KAMOCHA J: The 26
year appellant was charged with the crime of rape. In
that during the period between the months of January 2008 and October 2008 and
on divers occasions he had sexual intercourse with the complainant who by that
time was 13 years old knowing that she had not consented to it or realizing
that there was a real risk or possibility that she may not have consented to
it.
In the alternative, he was charged
with contravening section 75(2)(b) of the Criminal Law Codification and Reform
Act [Chapter 9:23] in that he was alleged to have had, during the period
extending from January 2008 to October 2008, sexual intercourse with his step
daughter knowing that she was related to him.
The appellant tendered pleas of not
guilty and the matter proceeded to a full trial. He was found guilty as charged of rape on the
main count. On the alternative charge he
was found guilty of having sexual intercourse with a young person in
contravention of section 70(1)(a) of the Criminal Law Codification and Reform
Act [Chapter 9:23].
The court treated both counts as one
for the purpose of sentence and sentenced the appellant to 15 years
imprisonment of which 3 years imprisonment was suspended for 5 years on the
customary conditions of future good behavior.
He has appealed against both
conviction and sentence. In respect of
the convictions the appellant complained that it was improper for the learned
Regional Magistrate to convict him of both the main charge of rape and the
alternative charge of having sexual intercourse with a young person on divers
occasions from January 2008 to October 2008.
The appellant's criminal conduct could not have constituted two
different offences. Since he had been
charged in the alternative the court should have acquitted him on the main
charge of rape and convicted him of having sexual intercourse with a young
person in contravention of section 70 or contravening section 75 (2)(b) –
having sexual intercourse with his step daughter.
Appellant further complained that it
had not been established beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant had not
consented to the first act of sexual intercourse when regard is had to the fact
that she had not reported the matter at all.
It was only after her mother had assaulted her that she opened up. When she and the appellant were caught in fragrante delicto she initially
denied any wrong doing when confronted by Vimbayi. Complainant in fact admitted that after the
first act of sexual intercourse she had consented to the subsequent ones.
His complaint against the sentence
was that it was excessive and too long that it induced a sense of shock and
outrage. It was way out of line with the
maximum of 10 years imprisonment stipulated in section 70 of the Act. He concluded that since no violence was used
during the commission of the offence and regard being had to the ages of the
parties the sentence should be reduced to a period of imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years imprisonment.
Mr K Ndlovu counsel for the respondent conceded that it was not proper
for the trial court to convict the appellant on both the main count and
alternative. The concession was properly
made.
When charges are framed in the main
and alternative the accused person has an election to either plead guilty to
the main count or alternative count. He
can plead not guilty to both counts and may be found not guilty of both the
main and alternative; but he may not be found guilty of both counts. A further concession which was properly made
by the respondent's counsel was that the appellant ought to have been convicted
of contravening section 70(1)(a) – having sexual intercourse with a young
person but should have been acquitted of rape.
In relation to the sentence imposed
counsel for the respondent again properly conceded that it was out of step with
that prescribed by the provisions of section 70(1)(a) of the Act which provide
that a person convicted of having sexual intercourse with a young person shall
be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years.
Although the trial magistrate had
sentenced the appellant for both rape and having sexual intercourse with a
young person the sentence was incompetent because it exceeded what the law
provided. The global sentence imposed
should have been within the court's jurisdiction on both counts.
It was submitted by the respondent
counsel that the appellant deserved to be incarcerated for a long period in the
region of 10 years imprisonment with a portion being suspended on the customary
conditions of future good behavior. It
was pointed out that the appellant was 26 years when he committed the offences
while the complainant was 13 years old.
The offences were committed from January 2008 barely seven months after
she had attained the age of consent. The
age difference was 13 years which is too wide a difference. In addition the complainant was way below the
age of 16 years. Furthermore the
appellant was the boyfriend of the complainant's mother. He had sexual intercourse with the
complainant on divers occasions. Meaning
that at some stage he used to have sexual intercourse with both mother and
daughter during the same period. The
appellant is completely depraved. Very
little or nothing can be said in his favour.
The maximum sentence stipulated by law is appropriate in his case.
In the light of the foregoing the
appeal succeeds to the following extent:-
(a)
The
conviction of rape is hereby quashed and the appellant is acquitted on the main
count;
(b)
The
conviction for having sexual intercourse with a young person is confirmed; and
(c)
The
sentence of 15 years imprisonment imposed by the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the following:-
10 years imprisonment of which 2 years imprisonment is suspended for
period of 5 years on condition that the appellant is not convicted of any
offence of a sexual nature committed within that period for which he is
sentenced to imprisonment without the option of paying a fine.
Effective: 8 years imprisonment
Ndou J
…………………………………………….. I agree
