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HB124-16 - THE STATE vs INNOCENT GWEBU

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Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re corroborative evidence iro pervasive influence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re onus iro burden of proof.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re onus iro standard of proof.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re police investigations.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re direct evidence iro key witness.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re circumstantial evidence iro key witness.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re admissions.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re prevaricative evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re circumstantial evidence iro evidence aliunde.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re findings of fact iro witness testimony.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re hostile witness.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re adverse witness.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re extra curial statements iro the presumption of clarity of events nearer the date of the event.
Procedural Law-viz application for discharge re section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].
Procedural Law-viz judicial discharge re section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re direct evidence iro murder.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re circumstantial evidence iro murder.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re direct evidence iro inferential reasoning.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re circumstantial evidence iro inferential reasoning.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re recalcitrant witness iro section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].
Procedural Law-viz hostile witness re impeachment proceedings iro section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].
Procedural Law-viz adverse witness re impeachment proceedings iro section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re evidence of identification iro tool mark evidence.
Procedural Law-viz evidence of identification re toolmark evidence iro footprints.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re subpoena iro competent witness.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re subpoena iro compellable witness.
Procedural Law-viz Constitutional rights to a speedy trial re fugitive from justice.

Direct and Circumstantial Evidence, Causation, Inferential Reasoning, Confessions & the Principle of Evidence Aliunde

If it was not naïve in the extreme, it was downright utopian to hinge the entire State case on the evidence of an accused person's mother, son and nephew and expect that they would assist in sending their loved one to prison even if indeed he did pump six bullets into a hapless villager suspected of having broken into his homestead and stolen a bicycle among other valuables.

The whole case for the prosecution was built around Meikles Ncube, the accused's son, Mgcini Ndlovu his nephew, Edith Gwebu his very own mother and the ubiquitous Tongai Nyoni, a truck driver who has since retraced his steps to his home in Zvishavane and was as dis-interested in the whole incident he does not remember anyone that he came across on the fateful day - perhaps a question of selective amnesia.

Then there was the Investigating Officer, detective Lection Sibanda, who did not see the wisdom of even extracting finger prints from anything that could shed light on who the perpetrator was; content only to rough up the accused's family members, obtain statements from them incriminating the accused person and then spend the entire period of 6 years 8 months, when the accused was a fugitive from justice, waiting for him to surrender himself even after the accused had contacted him using a South African number and his relatives were available all the time to point out his address in that country.

Whatever happened to Interpol and extradition of accused persons?

This case was so mis-managed by those charged with the responsibility of bringing offenders to book who displayed a lackadaisical approach to criminality which is unprecedented. As it is, the deceased, who may have died for nothing when the law of the jungle was applied and vigilante justice took over, will never see real justice.

The accused is charged with the murder of one Nkosilamandla Moyo, a male adult who was aged 28 at the time he met his painful death on 13 April 2008, at Mbilamboyi Bus Stop in Esigodini. The accused himself was aged 40 years at the time.

The State alleges that there had been several break-ins at the accused's homestead in Esigodini when he returned home from his base in South Africa seething with anger. He was intent on finding the culprit and meting out vigilante justice. He is said to have set about on a manhunt for the deceased who was suspected of having stolen those valuables from the accused's homestead. Ably assisted by his wife, Sigezephi Sibanda, the accused had caught up with the deceased as they boarded the same lift from Mawabeni to Mbilamboyi Bus Stop in Long field, Esigodini. When they alighted from the motor vehicle, driven by Tongai Nyoni, at the bus stop, the accused is said to have confronted the deceased accusing him of having stolen from him. He chased away his wife, his son, and nephew, Mgcini Ndlovu, saying he wanted to deal with the deceased. Left alone with the deceased at the bus stop, it is alleged that he shot him six times with an unknown firearm leaving him dead.

The gunshots echoed through the village and were heard by all the relevant witnesses. In fact, that is the only thing the witnesses were prepared to admit when they testified. The accused then beat a hasty retreat leaving for South Africa very early the following morning in the company of his loving wife. The deceased's body was later discovered at the bus stop but it was not until 24 December 2014, some 6 years and 8 months later, that the accused was arrested as he had eventually crept back home from his sojourn in foreign land.

