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HH397-15 - THE STATE vs JAMES MADZOGO and DANIEL MANYERE and GEORGE NYAMAYARO and HERBERT HWEMBA and TICHAONA HWEMBA

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Procedural Law-viz application for discharge re section 198 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].
Procedural Law-viz rules of construction re peremptory provision iro use of the word "shall".
Procedural Law-viz rules of interpretation re mandatory provision iro use of the word "shall".
Murder-viz mob assault re the doctrine of common purpose.
Murder-viz multiple assailants re the doctrine of common purpose.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re direct evidence iro eye witness evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re State Outline iro disparities between witness statements and oral evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re State Summary iro inconsistencies between witness statements and viva voce evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re evidence of identification.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re disparities between witness statements and oral evidence iro the presumption of clarity of events nearer the date of the event.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re inconsistencies between witness statements and viva voce evidence iro the presumption of clarity of events nearer the date of the event.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re witness statements iro the presumption of clarity of events nearer the date of the event.

Rules of Construction or Interpretation re: Approach, Inconsistencies Between Statutes & Ambiguous Provisions


Section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] which provides that:

“(3) If, at the close of the case for the prosecution, the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty.”

The section is couched in peremptory terms making it mandatory for the Court to find the accused not guilty and acquitted if, at the close of the State case, there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other competent verdict or offence arising from that charge.

Application for Discharge, Evidential Deficit, Evidence Indicative of a Permissible Verdict & Prima Facie Concept


The third accused, George Nyamayaro, stands charged with murder together with four (4) others. He now applies for discharge at the close of the State case in terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] which provides that:

“(3) If, at the close of the case for the prosecution, the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty.”

The section is couched in peremptory terms making it mandatory for the Court to find the accused not guilty and acquitted if, at the close of the State case, there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other competent verdict or offence arising from that charge.

The section has received wide interpretation through the cases such that there is no longer any controversy regarding the meaning and import of the section.

The meaning and import of the section, as determined through the cases, is that where, at the close of the State case, the court finds that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other offence arising from that charge the court has no option but to acquit the accused.

The circumstances under which an accused person may be entitled to acquittal, as a matter of right, by operation of law, at the close of the State case are wide and varied but have been summarized as follows:

1. Where there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence – Attorney General v Bvuma & Another 1987 (2) ZLR 96 (S)...,.;

2. Where there is no evidence on which a reasonable Court, acting carefully, might properly convict – Attorney General v Mzizi 1991 (2) ZLR 321; and

3. Where the evidence adduced on behalf of the State is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable Court could safely act on it – Attorney General v Tarwireyi 1997 (1) ZLR 575 (S)...,.

Having summarised the applicable law, I now turn to consider the facts giving rise to the charge.

The facts surrounding the alleged murder are by and large common cause. The undisputed facts are that on 4 August 2012 the five accused persons were drinking beer in the company of the deceased, Gidion Jonasi, and his nephew, inside Chiwandamira Bottle Store at Chizanga Business Centre, Murehwa.

As they were drinking beer, the first accused picked up a quarrel with the deceased's nephew, William Chirenje, and threatened to assault him. The deceased intervened to save his nephew whereupon the first accused and his co-accused turned on the deceased and attacked him instead. They are alleged to have struck him with booted feet and fists. They dragged him out of the bottle store onto the veranda where they continued to assault him. The deceased was then dragged away to some secluded place from where the five (5) accused returned after about an hour.

The group that had been attacking the deceased came back after about an hour and left in a commuter omnibus driven by the fourth accused.

The State called three (3) eyewitnesses to the assault that is alleged to have resulted in the deceased's death. The first State witness, Farai Munanairi, testified that he was in the bottle store when the fight broke out. He saw the first, second, fourth and fifth accused persons attacking the accused in the manner alleged by the State. He however denied ever seeing the third accused at the scene of the crime. Although in his statement to the police he implicated the third accused and professed having seen him at the scene participating in the attack in his viva voce evidence in court he made an about turn and alleged that he had been influenced by the evidence of other witnesses.

The second State witness, Silas Gandiwa, was an eye-witness to the alleged murder. It was his testimony that on the night in question he was at Chiwandamira Bottle Store. He knows all the five (5) accused persons as they live in the same village. He grew up with the third accused in the same village. He has known the third accused for about 40 years. This is what he had to say in his own words:

“From where I was I could see what was happening. That was clearly visible. As second accused was grabbing the deceased others joined in, grabbed him, and dragged him to the veranda. I saw 5 people there and I recognised them.

The third accused was present but I did not witness the role that he played.

I saw five (5) people pushing the deceased onto the veranda. There was James, Daniel, Tichaona, Herbert and George (i.e. third accused). George was not pushing the deceased but he was present at the veranda. He was accompanying his colleagues who were mobbing the deceased. I do not know exactly what he was doing....,.

I did not witness third accused assaulting the deceased. I saw him when he was standing at the veranda but I did not witness the specific role that he played in assaulting the deceased.”

