view.
Indeed
circumstantial evidence in this case was conclusive and the only
reasonable inference in the circumstances pointed to the appellant
having damaged the telecommunications cables, packed them in sacks,
hired a taxi and transported them to his house, this conclusion is
not detached from the proven facts highlighted herein above and we
are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the inference was properly
reached by the trial court.
Ground
number 3 of the appellant's notice of appeal attacked the search
and seizure of the cables and tools as being in violation of the law
and appellant's rights.
However
during arguments on appeal, the appellant wittingly or deliberately
abandoned that line of argument, had he pursued it, we could have
also canvassed it in our judgment.
We
take it that failure to pursue the ground of appeal means the
appellant was no longer desirous of pursuing it. We deem it
abandoned.
As
regards the aspect of sentence, ground number 7 of appellant's
notice of appeal states that the trial court erred and misdirected
itself when she totally injudiciously forgot and ignored sentencing
the appellant for his conviction on count two.
During
the hearing of the appeal Mr Ndlovu
was asked by the court whether he was still pursuing the appeal
vis-a-vis
count two, he confirmed that he was not.
This
would remain with the question whether special circumstances exist in
this case which would enable the trial court to avoid the mandatory
sentence of 10 years.
The
appellant contended that the fact that he was an accessory after the
fact was sufficient to find special circumstances.
No
other aspect was advanced by the appellant's counsel to constitute
a special circumstance and we have carefully examined the record of
proceedings more particularly on the issue of special circumstances,
we were unable to find any.
Even
during hearing of the appeal appellant could not substantiate any
that would amount to special circumstance. Hence we do not see any
perceived misdirection at the instance of the court a
quo
on the issue of sentence.
Accordingly
the following order is granted:
The
appeals against both conviction and sentence are dismissed.
MWAYERA
J agrees ____________________
Gonese
& Ndlovu,
appellant's legal practitioners
National
Prosecuting Authority,
respondent's legal practitioners
1.
S v Ngara 1987 (1) ZLR (1) 91; The State v Malinga 1963 (1) A 692
(AD); R v Simakonda 1956 REN 463 (SR); S v Chouhan 1986 (2) ZLR 237
(S)