So much for the allegations.

When it came to proving its case against the accused, the State lined up four witnesses who were mainly the accused's relatives. Although it was pretty obvious that Mgcini Ndlovu and Edith Gwebu, who are the accused's nephew and mother respectively, had given statements to the police incriminating the accused as alleged by the State, it soon became apparent when they took to the witness's stand where their allegiance stood - after all blood is thicker than water. Mgcini Ndlovu pretended to be an extremely stupid witness who kept on swallowing his words, saying things and then reneging from them and in the end succeeded to contribute absolutely nothing to the State case. He claimed to have been arrested by the police who assaulted him and detained him for a long time while eliciting a statement to the effect that the accused committed the offence. He denied having been in the company of the accused on the fateful day when he went to Esigodini to identify stolen property which had been recovered. He said he turned back on the way without giving any reason for that, conveniently being elsewhere when the real events unfolded. Mgcini Ndlovu denied boarding Tongai Nyoni's motor vehicle with the accused, his wife, and son, Meikles Ncube, together with the deceased - that way, he deprived the State of any evidence placing the accused anywhere near the deceased or the scene of the crime.

Although he dithered about the whereabouts of the accused at the time the shots sounded, suggesting firstly, that he had been at home and then appearing to say that he only returned home after the shots were fired, nothing reliable could be gleaned from his untruthful testimony.

Then came the dramatist herself, Edith Gwebu, the mother of the accused person. A very old but clever woman; this witness also reneged from her statement electing to volunteer evidence which was not asked of her, like that the accused had never owned or held a gun in his hands ever since she gave birth to him. One would have thought that the accused was always under her watchful eye and did not live in South Africa. More importantly, Edith Gwebu insisted that when gunshots were fired the accused had been sitting at home next to her in a round hut while enjoying his supper. Again, this deprived the State of any evidence linking the accused to the shooting and presented the accused with an alibi - Christmas come early indeed.

Tongai Nyoni was next to wade away from his statement to the police. Appearing very timid and incoherent, the dreadlocked driver said he did not remember much except that he gave a lift to the deceased at Mawabeni Shopping Centre, although he did not even remember the deceased's name. He denied giving a lift to the accused and his wife putting the final nail in the coffin of the State case….,.

It is, however, the failure of the State to impeach any of the three hostile witnesses and to allow their evidence to remain intact and part of the State case which came as a surprise.

As it is, the State case, as presented to us, is that the accused did not board a lift with the deceased as alleged; he did not alight at Mbilamboyi Bus Stop with the deceased and the accused's family members; and when the six gunshots sounded he was at home with his mother conveniently enjoying a meal.

Presented with that kind of a sitter, counsel for the accused person gleefully made an application for discharge at the close of the State case on the basis that the State had failed to establish a prima facie case upon which the accused person could be put to his defence. He submitted that the State case always depended on circumstantial evidence. When both Mgcini Ndlovu and Edith Gwebu testified that he was at home when the shots that presumably killed the deceased were fired, there was no inference that could be drawn to the effect that he is the one who fired the shots.

We agree.

In terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]:

If, at the close of the case for the prosecution, the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty.”

It is a provision which has been relied upon by legal practitioners repeatedly over the years even those that have nothing else to do but would want to appear to have done it. In that regard, the courts have pronounced themselves over and over again on an application for a discharge at the close of the State case in formulating the test to be applied in relating to such an application. See S v Hartlebury and Another 1985 (1) ZLR…,.; Attorney General v Bvuma and Another 1987 (2) ZLR 96 (S)…,.; Attorney General v Mzizi 1991 (2) ZLR 321 (S)…,.; Attorney General v Tarwirei 1997 (1) ZLR 575 (S)….,.; S v Kachipare 1998 (2) ZLR 273 (S)…,.

The essence of those judgments is that the court will acquit an accused person at the close of the State case where:

(i) There is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence;

(ii) There is no evidence on which a reasonable court, acting carefully, might properly convict; or

(iii) The evidence of the State is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable court could safely act on it.