Under cross-examination by counsel for the third accused this is what the witness had to say:

“Q. When you got to the bottle store did you see the third accused?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was he?

A. In the bottle store.

Q. Where?

A. He was drinking beer and dancing.

Q. When the fight started was he involved?

A. I did not see him participate but he was amongst the group.

Q. In your statement you include third accused in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. Why did you include him?

A. Because he was amongst the group and he went out onto the veranda.

Q. Paragraph 9 of your statement. (Read).

A. They were surrounding him.

Q. Was it your evidence that third accused was part of the people who dragged the deceased out of the bottle store and is one of them who was holding and restraining him from escaping?

A. Yes, he was amongst them.

Q. Which part of the deceased was he holding?

A. I did not see but he was amongst them.

Q. Was he amongst the mob or people holding the deceased?

A. He was amongst the people holding the deceased.

Q. In your evidence in chief you said Accused 3 was amongst the mob but now you say he was among the people who were holding the deceased?

A. He was among the people holding the deceased.

Q. I put it to you that Accused 3 helped to restrain Tichaona from assaulting the deceased by holding his hands.

A. On that point, I do not know whether he was restraining or assisting Tichaona to assault the deceased.”

Shepard Gandiwa, one of the fellow villagers who was in the bottle store when the fight broke out, confirmed that the third accused was in the bottle store and was part of the mob that surrounded and dragged the deceased onto the veranda when the fight broke out. He confirmed that the third accused, and his co-accused, dragged the deceased from the veranda into the darkness from which they returned some time later and drove away in a kombi omnibus. His evidence to this effect reads:

“We first heard James shouting that he was now going to deal with Gidion since he was involving himself in the matter. We then saw James assaulting Gidion. He assaulted him with a fist on the chest.

His colleagues then started pushing Gidion onto the veranda. The five of them were dragging him. They were pushing him.

Accused 2 was standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything.

Accused 3 was just standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything apart from surrounding the deceased.”

Although the first State witness, Farai Munanairi, did not see the third accused at the scene, the accused himself does not deny having been present at the scene during the fracas. It is therefore common cause that he was present at the scene actively participating in the fracas. He was not just an ordinary bystander but an active participant in the brawl.

The only point of departure is whether or not his involvement was that of a peace-maker or an accomplice.

There are two independent eyewitnesses, Silas Gandiwa and Shepard Gandiwa, who gave evidence directly linking the accused to the commission of the offence. They both gave evidence to the effect that the third accused actively participated in the common design and purpose of his co-accused to assault the deceased for restraining the first accused from assaulting the deceased's nephew, William Chirenje. It is that assault which allegedly led to the deceased's death. Their combined evidence is to the effect that he helped to push the deceased onto the veranda and prevented him from escaping.

The State has sought to rely on the doctrine of common purpose in linking the applicant to the commission of the offence.

It is trite that the doctrine of common purpose renders a socius criminis, that is to say, a person who associates himself with the criminal conduct of another, criminally liable for the crime of the principal offender.

All what it needs for the State to discharge its onus of proof is that the accused associated himself with the criminal conduct of another in furtherance of a common purpose to commit a crime. It is not necessary for the State to prove the specific act the accomplice performed in fulfilment of the common purpose and design to commit the crime. The common purpose need not have been premeditated. It can arise at the spur of the moment depending on the circumstances of each case. See S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868.

In this case, the State went beyond merely proving that the applicant was a mere spectator or peacemaker when the crime was being committed by adducing believable evidence to the effect that he aided and abated the commission of the assault which caused the deceased's death. For that reason, this court comes to the unanimous decision that the applicant has a case to answer. He is liable to explain his conduct on the day in question as he interacted and associated with his alleged accomplices during the events leading to the deceased's death.

It is accordingly ordered that the application for discharge at the close of the State case be and is hereby dismissed.

Murder re: Mob Assault, Multiple Assailants or Murder By a Group


The third accused, George Nyamayaro, stands charged with murder together with four (4) others. He now applies for discharge at the close of the State case in terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] which provides that:

“(3) If, at the close of the case for the prosecution, the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty.”

The section is couched in peremptory terms making it mandatory for the Court to find the accused not guilty and acquitted if, at the close of the State case, there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other competent verdict or offence arising from that charge.

The section has received wide interpretation through the cases such that there is no longer any controversy regarding the meaning and import of the section. 

The meaning and import of the section, as determined through the cases, is that where, at the close of the State case, the court finds that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other offence arising from that charge the court has no option but to acquit the accused.

The circumstances under which an accused person may be entitled to acquittal, as a matter of right, by operation of law, at the close of the State case are wide and varied but have been summarized as follows:

1. Where there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence – Attorney General v Bvuma & Another 1987 (2) ZLR 96 (S)...,.;

2. Where there is no evidence on which a reasonable Court, acting carefully, might properly convict – Attorney General v Mzizi 1991 (2) ZLR 321; and

3. Where the evidence adduced on behalf of the State is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable Court could safely act on it – Attorney General v Tarwireyi 1997 (1) ZLR 575 (S)...,.

