Subpoena re: Warrant of Entry, Search and Seizure, Claim for Return of Seized Property and the Anton Piller Order

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI
Ruled By: UCHENA J

The applicant's motor vehicle was, on 8 April 2010, seized by the third respondent without a warrant. It was seized because the police had information that it had been bought with proceeds from frauds committed by the applicant's brother, Roderick Chongo, against his employer, FBC Banking Limited, Mutare. The frauds are being investigated by the third respondent under Mutare Central CR's 07/02/10 and 42/02/10. The third respondents' investigations had, by the time he seized the applicant's vehicle, established that the applicant had, on two occasions, been given large sums of money by her brother, who is now on the run, to buy a house and household goods in her own name. The Agreement of Sale states that the applicant is the purchaser. The applicant had confessed, in an affidavit, that the house belonged to her brother who asked her to purport to be the buyer on his behalf.

The applicant applied to this court for a provisional order ordering the respondents to release the motor vehicle to her on the ground that the third respondent had unlawfully seized it without a warrant. She further said that she did not consent to its seizure.

The third respondent does not dispute seizing the motor vehicle without a warrant. He, in para 4 of his opposing affidavit says –

“I hold a reasonable suspicion that this vehicle is the product of the proceeds of a fraud which is under investigation under Mutare Central CR's 07/02/10, 41/02//10, ad 42/02/10, and I believe that a warrant, which I have already applied for, will be issued to me, thus the seizure cannot, at this particular point, be pronounced unlawful.”

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the seizure of property without a warrant must be in terms of section 51(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] which provides as follows –

“(1) A police officer may, without warrant, search any person or container or premises for purposes of seizing any article referred to in section forty-nine, and, additionally, or alternatively, seize any such article –

(a) If the person concerned consents to the search for, and, additionally, or alternatively, the seizure of the article in question, or if a person who may consent to the search of the container or premises, consents to such search, and, additionally, or alternatively, the seizure of the article in question; or

(b) If he, on reasonable grounds, believes that -

(i) A warrant would be issued to him in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section fifty if he applied for one; and

(ii) The delay in obtaining a warrant would prevent the seizure or defeat the object of the search, as the case may be.”

He submitted that there was no basis for the seizure of the motor vehicle without a warrant as the applicant had given the third respondent a certified copy of the motor vehicle's registration book.

Counsel for the respondents submitted that the seizure was in terms of section 51(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] as the third respondent believed, on reasonable grounds, that the warrant he had applied for would be issued.

A seizure without a warrant in terms of section 51(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] must satisfy the two requirements of section 51(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]. The officer effecting the seizure must, on reasonable grounds, believe that a warrant would be issued to him in terms of para (a) of subsection (1) of section fifty if he applied for one; and the delay in obtaining a warrant would prevent the seizure or defeat the object of the search, as the case may be.

In this case, counsel for the applicant submitted that the third respondent did not have reasonable grounds for believing that the delay in obtaining a warrant would prevent the seizure or defeat the object of the search as the third respondent had, just before the seizure, been given a certified copy of the motor vehicle's registration book.

I agree with counsel for the applicant that seizure without a warrant is only permissible if the two requirements of section 51(1)(b)(i) and (ii) are met. In this case, the first requirement is satisfied by the third respondent's narration of the basis of his suspicion; that the applicant was being used by her brother to spend proceeds of the frauds on properties which were being registered in her name. The third respondent was therefore justified in believing that the applicant had also been used by her brother to purchase, and register, the motor vehicle in her name. The modus operandi between the applicant and her brother had been established by her deposing an affidavit, Annexure C, to the third respondent's opposing affidavit, in the presence of her legal practitioner, in which she agreed to having bought the house mentioned in Annexure B for her brother in her own name. She had, again, been given money by her brother to buy household goods from the seller of the house. A total of $137,000= was spent on the house and household goods. She had also, during the relevant period, bought a Stand in Goromonzi for US$25,000=. The third respondent had also established that the applicant did not, during the relevant period, have such large sums of money in her bank account...,. The Goromonzi Stand was bought on 8 October 2009. The Marlborough house was bought on 12 December 2009. The motor vehicle in issue was registered in the applicant's name on 9 November 2009. The cumulative effect justifies the third respondent's suspicion that proceeds of frauds were used to buy the motor vehicle in question, and, that if he applied for a warrant of seizure on those facts it would be granted.