In the present case one does not even go beyond the first question as there is no evidence that has been led pointing to the accused as having fired the shots that killed the deceased.

Counsel for the State submitted that such evidence exists in the form of the testimony of Detective Sibanda who says that he observed Northstar tennis prints at the scene and similar ones at the accused's homestead. This is the same witness who was quick to admit that Northstar tennis shoes are very common and could have belonged to anyone. In any event, he did not recover any such tennis shoes from the accused. Of course there is a lot that Detective Sibanda did not recover during his investigations - including the murder weapon.

This is a case in which nobody witnessed the killing of the deceased, and, as such, there is no direct evidence of the offence. The State case is therefore essentially circumstantial.

In our law, the guiding principle is that circumstantial evidence depends upon facts which are proved by direct evidence from which the court is required to draw inferences. Indeed, means, motive and opportunity are examples of circumstantial evidence. To show that the accused person had the means, a motive, and the opportunity assists in persuading the court of his guilt and raises a prima facie case against him for him to answer. However, where the conviction of the accused is dependent upon circumstantial evidence, the inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with the proved facts and the facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from them except that which is sought to be drawn. See S v Edwards 1949 SR 30; R v Blom 1939 AD 188…,.; S v Vhera 2003 (1) ZLR 668 (H)…,.; S v Phiri HB19-16; HOFFMAN and ZEFFERT, The South African Law of Evidence, 3rd edition…,.

All the evidence of the State relevant to the issue having been that of the accused's relatives who turned hostile, the State had the option to impeach the witnesses in terms of section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].

Where a State witness has become hostile and departed from the statement made to the police because of his or her relationship to the accused or for any other reason, the State may really have no choice but to impeach that witness with a view, not to persuade the court to accept the evidence contained in the statement to the police, but simply to destroy his or her reliability for both sides. Failure to do so leaves the evidence of that recalcitrant witness sitting in the State case and causing havoc to it.

The procedure for impeachment involves the production of the original statement of the witness and making available to the witness the details of where and when the statement was made in order to identify it. When that has been done, the witness must then be asked if he made the statement. If the statement was signed, the witness must be made to admit his signature. Once the witness has admitted making the statement, the statement should then be put to that witness in order to solicit an admission that he had said the words in the statement. Where the witness admits saying the words in the previous statement, the procedure is that the statement may be used without further proof. On the other hand, if the witness denies using the words contained in the statement, State counsel must then call witnesses who recorded and/or witnessed the making of the statement to prove that indeed the statement was made. In the process of impeachment, the witness must be made to explain the discrepancies between the previous statement and the hostile testimony in court. If the witness's explanation is not acceptable, the correct procedure is to impeach the witness in terms of section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].

See S v Chari 1989 (1) ZLR 231 (S); S v Muhlaba and Others 1973 (1) RLR 178 (GD).

It is when the State has made an application for the witness to be declared hostile, and the court has done so, that the State counsel may then proceed to cross-examine his own witness. Before the declaration of hostility, the State counsel cannot go beyond merely pointing out the discrepancies and seeking an explanation from the witness.

It is that procedure which the State failed to adhere to when Mgcini Ndlovu, Edith Gwebu and Tongai Nyoni became hostile. The State allowed them to waffle and abandon their statements without pointing out the discrepancies and without even producing the original statements they had made. In short, the State did nothing about the patent betrayal with the result that the hostile evidence is now the only State case.

In the end, what is left is the testimony of the Investigating Officer who did not witness the attack on the deceased and was nowhere near the scene.

Counsel for the State submitted that there are “pieces of evidence” which the accused should be put to his defence to explain. These are the footprints at the scene which Detective Sibanda said were similar to those found at his homestead after he had absconded and the telephone call he made to the good detective from South Africa when he heard the police were anxious to interview him. Although he undertook to avail himself at the end of the month he never did.