Having summarised the applicable law, I now turn to consider the facts giving rise to the charge.

The facts surrounding the alleged murder are by and large common cause. The undisputed facts are that on 4 August 2012 the five accused persons were drinking beer in the company of the deceased, Gidion Jonasi, and his nephew, inside Chiwandamira Bottle Store at Chizanga Business Centre, Murehwa.

As they were drinking beer, the first accused picked up a quarrel with the deceased's nephew, William Chirenje, and threatened to assault him. The deceased intervened to save his nephew whereupon the first accused and his co-accused turned on the deceased and attacked him instead. They are alleged to have struck him with booted feet and fists. They dragged him out of the bottle store onto the veranda where they continued to assault him. The deceased was then dragged away to some secluded place from where the five (5) accused returned after about an hour.

The group that had been attacking the deceased came back after about an hour and left in a commuter omnibus driven by the fourth accused.

The State called three (3) eyewitnesses to the assault that is alleged to have resulted in the deceased's death. The first State witness, Farai Munanairi, testified that he was in the bottle store when the fight broke out. He saw the first, second, fourth and fifth accused persons attacking the accused in the manner alleged by the State. He however denied ever seeing the third accused at the scene of the crime. Although in his statement to the police he implicated the third accused and professed having seen him at the scene participating in the attack in his viva voce evidence in court he made an about turn and alleged that he had been influenced by the evidence of other witnesses.

The second State witness, Silas Gandiwa, was an eye-witness to the alleged murder. It was his testimony that on the night in question he was at Chiwandamira Bottle Store. He knows all the five (5) accused persons as they live in the same village. He grew up with the third accused in the same village. He has known the third accused for about 40 years. This is what he had to say in his own words:

“From where I was I could see what was happening. That was clearly visible. As second accused was grabbing the deceased others joined in, grabbed him, and dragged him to the veranda. I saw 5 people there and I recognised them.

The third accused was present but I did not witness the role that he played.

I saw five (5) people pushing the deceased onto the veranda. There was James, Daniel, Tichaona, Herbert and George (i.e. third accused). George was not pushing the deceased but he was present at the veranda. He was accompanying his colleagues who were mobbing the deceased. I do not know exactly what he was doing....,.

I did not witness third accused assaulting the deceased. I saw him when he was standing at the veranda but I did not witness the specific role that he played in assaulting the deceased.”

Under cross-examination by counsel for the third accused this is what the witness had to say:

“Q. When you got to the bottle store did you see the third accused?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was he?

A. In the bottle store.

Q. Where?

A. He was drinking beer and dancing.

Q. When the fight started was he involved?

A. I did not see him participate but he was amongst the group.

Q. In your statement you include third accused in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. Why did you include him?

A. Because he was amongst the group and he went out onto the veranda.

Q. Paragraph 9 of your statement. (Read).

A. They were surrounding him.

Q. Was it your evidence that third accused was part of the people who dragged the deceased out of the bottle store and is one of them who was holding and restraining him from escaping?

A. Yes, he was amongst them.

Q. Which part of the deceased was he holding?

A. I did not see but he was amongst them.

Q. Was he amongst the mob or people holding the deceased?

A. He was amongst the people holding the deceased.

Q. In your evidence in chief you said Accused 3 was amongst the mob but now you say he was among the people who were holding the deceased?

A. He was among the people holding the deceased.

Q. I put it to you that Accused 3 helped to restrain Tichaona from assaulting the deceased by holding his hands.

A. On that point, I do not know whether he was restraining or assisting Tichaona to assault the deceased.”

Shepard Gandiwa, one of the fellow villagers who was in the bottle store when the fight broke out, confirmed that the third accused was in the bottle store and was part of the mob that surrounded and dragged the deceased onto the veranda when the fight broke out. He confirmed that the third accused, and his co-accused, dragged the deceased from the veranda into the darkness from which they returned some time later and drove away in a kombi omnibus. His evidence to this effect reads:

“We first heard James shouting that he was now going to deal with Gidion since he was involving himself in the matter. We then saw James assaulting Gidion. He assaulted him with a fist on the chest.

His colleagues then started pushing Gidion onto the veranda. The five of them were dragging him. They were pushing him.

Accused 2 was standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything.

Accused 3 was just standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything apart from surrounding the deceased.”

Although the first State witness, Farai Munanairi, did not see the third accused at the scene, the accused himself does not deny having been present at the scene during the fracas. It is therefore common cause that he was present at the scene actively participating in the fracas. He was not just an ordinary bystander but an active participant in the brawl.

The only point of departure is whether or not his involvement was that of a peace-maker or an accomplice.

There are two independent eyewitnesses, Silas Gandiwa and Shepard Gandiwa, who gave evidence directly linking the accused to the commission of the offence. They both gave evidence to the effect that the third accused actively participated in the common design and purpose of his co-accused to assault the deceased for restraining the first accused from assaulting the deceased's nephew, William Chirenje. It is that assault which allegedly led to the deceased's death. Their combined evidence is to the effect that he helped to push the deceased onto the veranda and prevented him from escaping.