If that was all that he had to prove, he would have been able to defend his seizure of the motor vehicle without a warrant. The use of the word “and” at the end of section 51(1)(b)(i), and before section 51(1)(b)(ii), means the requirements of both subsections, (i) and (ii), must be satisfied before a seizure without a warrant can be lawful.

An examination of the respondent's opposing affidavit, however, reveals that he did not deal with the effect of the delay in seizing the motor vehicle while awaiting the issuance of a warrant of seizure. This leaves the issue of the effect of delay unexplained, and the seizure cannot, in the absence of that explanation, stand. In the case of Hako v Minister of Safety & Security & Anor 1996 (2) SA 891 (TK)..., MILLER AJ, commenting on the South African provision on seizure without a warrant identical to ours said -

“Lieutenant Colonel Westraad also avers that the seizure was performed in terms of s22(b)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act. He gives no reasons, or explanation, as to why the police officials did not obtain a search warrant prior to the seizure. Section 22(b)(i) cannot be read in isolation – it must be read together with s22(b)(ii). This is so because of the word “and” which appears immediately after s22(b)(i). There is absolutely nothing on record to suggest that a delay in obtaining a search warrant would defeat the object of the search.”

See also the case of Ndlovu v Minister of Police, Transkei & Ors 1993 (3) SA 91 (TK).

In this case, the absence of an explanation of the effect of a delay in seizing the motor vehicle while awaiting the issuance of a warrant of seizure is fatal. The application for the provisional order must, therefore, be granted.

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI
Ruled By: UCHENA J

I could, however, not lose sight of the fact that the third respondent had, in his opposing affidavit, said he had, before seizing the motor vehicle, applied for a warrant of seizure. It became necessary to find out the result of that application because if a warrant of seizure was granted before the seizure it might ...

I could, however, not lose sight of the fact that the third respondent had, in his opposing affidavit, said he had, before seizing the motor vehicle, applied for a warrant of seizure.

It became necessary to find out the result of that application because if a warrant of seizure was granted before the seizure it might have an effect on the order this court has to grant. The parties were called back for them to clarify whether or not the warrant was issued and when it was issued. Counsel for the respondents confirmed that it was, and produced Exhibit 1 by consent. The warrant of seizure was issued by a magistrate on 20 April 2010. It was, therefore, issued twelve days after the applicant's motor vehicle had been seized without a warrant.

The warrant does not have retrospective effect. It could only have been acted upon after it was issued. It therefore took effect from 20 April 2010 onwards. A reading of section 50(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] confirms that a warrant takes effect from the time it is issued. Section 50(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] provides as follows -

“(1) Subject to sections fifty-one, fifty-two, and fifty-three, an article referred to in section forty-nine shall be seized only by virtue of a warrant issued -

(a) ...,.

(b) ...,.

(2) A warrant issued in terms of subsection (1) shall require a police officer to seize the article in question and shall, to that end, authorize such police officer, where necessary -

(a) To search any person identified in the warrant; or

(b) To enter and search any premises identified in the warrant, or any premises within an area identified in the warrant, and to search any person found upon, or in, those premises.”

Section 50(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] clearly states that an article “shall be seized only by virtue of a warrant issued.” This means the warrant must be in existence before the seizure.

Section 50(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] clarifies the above by stating that “a warrant issued in terms of subs (1) shall require a police officer to seize the article in question, and shall, to that end, authorize such police officer, where necessary...,.”

Therefore, the warrant must pre-exist the seizure for it to “require a police officer to seize the article”, and authorize such officer to search persons, and enter premises, where necessary. The police officer must, in those circumstances, ascertain from the warrant the extent of the authority it gives him.

In this case, there is a clear distinction between the third respondent's conduct on 8 April 2010, when he clearly acted without a warrant, and what he may do in future in terms of the warrant issued on 20 April 2010.