For counsel for the State to even allude to such evidence is indicative of the height of desperation the State was forced to scale. Surely, the accused's response by telephone cannot lead to any inference useful to the State. Even the footprints are useless evidence in the manner they were presented. One needs go no further than Detective Sibanda's own admission that the Northstar tennis shoe is very common and used by several people. Therefore, there are several other inferences that can be drawn from that fact.

In any event, while it is permissible for the court to rely on evidence of footprints, there are a number of precautions to be observed before such evidence is used. For instance, the witness must tell the court by what characteristics or peculiarities or marks he recognised the footprints as being those of the accused. It is the ability to give a precise and detailed description of the unique features of the print which points to reliable identification. Needless to say that Detective Sibanda's evidence does not even begin to meet the requirements. All this leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the State has not made a prima facie case against the accused person for him to be put to his defence. In fact, there is absolutely no evidence to prove that it is the accused who fired the shots that killed the deceased. The State case was not helped by the failure to locate the murder weapon or even to do the elementary follow up of crucial witnesses like the lady who employed the disinterested Tongai Nyoni and knew the locals. She was in the motor vehicle driven by Tongai Nyoni and would have easily identified the accused and his family.

Accordingly, it is ordered that;

(1) The State has failed to prove a prima facie case upon which the accused could be put to his defence.

(2) The accused person is hereby found not guilty and acquitted of the charge of murder.

Police Investigations, Arrest, Search and Seizure With or Without a Warrant re: Approach

Then there was the Investigating Officer, detective Lection Sibanda, who did not see the wisdom of even extracting finger prints from anything that could shed light on who the perpetrator was; content only to rough up the accused's family members, obtain statements from them incriminating the accused person and then spend the entire period of 6 years 8 months, when the accused was a fugitive from justice, waiting for him to surrender himself even after the accused had contacted him using a South African number and his relatives were available all the time to point out his address in that country.

Whatever happened to Interpol and extradition of accused persons?

Warned and Cautioned Statements, Indications, Evidence Aliunde & Presumption of Clarity of Events Nearer Date of Event

Then there was the Investigating Officer..., who did not see the wisdom of even extracting finger prints from anything that could shed light on who the perpetrator was; content only to rough up the accused's family members, obtain statements from them incriminating the accused person....,

Corroborative Evidence re: Hostile, Adverse or Recalcitrant Witness and Impeachment Proceedings

Tongai Nyoni may have been a recalcitrant witness for no apparent reason other than that he appeared fearful….,.

It is…, the failure of the State to impeach any of the three hostile witnesses and to allow their evidence to remain intact and part of the State case which came as a surprise….,.

All the evidence of the State relevant to the issue having been that of the accused's relatives who turned hostile, the State had the option to impeach the witnesses in terms of section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].

Where a State witness has become hostile and departed from the statement made to the police because of his or her relationship to the accused or for any other reason, the State may really have no choice but to impeach that witness with a view, not to persuade the court to accept the evidence contained in the statement to the police, but simply to destroy his or her reliability for both sides. Failure to do so leaves the evidence of that recalcitrant witness sitting in the State case and causing havoc to it.

The procedure for impeachment involves the production of the original statement of the witness and making available to the witness the details of where and when the statement was made in order to identify it. When that has been done, the witness must then be asked if he made the statement. If the statement was signed, the witness must be made to admit his signature. Once the witness has admitted making the statement, the statement should then be put to that witness in order to solicit an admission that he had said the words in the statement. Where the witness admits saying the words in the previous statement, the procedure is that the statement may be used without further proof. On the other hand, if the witness denies using the words contained in the statement, State counsel must then call witnesses who recorded and/or witnessed the making of the statement to prove that indeed the statement was made. In the process of impeachment, the witness must be made to explain the discrepancies between the previous statement and the hostile testimony in court. If the witness's explanation is not acceptable, the correct procedure is to impeach the witness in terms of section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].

See S v Chari 1989 (1) ZLR 231 (S); S v Muhlaba and Others 1973 (1) RLR 178 (GD).

It is when the State has made an application for the witness to be declared hostile, and the court has done so, that the State counsel may then proceed to cross-examine his own witness. Before the declaration of hostility, the State counsel cannot go beyond merely pointing out the discrepancies and seeking an explanation from the witness.