The State has sought to rely on the doctrine of common purpose in linking the applicant to the commission of the offence. 

It is trite that the doctrine of common purpose renders a socius criminis, that is to say, a person who associates himself with the criminal conduct of another, criminally liable for the crime of the principal offender.

All what it needs for the State to discharge its onus of proof is that the accused associated himself with the criminal conduct of another in furtherance of a common purpose to commit a crime. It is not necessary for the State to prove the specific act the accomplice performed in fulfilment of the common purpose and design to commit the crime. The common purpose need not have been premeditated. It can arise at the spur of the moment depending on the circumstances of each case. See S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868.

In this case, the State went beyond merely proving that the applicant was a mere spectator or peacemaker when the crime was being committed by adducing believable evidence to the effect that he aided and abated the commission of the assault which caused the deceased's death. For that reason, this court comes to the unanimous decision that the applicant has a case to answer. He is liable to explain his conduct on the day in question as he interacted and associated with his alleged accomplices during the events leading to the deceased's death.

It is accordingly ordered that the application for discharge at the close of the State case be and is hereby dismissed.

Accessory, Accomplice, Common Purpose, Conspiracy to Commit, Co-perpetrators and Complicity re: Approach


The third accused, George Nyamayaro, stands charged with murder together with four (4) others. He now applies for discharge at the close of the State case in terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] which provides that:

“(3) If, at the close of the case for the prosecution, the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty.”

The section is couched in peremptory terms making it mandatory for the Court to find the accused not guilty and acquitted if, at the close of the State case, there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other competent verdict or offence arising from that charge.

The section has received wide interpretation through the cases such that there is no longer any controversy regarding the meaning and import of the section. 

The meaning and import of the section, as determined through the cases, is that where, at the close of the State case, the court finds that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other offence arising from that charge the court has no option but to acquit the accused.

The circumstances under which an accused person may be entitled to acquittal, as a matter of right, by operation of law, at the close of the State case are wide and varied but have been summarized as follows:

1. Where there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence – Attorney General v Bvuma & Another 1987 (2) ZLR 96 (S)...,.;

2. Where there is no evidence on which a reasonable Court, acting carefully, might properly convict – Attorney General v Mzizi 1991 (2) ZLR 321; and

3. Where the evidence adduced on behalf of the State is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable Court could safely act on it – Attorney General v Tarwireyi 1997 (1) ZLR 575 (S)...,.

Having summarised the applicable law, I now turn to consider the facts giving rise to the charge.

The facts surrounding the alleged murder are by and large common cause. The undisputed facts are that on 4 August 2012 the five accused persons were drinking beer in the company of the deceased, Gidion Jonasi, and his nephew, inside Chiwandamira Bottle Store at Chizanga Business Centre, Murehwa.

As they were drinking beer, the first accused picked up a quarrel with the deceased's nephew, William Chirenje, and threatened to assault him. The deceased intervened to save his nephew whereupon the first accused and his co-accused turned on the deceased and attacked him instead. They are alleged to have struck him with booted feet and fists. They dragged him out of the bottle store onto the veranda where they continued to assault him. The deceased was then dragged away to some secluded place from where the five (5) accused returned after about an hour.

The group that had been attacking the deceased came back after about an hour and left in a commuter omnibus driven by the fourth accused.

The State called three (3) eyewitnesses to the assault that is alleged to have resulted in the deceased's death. The first State witness, Farai Munanairi, testified that he was in the bottle store when the fight broke out. He saw the first, second, fourth and fifth accused persons attacking the accused in the manner alleged by the State. He however denied ever seeing the third accused at the scene of the crime. Although in his statement to the police he implicated the third accused and professed having seen him at the scene participating in the attack in his viva voce evidence in court he made an about turn and alleged that he had been influenced by the evidence of other witnesses.

The second State witness, Silas Gandiwa, was an eye-witness to the alleged murder. It was his testimony that on the night in question he was at Chiwandamira Bottle Store. He knows all the five (5) accused persons as they live in the same village. He grew up with the third accused in the same village. He has known the third accused for about 40 years. This is what he had to say in his own words:

“From where I was I could see what was happening. That was clearly visible. As second accused was grabbing the deceased others joined in, grabbed him, and dragged him to the veranda. I saw 5 people there and I recognised them.

The third accused was present but I did not witness the role that he played.

I saw five (5) people pushing the deceased onto the veranda. There was James, Daniel, Tichaona, Herbert and George (i.e. third accused). George was not pushing the deceased but he was present at the veranda. He was accompanying his colleagues who were mobbing the deceased. I do not know exactly what he was doing....,.

I did not witness third accused assaulting the deceased. I saw him when he was standing at the veranda but I did not witness the specific role that he played in assaulting the deceased.”

Under cross-examination by counsel for the third accused this is what the witness had to say:

“Q. When you got to the bottle store did you see the third accused?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was he?