HH156-11 : TENDAI BITI vs SUPERINTENDENT MAJUTA and ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER NYATHI and COMMISSIONER GENERAL CHIHURI and ECONET WIRELESS ZIMBABWE LIMITED
Ruled By: BHUNU J

The applicant is the Minister of Finance in the Ministry of Finance. On the other hand, the first to third respondents are members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police engaged in criminal investigations concerning cell phone lines 0772 568 807, 0774 346 082 and 0778 437 880 which have to do with the applicant's calls. The firstrespondent is the Investigating Officer whereas the second respondent is the Officer Commanding, Criminal Investigations (CID). The third respondent is the Commissioner General responsible for all police operations in Zimbabwe. The fourth respondent is a company in the business of mobile telephone communication services and is responsible for operating the above three cell phone numbers.

The police are currently investigating allegations against the applicant to the effect that he unlawfully authorized an employee in his Ministry, one Petronella Chishawa, to go on various foreign trips on special per diem rates thereby showing favour to the said Petronella Chishawa.

In the course of investigations, the first respondent first sought to obtain a record of information pertaining to the above three numbers on 20 June 2011 from the fourth respondent without success.

Having failed to obtain the required information upon request the police invoked the provisions of section 54(2)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]. That section permits police to enter premises and obtain evidence upon reasonable suspicion that relevant information may be obtained therein. The section provides as follows:

“54 Entering of premises for purposes of obtaining evidence

(1) Where a police officer in the investigation of an offence or alleged offence reasonably suspects that a person who may furnish information with reference to any such offence is upon or in any premises, he may, without warrant, enter the premises for the purpose of interrogating such person and obtaining a statement from him:

Provided that a police officer shall not enter any dwelling in terms of this section without the consent of the occupier thereof.

(2) Where a police officer of such class as the Minister may designate considers on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the purpose of investigating or detecting an offence to examine any books, documents or other records, he may, without warrant -

(a) Enter any premises for the purpose of examining such books, documents or other records; and

(b) Require from any person thereupon or therein the production then and there of such books, documents or other records which are or have been upon or in the premises or in the custody or under the control of any person by whom the premises are occupied or used; and may examine and make extracts from and copies of all such books, documents and other records:

Provided that a police officer shall not enter any dwelling in terms of this subsection without the consent of the occupier thereof.”

The above section quite clearly authorizes the police to obtain, without warrant, the required information not only upon reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed but also for purposes of detecting crime.

Out of an abundance of caution, the police, in an ex parte application, also obtained a search warrant in terms of section 49 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] as read with section 50 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] authorizing them to enter the fourth respondent's premises and seize the required information in the form of records pertaining to the call history of the three cell phone lines in question.

The applicant has since appealed to this court for an order setting aside the search warrant. He has now filed an urgent chamber application seeking to interdict the first, second and third respondents from accessing any information concerning his calls and the fourth respondent from providing the required information.

In determining the application, the court is duty bound to determine the applicant's prospects of success on appeal. The first hurdle which the applicant has to surmount is whether or not the search warrant is appealable.

It is trite that the Magistrate's Court is a creature of statute. It has no inherent jurisdiction. It thus can only do that which it is empowered to do by statute as it has no power of its own other than that conferred upon it by statute. The right to appeal against the Magistrates' Court decision in criminal proceedings is conferred upon it under section 60 of the Magistrates Court Act [Chapter 7:10] which provides that:

“60 Appeal from magistrates courts in criminal cases

(1) Subject to this section and any other enactment, any person who is convicted of any offence by a court may appeal to the High Court against the conviction and additionally, or alternatively, any sentence or order of the court following upon the conviction?

(2) …,.

(3) A person who is convicted of any offence by a court and who is discharged after conviction in terms of any provision of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] may appeal against such conviction to the High Court.

(4) Any person who has been convicted by a court but sentenced by a judge of the High Court in terms of Part IX of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] may appeal to the Supreme Court against such conviction or any sentence imposed upon him or any order of court following upon such sentence as though he had been both convicted and sentenced in the High Court.”