It is that procedure which the State failed to adhere to when Mgcini Ndlovu, Edith Gwebu and Tongai Nyoni became hostile. The State allowed them to waffle and abandon their statements without pointing out the discrepancies and without even producing the original statements they had made. In short, the State did nothing about the patent betrayal with the result that the hostile evidence is now the only State case.

Application for Discharge, Evidential Deficit, Evidence Indicative of a Permissible Verdict & Prima Facie Concept

In terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]:

If at the close of the case for the prosecution the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty.”

It is a provision which has been relied upon by legal practitioners repeatedly over the years even those that have nothing else to do but would want to appear to have done it. In that regard, the courts have pronounced themselves over and over again on an application for a discharge at the close of the State case in formulating the test to be applied in relating to such an application. See S v Hartlebury and Another 1985 (1) ZLR…,.; Attorney General v Bvuma and Another 1987 (2) ZLR 96 (S)…,.; Attorney General v Mzizi 1991 (2) ZLR 321 (S)…,.; Attorney General v Tarwirei 1997 (1) ZLR 575 (S)….,.; S v Kachipare 1998 (2) ZLR 273 (S)…,.

The essence of those judgments is that the court will acquit an accused person at the close of the State case where:

(i) There is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence;

(ii) There is no evidence on which a reasonable court, acting carefully, might properly convict; or

(iii) The evidence of the State is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable court could safely act on it.

Physical Evidence re: Approach

In the present case…, there is no evidence that has been led pointing to the accused as having fired the shots that killed the deceased.

Counsel for the State submitted that such evidence exists in the form of the testimony of Detective Sibanda who says that he observed Northstar tennis prints at the scene and similar ones at the accused's homestead. This is the same witness who was quick to admit that Northstar tennis shoes are very common and could have belonged to anyone. In any event, he did not recover any such tennis shoes from the accused. Of course there is a lot that Detective Sibanda did not recover during his investigations - including the murder weapon.

Corroborative Evidence re: Pervasive or Undue Influence, Partisan Evidence and Witness Coaching

If it was not naïve in the extreme, it was downright utopian to hinge the entire State case on the evidence of an accused person's mother, son and nephew and expect that they would assist in sending their loved one to prison even if indeed he did pump six bullets into a hapless villager suspected of having broken into his homestead and stolen a bicycle among other valuables.

The whole case for the prosecution was built around Meikles Ncube, the accused's son, Mgcini Ndlovu his nephew, Edith Gwebu, his very own mother, and the ubiquitous Tongai Nyoni, a truck driver who has since retraced his steps to his home in Zvishavane and was as dis-interested in the whole incident he does not remember anyone that he came across on the fateful day - perhaps a question of selective amnesia.

Onus re: Evidential Standard and Burden of Proof iro Approach and the Presumption of Innocence

This case was so mis-managed by those charged with the responsibility of bringing offenders to book who displayed a lackadaisical approach to criminality which is unprecedented. As it is, the deceased, who may have died for nothing when the law of the jungle was applied and vigilante justice took over, will never see real justice.

Evidence of Identification, Identification Parade, Tool Mark Evidence, Alias, Evidence Aliunde & the Defence of Alibi

While it is permissible for the court to rely on evidence of footprints, there are a number of precautions to be observed before such evidence is used.

For instance, the witness must tell the court by what characteristics or peculiarities or marks he recognised the footprints as being those of the accused. It is the ability to give a precise and detailed description of the unique features of the print which points to reliable identification.

Subpoena, Witness Summons or Compellable Witness, Subpoena Duces Tecum and the Claim of Privilege

The State case was not helped by the failure…, to do the elementary follow up of crucial witnesses like the lady who employed the dis-interested Tongai Nyoni and knew the locals. She was in the motor vehicle driven by Tongai Nyoni and would have easily identified the accused and his family.


MATHONSI J: If it was not naïve in the extreme, it was downright utopian to hinge the entire State case on the evidence of an accused person's mother, son and nephew and expect that they would assist in sending their loved one to prison even if indeed he did pump six bullets into a hapless villager suspected of having broken into his homestead and stolen a bicycle among other valuables.