A. In the bottle store.

Q. Where?

A. He was drinking beer and dancing.

Q. When the fight started was he involved?

A. I did not see him participate but he was amongst the group.

Q. In your statement you include third accused in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. Why did you include him?

A. Because he was amongst the group and he went out onto the veranda.

Q. Paragraph 9 of your statement. (Read).

A. They were surrounding him.

Q. Was it your evidence that third accused was part of the people who dragged the deceased out of the bottle store and is one of them who was holding and restraining him from escaping?

A. Yes, he was amongst them.

Q. Which part of the deceased was he holding?

A. I did not see but he was amongst them.

Q. Was he amongst the mob or people holding the deceased?

A. He was amongst the people holding the deceased.

Q. In your evidence in chief you said Accused 3 was amongst the mob but now you say he was among the people who were holding the deceased?

A. He was among the people holding the deceased.

Q. I put it to you that Accused 3 helped to restrain Tichaona from assaulting the deceased by holding his hands.

A. On that point, I do not know whether he was restraining or assisting Tichaona to assault the deceased.”

Shepard Gandiwa, one of the fellow villagers who was in the bottle store when the fight broke out, confirmed that the third accused was in the bottle store and was part of the mob that surrounded and dragged the deceased onto the veranda when the fight broke out. He confirmed that the third accused, and his co-accused, dragged the deceased from the veranda into the darkness from which they returned some time later and drove away in a kombi omnibus. His evidence to this effect reads:

“We first heard James shouting that he was now going to deal with Gidion since he was involving himself in the matter. We then saw James assaulting Gidion. He assaulted him with a fist on the chest.

His colleagues then started pushing Gidion onto the veranda. The five of them were dragging him. They were pushing him.

Accused 2 was standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything.

Accused 3 was just standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything apart from surrounding the deceased.”

Although the first State witness, Farai Munanairi, did not see the third accused at the scene, the accused himself does not deny having been present at the scene during the fracas. It is therefore common cause that he was present at the scene actively participating in the fracas. He was not just an ordinary bystander but an active participant in the brawl.

The only point of departure is whether or not his involvement was that of a peace-maker or an accomplice.

There are two independent eyewitnesses, Silas Gandiwa and Shepard Gandiwa, who gave evidence directly linking the accused to the commission of the offence. They both gave evidence to the effect that the third accused actively participated in the common design and purpose of his co-accused to assault the deceased for restraining the first accused from assaulting the deceased's nephew, William Chirenje. It is that assault which allegedly led to the deceased's death. Their combined evidence is to the effect that he helped to push the deceased onto the veranda and prevented him from escaping.

The State has sought to rely on the doctrine of common purpose in linking the applicant to the commission of the offence. 

It is trite that the doctrine of common purpose renders a socius criminis, that is to say, a person who associates himself with the criminal conduct of another, criminally liable for the crime of the principal offender.

All what it needs for the State to discharge its onus of proof is that the accused associated himself with the criminal conduct of another in furtherance of a common purpose to commit a crime. It is not necessary for the State to prove the specific act the accomplice performed in fulfilment of the common purpose and design to commit the crime. The common purpose need not have been premeditated. It can arise at the spur of the moment depending on the circumstances of each case. See S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868.

In this case, the State went beyond merely proving that the applicant was a mere spectator or peacemaker when the crime was being committed by adducing believable evidence to the effect that he aided and abated the commission of the assault which caused the deceased's death. For that reason, this court comes to the unanimous decision that the applicant has a case to answer. He is liable to explain his conduct on the day in question as he interacted and associated with his alleged accomplices during the events leading to the deceased's death.

It is accordingly ordered that the application for discharge at the close of the State case be and is hereby dismissed.

Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, Causation and Inferential Reasoning re: Key Witness, Eyewitness & Res Gestae


The third accused, George Nyamayaro, stands charged with murder together with four (4) others. He now applies for discharge at the close of the State case in terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] which provides that:

“(3) If, at the close of the case for the prosecution, the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty.”

The section is couched in peremptory terms making it mandatory for the Court to find the accused not guilty and acquitted if, at the close of the State case, there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other competent verdict or offence arising from that charge.

The section has received wide interpretation through the cases such that there is no longer any controversy regarding the meaning and import of the section. 

The meaning and import of the section, as determined through the cases, is that where, at the close of the State case, the court finds that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other offence arising from that charge the court has no option but to acquit the accused.

The circumstances under which an accused person may be entitled to acquittal, as a matter of right, by operation of law, at the close of the State case are wide and varied but have been summarized as follows:

1. Where there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence – Attorney General v Bvuma & Another 1987 (2) ZLR 96 (S)...,.;

2. Where there is no evidence on which a reasonable Court, acting carefully, might properly convict – Attorney General v Mzizi 1991 (2) ZLR 321; and

3. Where the evidence adduced on behalf of the State is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable Court could safely act on it – Attorney General v Tarwireyi 1997 (1) ZLR 575 (S)...,.