It is self-evident that the Magistrates Court Act [Chapter 7:10] makes no provision for an appeal to any court against the issuance of a search warrant in terms of section 54 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]. I have also perused the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] and I am satisfied that it makes no provision for an appeal against a search warrant issued by a magistrate in terms of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].

Section 60 of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06] limits the right of appeal in criminal cases from the Magistrates Court to those aggrieved by conviction or sentence or where the right of appeal to the High Court has been conferred by statute. Despite being specifically asked, counsel for the applicant has been unable to point to any statutory provision which entitles an aggrieved person to appeal to the High Court against the issuing of a search warrant by a magistrate.

In the absence of any right of appeal to the High Court, it appears to me that a search warrant issued by a magistrate can only be impugned on review and not appeal. That being the case, the prospects of the High Court entertaining the appeal pending before it in respect of this matter are pretty deem indeed.

HB87-11 : WOMEN OF ZIMBABWE ARISE TRUST vs THE OFFICER IN CHARGE C.I.D. LAW AND ORDER and THE OFFICER COMMANDING C.I.D LAW AND ORDER CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT P.R. MOYO and ANOTHER
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

The applicant leases House No.33A Clark Road, Suburbs, Bulawayo which premises it uses as offices. On 10 June 2011, the police raided the premises and forced their way in causing the occupants to flee. They then took occupation of the premises through mounted guards who have stood sentinel for 24 hours everyday up to ...

The applicant has brought this urgent application seeking an order for restoration of possession and directing the police to leave the premises.

In their opposing papers, the respondents state that they undertook that exercise because they “had information that there were some illegal activities taking place” at the house.

They have not disclosed what these illegal activities are.

The respondents also state that after forcing their way into the house “no one asked for a search warrant from them and no search was conducted since all the occupants had fled.” They say the guards have been placed there awaiting the arrival of the occupants so that a search can be done in their presence.

The explanation given by the respondents for the unusual behaviour of the police to take occupation of the applicant's premises does not hold water at all. Firstly, counsel for the respondents submitted that there is an individual at the premises who uses the servant's quarters but the police cannot conduct the search in the presence of that individual because they want a representative of the applicant, who is not that individual, to be present during the search. He did not give a name of that other representative. If it is accepted that there is someone at the premises and that the police genuinely want to conduct a search in the presence of someone, there is absolutely nothing stopping the police from undertaking the search because the applicant's representative is on the ground to superintend that search.

Secondly, the respondents conceded that the applicant's legal practitioners did attend at the house immediately after police's arrival intending to oversee the activities of the police at the house. It is not clear why the police could not undertake the search in the presence of the legal representatives of the applicant. The applicant has a constitutional right to be represented by a legal practitioner of their choice and the police must live with that.

Affidavits have been submitted by Mr Kossam Ncube and Ms Nosimilo Chanayiwa to the effect that the police actually chased them away from the house. Mr Kossam Ncube stated, in his affidavit, that:

“3…,. The position is that on Friday the 10^th June 2011, when the police raided the applicant's offices, I was summoned to the scene and went there in the company of Nosimilo Chanayiwa of the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights.

4. When we got there we parked our vehicle about 5 metres from the gate where our client's offices are housed.

5. The police immediately came to where we were parked and ordered us to leave. They indicated that they did not want to discuss anything with us and they sternly advised that if we did not want any trouble we should leave forthwith.”

As if that was not enough, the respondents admit having received a letter from Kossam Ncube and Partners, dated 13 June 2011, which is filed of record, in which the legal practitioners make it clear they represent the applicant. If, indeed, the police wanted to conduct a search at the premises, they could have easily done so in the presence of the legal practitioners who availed themselves on 10 June 2011.

Instead, they chased then away.

Even if this had been done by overzealous junior officers on the ground, the first respondent had an opportunity, when he received the letter of 13 June 2011, to liaise with the applicant's legal practitioners so that they avail themselves for the search to be carried out in their presence. For him to claim now that his officers are standing sentinel at the house awaiting the arrival of a representative of the applicant, who is not the one at the premises and is also not the legal practitioner that he knows, is simply a red herring and cannot be taken seriously.