The whole case for the prosecution was built around Meikles Ncube, the accused's son, Mgcini Ndlovu his nephew, Edith Gwebu his very own mother and the ubiquitous Tongai Nyoni a truck driver who has since retraced his steps to his home in Zvishavane and was as disinterested in the whole incident he does not remember anyone that he came across on the fateful day, perhaps a question of selective amnesia.

Then there was the investigating officer, detective Lection Sibanda, who did not see the wisdom of even extracting finger prints from anything that could shed light on who the perpetrator was content only to rough up the accused's family members, obtain statements from them incriminating the accused person and then spend the entire period of 6 years 8 months, when the accused was a fugitive from justice, waiting for him to surrender himself even after the accused had contacted him using a South African number and his relatives were available all the time to point out his address in that country. Whatever happened to Interpol and extradition of accused persons?

This case was so mismanaged by those charged with the responsibility of bringing offenders to book who displayed a lackadaisical approach to criminality which is unprecedented. As it is, the deceased who may have died for nothing when the law of the jungle was applied and vigilante justice took over, will never see real justice.

The accused is charged with the murder of one Nkosilamandla Moyo, a male adult who was aged 28 at the time he met his painful death on 13 April 2008, at Mbilamboyi Bus Stop in Esigodini. The accused himself was aged 40 years at the time. The State alleges that there had been several break-ins at the accused's homestead in Esigodini when he returned home from his base in South Africa seething with anger. He was intent on finding the culprit and meting out vigilante justice. He is said to have set about on a manhunt for the deceased who was suspected of having stolen those valuables from the accused's homestead. Ably assisted by his wife Sigezephi Sibanda, the accused had caught up with the deceased as they boarded the same lift from Mawabeni to Mbilamboyi Bus Stop in Long field, Esigodini. When they alighted from the motor vehicle, driven by Tongai Nyoni , at the bus stop, the accused is said to have confronted the deceased accusing him of having stolen from him. He chased away his wife, his son and nephew Mgcini Ndlovu saying he wanted to deal with the deceased. Left alone with the deceased at the bus stop, it is alleged that he shot him six times with an unknown firearm leaving him dead.

The gunshots echoed through the village and were heard by all the relevant witnesses. In fact that is the only thing the witnesses were prepared to admit when they testified. The accused then beat a hasty retreat leaving for South Africa very early the following morning in the company of his loving wife. The deceased's body was later discovered at the bus stop but it was not until 24 December 2014, some 6 years and 8 months later, that the accused was arrested as he had eventually crept back home from his sojourn in foreign land.

So much for the allegations.

When it came to proving its case against the accused the State lined up four witnesses who were mainly the accused's relatives. Although it was pretty obvious that Mgcini Ndlovu and Edith Gwebu who are the accused's nephew and mother respectively had given statements to the police incriminating the accused as alleged by the State, it soon became apparent when they took to the witness's stand where their allegiance stood, after all blood is thicker than water. Mgcini Ndlovu pretended to be an extremely stupid witness who kept on swallowing his words, saying things and then reneging from them and in the end succeeded to contribute absolutely nothing to the State case. He claimed to have been arrested by the police who assaulted him and detained him for a long time while eliciting a statement to the effect that the accused committed the offence. He denied having been in the company of the accused on the fateful day when he went to Esigodini to identify stolen property which had been recovered. He said he turned back on the way without giving any reason for that, conveniently being elsewhere when the real events unfolded. Mgcini denied boarding Tongai Nyoni's motor vehicle with the accused, his wife and son Meikles, together with the deceased.

That way he deprived the State of any evidence placing the accused anywhere near the deceased or the scene of the crime.

Although he dithered about the whereabouts of the accused at the time the shots sounded suggesting firstly that he had been at home and then appearing to say that he only returned home after the shots were fired, nothing reliable could be gleaned from his untruthful testimony.