Having summarised the applicable law, I now turn to consider the facts giving rise to the charge.

The facts surrounding the alleged murder are by and large common cause. The undisputed facts are that on 4 August 2012 the five accused persons were drinking beer in the company of the deceased, Gidion Jonasi, and his nephew, inside Chiwandamira Bottle Store at Chizanga Business Centre, Murehwa.

As they were drinking beer, the first accused picked up a quarrel with the deceased's nephew, William Chirenje, and threatened to assault him. The deceased intervened to save his nephew whereupon the first accused and his co-accused turned on the deceased and attacked him instead. They are alleged to have struck him with booted feet and fists. They dragged him out of the bottle store onto the veranda where they continued to assault him. The deceased was then dragged away to some secluded place from where the five (5) accused returned after about an hour.

The group that had been attacking the deceased came back after about an hour and left in a commuter omnibus driven by the fourth accused.

The State called three (3) eyewitnesses to the assault that is alleged to have resulted in the deceased's death. The first State witness, Farai Munanairi, testified that he was in the bottle store when the fight broke out. He saw the first, second, fourth and fifth accused persons attacking the accused in the manner alleged by the State. He however denied ever seeing the third accused at the scene of the crime. Although in his statement to the police he implicated the third accused and professed having seen him at the scene participating in the attack in his viva voce evidence in court he made an about turn and alleged that he had been influenced by the evidence of other witnesses.

The second State witness, Silas Gandiwa, was an eye-witness to the alleged murder. It was his testimony that on the night in question he was at Chiwandamira Bottle Store. He knows all the five (5) accused persons as they live in the same village. He grew up with the third accused in the same village. He has known the third accused for about 40 years. This is what he had to say in his own words:

“From where I was I could see what was happening. That was clearly visible. As second accused was grabbing the deceased others joined in, grabbed him, and dragged him to the veranda. I saw 5 people there and I recognised them.

The third accused was present but I did not witness the role that he played.

I saw five (5) people pushing the deceased onto the veranda. There was James, Daniel, Tichaona, Herbert and George (i.e. third accused). George was not pushing the deceased but he was present at the veranda. He was accompanying his colleagues who were mobbing the deceased. I do not know exactly what he was doing....,.

I did not witness third accused assaulting the deceased. I saw him when he was standing at the veranda but I did not witness the specific role that he played in assaulting the deceased.”

Under cross-examination by counsel for the third accused this is what the witness had to say:

“Q. When you got to the bottle store did you see the third accused?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was he?

A. In the bottle store.

Q. Where?

A. He was drinking beer and dancing.

Q. When the fight started was he involved?

A. I did not see him participate but he was amongst the group.

Q. In your statement you include third accused in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. Why did you include him?

A. Because he was amongst the group and he went out onto the veranda.

Q. Paragraph 9 of your statement. (Read).

A. They were surrounding him.

Q. Was it your evidence that third accused was part of the people who dragged the deceased out of the bottle store and is one of them who was holding and restraining him from escaping?

A. Yes, he was amongst them.

Q. Which part of the deceased was he holding?

A. I did not see but he was amongst them.

Q. Was he amongst the mob or people holding the deceased?

A. He was amongst the people holding the deceased.

Q. In your evidence in chief you said Accused 3 was amongst the mob but now you say he was among the people who were holding the deceased?

A. He was among the people holding the deceased.

Q. I put it to you that Accused 3 helped to restrain Tichaona from assaulting the deceased by holding his hands.

A. On that point, I do not know whether he was restraining or assisting Tichaona to assault the deceased.”

Shepard Gandiwa, one of the fellow villagers who was in the bottle store when the fight broke out, confirmed that the third accused was in the bottle store and was part of the mob that surrounded and dragged the deceased onto the veranda when the fight broke out. He confirmed that the third accused, and his co-accused, dragged the deceased from the veranda into the darkness from which they returned some time later and drove away in a kombi omnibus. His evidence to this effect reads:

“We first heard James shouting that he was now going to deal with Gidion since he was involving himself in the matter. We then saw James assaulting Gidion. He assaulted him with a fist on the chest.

His colleagues then started pushing Gidion onto the veranda. The five of them were dragging him. They were pushing him.

Accused 2 was standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything.

Accused 3 was just standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything apart from surrounding the deceased.”

Although the first State witness, Farai Munanairi, did not see the third accused at the scene, the accused himself does not deny having been present at the scene during the fracas. It is therefore common cause that he was present at the scene actively participating in the fracas. He was not just an ordinary bystander but an active participant in the brawl.

The only point of departure is whether or not his involvement was that of a peace-maker or an accomplice.

There are two independent eyewitnesses, Silas Gandiwa and Shepard Gandiwa, who gave evidence directly linking the accused to the commission of the offence. They both gave evidence to the effect that the third accused actively participated in the common design and purpose of his co-accused to assault the deceased for restraining the first accused from assaulting the deceased's nephew, William Chirenje. It is that assault which allegedly led to the deceased's death. Their combined evidence is to the effect that he helped to push the deceased onto the veranda and prevented him from escaping.