Thirdly, the search warrant issued by Superintendent Mupungu that has been produced by the respondents is dated 10 June 2011 and authorises the bearer to search the premises, a Ford Ranger registration number ABI 3569 and Nissan Saloon registration number AAY 1888 for:

“Unregistered firearms, documents containing subversive information which adversely affects (sic) the economic interests of the State and any other offensive materials.”

There is nothing in the warrant suggesting that the search can only be conducted in the presence of a specific individual. Therefore, there was nothing stopping the officers from undertaking the exercise in the presence of the legal practitioners who attended the scene on 10 June 2011 and the occupant of the premises. In fact, counsel for the respondents emphatically argued that they do not want to arrest anyone but merely to conduct a search. This lends credence to the applicant's claims that the police did search the premises on that day. It also makes their continued presences at the premises inexplicable indeed.

The deployment of guards at the premises of the applicants in the manner employed by the respondents is not only clearly unjustified but is also unnecessary over-handedness that cannot be allowed. The police can still effectively discharge their constitutional mandate of investigating crime without resorting to such crude methods. In my view, the applicant has made out a good case for the relief sought.

Accordingly, the provisional order is granted in terms of the amended draft. The interim relief granted is as follows:

1. The applicants be and are hereby restored to full possession and occupation of House No.33A Clark Road, Suburbs, Bulawayo.

2. The respondents be and are hereby directed to order and facilitate the immediate withdrawal of all police officers from the aforesaid house and the surrounding yard.

3. The respondents be and are hereby directed to ensure that nothing is removed from the aforesaid house without due process.

HH354-13 : STANBIC NOMINEES PRIVATE LIMITED and STANBIC BANK ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs REMO INVESTMENT BROKERS (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

On 5 April 2012, the respondents, under an ex parte application in case number HC3694/12, were granted an Anton Pillar provisional order by this court. The terms of the interim relief were: “2. Respondent, its officials assigns, or agents on whom service is effected in terms of this order is ordered to allow the Deputy Sheriff, ...

On 5 April 2012, the respondents, under an ex parte application in case number HC3694/12, were granted an Anton Pillar provisional order by this court. The terms of the interim relief were:

“2. Respondent, its officials assigns, or agents on whom service is effected in terms of this order is ordered to allow the Deputy Sheriff, Mr Charles Chinyama (the Supervising Attorney) together with Mr Jonathan Samkange or failing him Mr Everson Samkange, the Applicant's Attorney including the applicant's officials to immediately enter the premises listed in paragraph 11 in the Founding Affidavit and any facilities and/or vehicles on such premises for the purposes of searching for and delivering into the Deputy Sheriff all the share certificates and any such documents listed in paragraph 5 of the Founding Affidavit and Annexure “A” and such documents which any of the aforementioned persons reasonably believe to relate to the Applicant.

3. Respondents, its officials, assigns or agents on whom service is effected in terms of this order is further ordered to permit the said persons to remain on the premises until the search is completed and if necessary to re-enter the premises on the same or following day to complete the search.

4. The Supervising Attorney mentioned in paragraph 2 above, together with the Deputy Sheriff, shall make a list of the recovered and removed share certificates in terms of this order. A copy of this list shall be handed by the Supervising Attorney to the Applicant's Attorney and to the 1^st Respondent or any such officials representing the 1^st Respondent referred to in paragraph 2 and 3 above. If present, and a copy shall be retained by the Deputy Sheriff.

5. In the event any of the said share certificates or relevant documentation exist in computer readable form, Respondent and its official is ordered to forthwith provide the Deputy Sheriff with effect access to the computers and all necessary password to enable them to be searched and cause the listed items to be printed out, a printout of these items is to be given to the Deputy Sheriff or displayed on the computer screen so that it may be read and copied by him.