Then came the dramatist herself, Edith Gwebu, the mother of the accused person. A very old but clever woman, this witness also reneged from her statement electing to volunteer evidence which was not asked of her, like that the accused had never owned or held a gun in his hands ever since she gave birth to him. One would have thought that the accused was always under her watchful eye and did not live in South Africa. More importantly, Edith Gwebu insisted that when gunshots were fired the accused had been sitting at home next to her in a round hut while enjoying his supper.

Again, this deprived the State of any evidence linking the accused to the shooting and presented the accused with an alibi, Christmas come early indeed.

Tongai Nyoni was next to wade away from his statement to the police. Appearing very timid and incoherent, the dreadlocked driver said he did not remember much except that he gave a lift to the deceased at Mawabeni Shopping Centre, although he did not even remember the deceased's name. He denied giving a lift to the accused and his wife putting the final nail in the coffin of the State case.

Nyoni may have been a recalcitrant witness for no apparent reason other than that he appeared fearful.

It is however the failure of the State to impeach any of the three hostile witnesses and to allow their evidence to remain intact and part of the State case which came as a surprise.

As it is, the State case, as presented to us, is that the accused did not board a lift with the deceased as alleged, he did not alight at Mbilamboyi Bus Stop with the deceased and the accused's family members and when the six gunshots sounded he was at home with his mother conveniently enjoying a meal. Presented with that kind of a sitter, Mr Matshakaile who appeared for the accused person gleefully made an application for discharge at the close of the State case on the basis that the State had failed to establish a prima facie case upon which the accused person could be put to his defence. He submitted that the State case always depended on circumstantial evidence. When both Mgcini Ndlovu and Edith Gwebu testified that he was at home when the shots that presumably killed the deceased were fired, there was no inference that could be drawn to the effect that he is the one who fired the shots.

We agree.

In terms of section 198(3) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]:

“If at the close of the case for the prosecution the court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence charged in the indictment, summons or charge, or any other offence of which he might be convicted thereon, it shall return a verdict of not guilty.”

It is a provision which has been relied upon by legal practitioners repeatedly over the years even those that have nothing else to do but would want to appear to have done it. In that regard the courts have pronounced themselves over and over again on an application for a discharge at the close of the State case in formulating the test to be applied in relating to such an application. See S v Hartlebury and Another 1985 (1) ZLR 1B-D; Attorney General v Bvuma and Another 1987 (2) ZLR 96 (S) 102 F-G; Attorney General v Mzizi 1991 (2) ZLR 321 (S) 232B; Attorney General v Tarwirei 1997 (1) ZLR 575 (S) 576G; S v Kachipare 1998 (2) ZLR 273(S) 276 D-E.

The essence of those judgments is that the court will acquit an accused person at the close of the State case where:

(i) there is no evidence to prove an essential element of the offence;

(ii) there is no evidence on which a reasonable court, acting carefully, might properly convict; or

(iii) the evidence of the State is so manifestly unreliable that no reasonable court could safely act on it. In the present case one does not even go beyond the first question as there is no evidence that has been led pointing to the accused as having fired the shots that killed the deceased.

Mr Hove who appeared for the State submitted that such evidence exists in the form of the testimony of Detective Sibanda who says that he observed Northstar tennis prints at the scene and similar ones at the accused's homestead. This is the same witness who was quick to admit that Northstar tennis shoes are very common and could have belonged to anyone. In any event he did not recover any such tennis shoes from the accused. Of course there is a lot that Detective Sibanda did not recover during his investigations including the murder weapon.

This is a case in which nobody witnessed the killing of the deceased and as such there is no direct evidence of the offence. The State case is therefore essentially circumstantial.

In our law, the guiding principle is that circumstantial evidence depends upon facts which are proved by direct evidence from which the court is required to draw inferences. Indeed, means, motive and opportunity are examples of circumstantial evidence. To show that the accused person had the means, a motive and the opportunity assists in persuading the court of his guilt and raises a prima facie case against him for him to answer. However, where the conviction of the accused is dependent upon circumstantial evidence, the inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with the proved facts and the facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from them except that which is sought to be drawn. See S v Edwards 1949 SR 30; R v Blom 1939 AD 188 at 202 -203; S v Vhera 2003 (1) ZLR 668 (H) 679 C-G; S v Phiri HB19/16; Hoffman and Zeffert, The South African Law of Evidence, 3rd edition pp 478479.