The State has sought to rely on the doctrine of common purpose in linking the applicant to the commission of the offence. 

It is trite that the doctrine of common purpose renders a socius criminis, that is to say, a person who associates himself with the criminal conduct of another, criminally liable for the crime of the principal offender.

All what it needs for the State to discharge its onus of proof is that the accused associated himself with the criminal conduct of another in furtherance of a common purpose to commit a crime. It is not necessary for the State to prove the specific act the accomplice performed in fulfilment of the common purpose and design to commit the crime. The common purpose need not have been premeditated. It can arise at the spur of the moment depending on the circumstances of each case. See S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868.

In this case, the State went beyond merely proving that the applicant was a mere spectator or peacemaker when the crime was being committed by adducing believable evidence to the effect that he aided and abated the commission of the assault which caused the deceased's death. For that reason, this court comes to the unanimous decision that the applicant has a case to answer. He is liable to explain his conduct on the day in question as he interacted and associated with his alleged accomplices during the events leading to the deceased's death.

It is accordingly ordered that the application for discharge at the close of the State case be and is hereby dismissed.

Warned and Cautioned Statements, Indications, Evidence Aliunde & Presumption of Clarity of Events Nearer Date of Event


The State called three (3) eye witnesses to the assault that is alleged to have resulted in the deceased's death.

The first State witness, Farai Munanairi, testified that he was in the bottle store when the fight broke out. He saw the first, second, fourth and fifth accused persons attacking the accused in the manner alleged by the State. He however denied ever seeing the third accused at the scene of the crime.

Although in his statement to the police he implicated the third accused and professed having seen him at the scene participating in the attack; in his viva voce evidence in court he made an about turn and alleged that he had been influenced by the evidence of other witnesses.

Defence Outline, State Outline re: Approach, Testimonial Discrepancies and Prevaricative or Inconsistent Evidence


The State called three (3) eye witnesses to the assault that is alleged to have resulted in the deceased's death.

The first State witness, Farai Munanairi, testified that he was in the bottle store when the fight broke out. He saw the first, second, fourth and fifth accused persons attacking the accused in the manner alleged by the State. He however denied ever seeing the third accused at the scene of the crime.

Although in his statement to the police he implicated the third accused and professed having seen him at the scene participating in the attack; in his viva voce evidence in court he made an about turn and alleged that he had been influenced by the evidence of other witnesses.

Application for Discharge at the Close of the State Case: 3rd Accused George Nyamayaro

BHUNU J: The third accused George Nyamayaro stands charged with murder together with 4 others. He now applies for discharge at the close of the State case in terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] which provides that:

(3) If at the close of  the case for the prosecution the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty”.

The section is couched in peremptory terms making it mandatory for the Court to find the accused not guilty and acquitted if at the close of the State case there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other competent verdict or offence arising from that charge.

The section has received wide interpretation through the cases such that there is no longer any controversy regarding the meaning and import of the section. The meaning and import of the section as determined through the cases is that where at the close of the State case the court finds that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged or any other offence arising from that charge the court has no option but to acquit the accused.

The circumstances under which an accused person may be entitled to acquittal as a matter of right by operation of law at the close of the State case are wide and varied but have been summarised as follows:

1. Where there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence Attorney-General v Bvuma & Another 1987 (2) ZLR 96 (S) at 102;

2. Where there is no evidence on which a reasonable Court, acting carefully, might properly convict – Attorney General v Mzizi 1991 (2) ZLR 321; and

3. Where the evidence adduced on behalf of the State is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable Court could safely act on it - Attorney-General v Tarwireyi 1997 (1) ZLR 575 (S) at 576.

Having summarised the applicable law, I now turn to consider the facts giving rise to the charge.

The facts surrounding the alleged murder are by and large common cause. The undisputed facts are that on 4 August 2012 the five accused persons were drinking beer in the company of the deceased Gidion Jonasi and his nephew inside Chiwandamira Bottle Store at Chizanga Business Centre, Murehwa.

As they were drinking beer the first accused picked up a quarrel with the deceased's nephew William Chirenje and threatened to assault him. The deceased intervened to save his nephew whereupon the first accused and his co-accused turned on the deceased and attacked him instead. They are alleged to have struck him with booted feet and fists. They dragged him out of the bottle store onto the veranda where they continued to assault him. The deceased was then dragged away to some secluded place from where the 5 accused returned after about an hour.

The group that had been attacking the deceased came back after about an hour and left in a commuter omnibus driven by the fourth accused.

The State called 3 eye witnesses to the assault that is alleged to have resulted in the deceased's death. The first State witness Farai Munanairi testified that he was in the bottle store when the fight broke out. He saw first, second, fourth and fifth accused persons attacking the accused in the manner alleged by the State. He however denied ever seeing the third accused at the scene of crime. Although in his statement to the police he implicated the third accused and professed having seen him at the scene participating in the attack in his viva voce evidence in court he made an about turn and alleged that he had been influenced by the evidence of other witnesses.