6. The listed items taken into possession by the Deputy Sheriff pursuant to this order shall be retained by him until the court orders otherwise. Save as provided hereinafter, no person shall be entitled to inspect any of the items taken into possession by the Deputy Sheriff nor shall any copies of such documents be made. Provided that pending the return day for the sole purpose of satisfying himself that the inventory correctly reflects the items seized. 1^st Respondents and his Attorney shall be entitled to inspect the items in the Deputy Sheriff's possession.

7. Applicant is directed to serve the court application in case number HC3624/12 on the Respondents within ten days from the date of this order and if it fails, without good reasons being shown on the return day to have filed and served such application by that date, the Sheriff shall return all the items immediately to 1^st Respondent and in such event the Court, in its discretion, shall make such order as it deems fit.

8. On the return day there shall be placed before the Court the report of the Supervising Attorney with proof that a copy thereof has been served on the Applicant's Attorney and on 1^st Respondent or their Attorney and an Affidavit of the Applicants Attorney that the said action has been duly instituted and if not the reason why this has not been done.

9. (a) Service of this order, together with the Notice on the 1^st Respondent or the person responsible for the premises shall be effected and the content thereof shall be explained by the Supervising Attorney before the provisions of paragraph 2 are carried out.

(b) In addition to the served referred to in sub paragraph (a) above service of the order, together with the Notice of Motion, supporting affidavits and accompanying Notice to Respondent shall be effected by the Deputy Sheriff in accordance with the rules of the court no later than 48 hours after the Supervising Attorney has directed that the search is finished.

(c) The provisions of paragraph 2 and 3 of this order may only be carried out in the presence and under the supervision of the Supervising Attorney.

10. Pending the finalisation of the Applicant's claim against the Respondents in case number HC3624/12, the 1^st Respondent be and is hereby barred and interdicted from destroying, concealing in any way, cause to be shipped or flown out any of the documents relating to share and certificates belonging to the Applicant.”

On 3^rd May 2012, the provisional order was amended as follows:-

“The Provisional Order granted on the 5^th of April 2012 is hereby amended by;

(i) Deleting on paragraph 2 line 5, paragraph 10 - and substituting it with paragraph 11; and

(ii) Adding on paragraph 2, the list of the companies and premises to be searched as follows;

Interfin Securities – 38 McChlery Avenue, Eastlea, Harare;

Corpserve Private Limited – 2^nd Floor, ZB Centre, Corner Kwame Nkrumah Avenue/First Street (formerly UDC Centre), Harare;

Kingdom Stockbrokers (Pvt) Ltd – 4^th Floor Karigamombe Centre, Julies Nyerere Way/Samora Machel Avenue, Harare;

Platinum Asset Management – 1^st Floor, 5 Central Avenue, Harare;

Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Custodial – 59 Samora Machel Avenue, Harare;

Barclays Bank Zimbabwe Custodial – Birmingham Road, Harare; and any other such addresses to which Applicant's shares or subsequent shares are reasonably believed to be kept or hidden.”

The above amendment was necessitated by a failure on the part of the Deputy Sheriff to execute the order on the applicants.

The background to the above order is that on a date, not indicated in these papers, the respondent obtained a loan from Interfin Securities (Pvt) Ltd and pledged its shares as security. The respondent repaid the loan in full and then demanded the return, from Interfin Securities (Pvt) Ltd, of its shares and certificates.

The shares and certificates were not returned.

The respondent then filed an urgent ex parte application. The result was the above provisional order granted by this court. The Deputy Sheriff was then instructed to execute the order against those holding the shares and certificates. An attempt to execute on the applicants failed because the applicants argued that the order was not binding on them since they were not cited in the ex parte urgent application. That development led to this application wherein the applicants seek a declaratory order in the following terms:

“IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the Provisional Order issued on the 5^th April 2012 as well as the Amended Provisional Order issued by this Honourable Court on the 9^th May 2012 under Case no. HC36894/12 are not binding on the 1^st and 2^nd Applicants.