All the evidence of the State relevant to the issue having been that of the accused's relatives who turned hostile, the State had the option to impeach the witnesses in terms of section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].

Where a State witness has become hostile and departed from the statement made to the police because of his or her relationship to the accused or for any other reason, the State may really have no choice but to impeach that witness with a view, not to persuade the court to accept the evidence contained in the statement to the police, but simply to destroy his or her reliability for both sides. Failure to do so leaves the evidence of that recalcitrant witness sitting in the State case and causing havoc to it.

The procedure for impeachment involves the production of the original statement of the witness and making available to the witness the details of where and when the statement was made in order to identify it. When that has been done, the witness must then be asked if he made the statement. If the statement was signed the witness must be made to admit his signature. Once the witness has admitted making the statement, the statement should then be put to that witness in order to solicit an admission that he had said the words in the statement. Where the witness admits saying the words in the previous statement, the procedure is that the statement may be used without further proof. On the other hand, if the witness denies using the words contained in the statement, State counsel must then call witnesses who recorded and/or witnessed the making of the statement to prove that indeed the statement was made. In the process of impeachment, the witness must be made to explain the discrepancies between the previous statement and the hostile testimony in court. If the witness's explanation is not acceptable, the correct procedure is to impeach the witness in terms of section 316. See S v Chari 1989 (1) ZLR 231 (S); S v Muhlaba and Others 1973 (1) RLR 178 (GD).

It is when the State has made an application for the witness to be declared hostile, and the court has done so, that the State counsel may then proceed to cross examine his own witness. Before the declaration of hostility, the State counsel cannot go beyond merely pointing out the discrepancies and seeking an explanation from the witness.

It is that procedure which the State failed to adhere to when Mgcini Ndlovu, Edith Gwebu and Tongai Nyoni became hostile. The State allowed them to waffle and abandon their statements without pointing out the discrepancies and without even producing the original statements they had made. In short, the State did nothing about the patent betrayal with the result that the hostile evidence is now the only State case.

In the end what is left is the testimony of the investigating officer who did not witness the attack on the deceased and was nowhere near the scene.

Mr Hove for the State submitted that there are “pieces of evidence” which the accused should be put to his defence to explain. These are the footprints at the scene which Detective Sibanda said were similar to those found at his homestead after he had absconded and the telephone call he made to the good detective from South Africa when he heard the police were anxious to interview him. Although he undertook to avail himself at the end of the month he never did.

For Mr Hove to even allude to such evidence is indicative of the height of desperation the State was forced to scale. Surely the accused's response by telephone cannot lead to any inference useful to the State. Even the footprints are useless evidence in the manner they were presented. One needs go no further than Sibanda's own admission that the Northstar tennis shoe is very common and used by several people. Therefore there are several other inferences that can be drawn from that fact.

In any event, while it is permissible for the court to rely on evidence of footprints, there are a number of precautions to be observed before such evidence is used. For instance, the witness must tell the court by what characteristics or peculiarities or marks he recognised the footprints as being those of the accused. It is the ability to give a precise and detailed description of the unique features of the print which points to reliable identification. Needless to say that Sibanda's evidence does not even begin to meet the requirements. All this leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the State has not made a prima facie case against the accused person for him to be put to his defence. In fact, there is absolutely no evidence to prove that it is the accused who fired the shots that killed the deceased. The State case was not helped by the failure to locate the murder weapon or even to do the elementary follow up of crucial witnesses like the lady who employed the disinterested Tongai Nyoni and knew the locals. She was in the motor vehicle driven by Nyoni and would have easily identified the accused and his family.

Accordingly it is ordered that;

(1) The State has failed to prove a prima facie case upon which the accused could be put to his defence.

(2) The accused person is hereby found not guilty and acquitted of the charge of murder.


National Prosecuting Authority, the State's legal practitioners

Lazarus and Sarif, accused's legal practitioners

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