The second State witness Silas Gandiwa was an eye witness to the alleged murder. It was his testimony that on the night in question he was at Chiwandamira Bottle Store. He knows all the 5 accused persons as they live in the same village. He grew up with the third accused in the same village. He has known the third accused for about 40 years. This is what he had to say in his own words:

From where I was I could see what was happening. That was clearly visible. As second accused was grabbing the deceased others joined in, grabbed him and dragged him to the veranda. I saw 5 people there and I recognised them.

The third accused was present but I did not witness the role that he played.

I saw 5 people pushing the deceased onto the veranda. There was James, Daniel, Tichaona, Herbert and George (i.e. 3rd accused). George was not pushing the deceased but he was present at the veranda. He was accompanying his colleagues who were mobbing the deceased. I do not know exactly what he was doing.…

I did not witness 3rd accused assaulting the deceased. I saw him when he was standing at the veranda but I did not witness the specific role that he played in assaulting the deceased.”

Under cross-examination by Ms Nyakudanga counsel for the third accused this is what the witness had to say:

Q. When you got to the bottle store did you see the third accused?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was he?

A. In the bottle store.

Q. Where?

A. He was drinking beer and dancing.

Q. When the fight started was he involved?

A. I did not see him participate but he was amongst the group.

Q. In your statement you include third accused in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. Why did you include him?

A. Because he was amongst the group and he went out onto the veranda.

Q. Paragraph 9 of your statement. (Read).

A. They were surrounding him.

Q. Was it your evidence that third accused was part of the people who dragged the deceased out of the bottle store and is one of them who was holding and restraining him from escaping?

A. Yes he was amongst them.

Q. Which part of the deceased was he holding?

A. I did not see but he was amongst them.

Q. Was he amongst the mob or people holding the deceased?

A. He was amongst the people holding the deceased.

Q. In your evidence in chief you said Accused 3 was amongst the mob but now you say he was among the people who were holding the deceased?

A. He was among the people holding the deceased.

Q. I put it to you that Accused 3 helped to restrain Tichaona from assaulting the deceased by holding his hands.

A. On that point I do not know whether he was restraining or assisting Tichaona to assault the deceased.

Shepard Gandiwa one of the fellow villagers who was in the bottle store when the fight broke out confirmed that the third accused was in the bottle store and was part of the mob that surrounded and dragged the deceased onto the veranda when the fight broke out. He confirmed that the third accused and his co-accused dragged the deceased from the veranda into the darkness from which they returned some time later and drove away in a kombi omnibus. His evidence to this effect reads:

We first heard James shouting that he was now going to deal with Gidion since he was involving himself in the matter. We then saw James assaulting Gidion. He assaulted him with a fist on the chest.

His colleagues then started pushing Gidion onto the veranda. The five of them were dragging him. They were pushing him.

Accused 2 was standing whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything.

Accused 3 was just sanding whilst surrounding the deceased. He was not doing anything apart from surrounding the deceased.”

Although the first State witness Farai Munanairi did not see the third accused at the scene the accused himself does not deny having been present at the scene during the fracas. It is therefore common cause that he was present at the scene actively participating in the fracas. He was not just an ordinary bystander but an active participant in the brawl.

The only point of departure is whether or not his involvement was that of a peace maker or an accomplice.

There are two independent eyewitnesses, Silas Gandiwa and Shepard Gandiwa who gave evidence directly linking the accused to the commission of the offence. They both gave evidence to the effect that the third accused actively participated in the common design and purpose of his co-accused to assault the deceased for restraining the first accused from assaulting the deceased's nephew William Chirenje. It is that assault which allegedly led to the deceased's death. Their combined evidence is to the effect that he helped to push the deceased onto the veranda and prevented him from escaping.

The State has sought to rely on the doctrine of common purpose in linking the applicant to the commission of the offence. It is trite that the doctrine of common purpose renders a socius criminis that is to say, a person who associates himself with the criminal conduct of another criminally liable for the crime of the principal offender.

All what it needs for the State to discharge its onus of proof is that the accused associated himself with the criminal conduct of another in furtherance of a common purpose to commit a crime. It is not necessary for the State to prove the specific act the accomplice performed in fulfilment of the common purpose and design to commit the crime. The common purpose need not have been premeditated. It can arise at the spur of the moment depending on the circumstances of each case. See S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868.

In this case the State went beyond merely proving that the applicant was a mere spectator or peacemaker when the crime was being committed by adducing believable evidence to the effect that he aided and abated the commission of the assault which caused the deceased's death. For that reason this court comes to the unanimous decision that the applicant has a case to answer. He is liable to explain his conduct on the day in question as he interacted and associated with his alleged accomplices during the events leading to the deceased's death.

It is accordingly ordered that the application for discharge at the close of the State case be and is hereby dismissed.











TK Hove and Partners, Applicant's Legal Practitioners

The Prosecutor General's office, Respondent's Legal Practitioners

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