2. That the Respondent shall pay the costs of this application.”

The parties to the exparte urgent application appear on the provisional order. They do not include the applicants. However, paragraph 2 of the order makes reference to the Founding Affidavit in HC3694/12 – wherein in paragraph 11 of the said affidavit the following entities are listed:-

“(i) Interfin Securities – 38 McChlery Avenue, Eastlea, Harare;

(ii) Corpserve Private Limited – 2^nd Floor, ZB Centre, Corner Kwame Nkrumah Avenue/First Street (formerly UDC Centre), Harare;

(iii) Kingdom Stockbrokers (Pvt) Ltd – 4^th Floor Karigamombe Centre, Julies Nyerere Way/Samora Machel Avenue, Harare;

(iv) Platinum Asset Management – 1^st Floor, 5 Central Avenue, Harare;

(v) Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Custodial – 59 Samora Machel Avenue, Harare;

(vi) Barclays Bank Zimbabwe Custodial – Birmingham Road, Harare; and any other such addresses to which Applicant's shares or subsequent shares are reasonably believed to be kept or hidden.”

The amendment of the Provisional Order on 3 May 2012 was meant to incorporate the above-listed entities. However, that incorporation did not amend the parties to the application. The parties remained as they were in the ex parte application.

In its opposing affidavit, the respondent, in part, states:

“1. Relief sought incompetent

Applicants are seeking to review or appeal the provisional order in case no. HC3694/12 by applying for a declaratory order. The provisional order complained of categorically authorised the Deputy Sheriff to enter certain premises which included Applicants' premises. What Applicants are seeking now is to have the provisional order varied through a declaratory order. This is incompetent. Applicants are seeking this same court to review its own order and the application should fail on this basis alone.

2. Applicants have dirty hands

Applicants' conduct is contemptuous and unethical. A litigant who defies a court order cannot be heard until they have complied with what the order says. Applicants deliberately, in a bid to defeat the provisional order, caused the transfer of Old Mutual shares, through Corpserve (Private) Limited, to a South African Company, Peregrinne (Pty) Ltd, and which shares were deposited with Kantor and Immerman on 16^th May 2012.

More fundamentally, the Respondent sought amendment to the order specifically to cover the Applicants and it was this amendment which Applicant evaded. This conduct is unlawful and defeats the integrity of court orders. Applicants should therefore be denied audience until they comply with the court order.

15. Applicants have ignored free legal counsel. Applicants, though their legal practitioners of record, were hinted to make an application for joinder which application would not be opposed. The Applicants did not do so. It was not only legally impossible, but it is also a practical falsity to believe that all the depositories of the Respondent's shares could be cited with precision. The volatile nature of shares was also taken into account by His Lordship in granting the order in HC3694/12. This application is an attempt by the Applicants to cover up for their disobedience of a valid court order. The court should proceed to deny Applicants audience until such time as they purge their contempt.”

According to the respondent, at the time of the hearing of this matter, the shares were no longer in the custody of the applicants and hence the submission that “the declaratory order sought is of an academic interest to the applicants and no more than that.”

The respondent, relying on Ngulube v Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and Others SC52-02 correctly spelt out the requirements for a declaratory order as follows:

“1. The applicant had to have an interest in an “existing, future, or contingent right or obligation;

2. The interest must not be an academic or abstract one;

3. There must be an interested person on whom the declaratory order would be binding;

4. The remedy is available at the discretion of the court and the applicant must satisfy the court that the case was a proper one.”

The respondent went further to submit that;

“12. Applicants did not comply with the order which required the search and seizure of shares and share certificates. Respondent, notwithstanding Applicants' disobedience of the order, have sought a confirmation of the court order from this Honourable Court. Applicants have disposed of the shares to a third party and there is nothing to be retrieved from them. Applicants defeated the court order.

13. It is submitted that the relief of a declaratory order is espoused in the various court cases, is not available for parties seeking to make an academic or intellectual point. There must be some justifiable advantage. See in this regard Barron v Greendale Town Management Board 1957 (2) SA 521 (SR); Musara v Zinatha 1992 (1) ZLR…, (H); and Lupu v Lupu 2000 (1) ZLR 120 (SC).”

The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the application with costs on an attorney – client scale.

On their part, the applicants justified their case by relying on Section 14 of the High Court Act [Chaper 7:06] which provides as follows;

“The High Court may, in its discretion, at the insistence of any interest person, inquire into and determine any existing, future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstanding that such person cannot claim any relief consequential upon such determination.”

The applicants' position was that they were not obliged to obey an order in which they were not cited. All they wanted was for the court to make a determination on whether or not the order granted to the respondent was binding on them when they were not cited as parties in the matter. The applicants submitted, in part, that:-

“10. From the foregoing, it is clear that the court order obtained by the Respondent in this matter was an order ad factum praestundum; that is an order to do, abstain from doing a particular act or deliver a thing,“(See HERBSTEIN and VAN WINSEN, the Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in South Africa 3ed p653. Such an order, by its nature, can only be enforced against the particular Respondent named in the court order and by no way can be construed as an order affecting status and therefore an order or judgment in rem.

11. In view of the foregoing, it would have been, therefore, imperative, in order for the Applicants to be bound by the orders obtained and sought to be enforced against them that they be cited therein. The failure to cite the Applicants clearly means that the order obtained cannot be enforced against them. In Rodgers and Ors v Muller and Ors 2010 (1) ZLR 49 (H) this court ruled that Rule 87(1) of the High Court of Zimbabwe Rules 1971 did not absolve a litigant of the obligation to cite all the relevant parties. Patel J at 53B – C stated as follows:-

'The discretion of the court in this regard must be exercised so as to ensure that all person who might be affected by its determination of the issues in dispute be afforded the opportunity to be heard before that determination is actually made.'

The court therefore held in the matter that the failure to cite the relevant Minister was a fatal defect and the application in that matter should be dismissed simply on the basis of that preliminary issue.”

In essence, the applicants contend that there was no order to comply with and as such the issue of approaching the court with dirty hands does not come into play. The applicants neither deny nor confirm whether or not the certificates and shares are still in their custody. That, in any case, would be irrelevant to them, since, in the absence of a court order, they could deal with the shares and certificate without hinderance.

In the headnote to Cooper v Leslie and Ors 2000 (1) ZLR 14 (H) the following appears;

“An Anton Piller Order is a modern legal remedy devised to cater for modern problems in the prosecution of civil actions. The procedure allows a party to make an ex parte application, without notice to the other side, for the attachment and removal of documents or other evidence. It has its genesis in English Law. Originally, its use was confined to cases involving intellectual property, but has since been extended to cover other civil cases. It has, after some initial reluctance and some contradictory judgments, been accepted by the courts of South Africa and should be accepted as part of the law of Zimbabwe.

An applicant for an Anton Piller Order must prima facie establish:

1. That he has a cause of action against the respondent which he intends to pursue;

2. That the respondent has, in his possession, specific and specified documents or things which constitute vital evidence in substantiation of the applicant's cause of action but in respect of which the applicant cannot claim a real or personal right; and

3. That there is a real and well-founded apprehension that this evidence may be hidden or destroyed or in some manner spirited away by the time the case comes to trial or to the stage of discovery.

The remedy may, if used indiscriminately, become an instrument of oppression, so the court must proceed with caution and impose safeguards to protect the rights of the party against whom the relief is sought. In exercising its discretion, the court must pay regard to the cogency of the prima facie case established with reference to the three items listed above; the potential harm that will be suffered by the respondent if the order is granted as compared to the potential harm to the applicant if is not; and whether the terms of the order sought are no more onerous than is necessary to protect the interests of the applicant.”…,.

In his judgment in Cooper v Leslie and Ors 2000 (1) ZLR 14 (H), DEVITTE J notes:

1. “There are two respects in which an Anton Piller Order is unusual. Firstly, it is akin to a search warrant in that the plaintiff and his attorneys are authorised to enter the respondent's premises and to inspect them or remove documents or other goods. Secondly, no prior notice is given to the respondent.”…,.

From the above, it is, in my view, quite clear that the Anton Piller Order should be directed to a specific respondent to whom notice is being denied until the search is effected. That is what brings the need for the court “to proceed with caution and impose safeguards to protect the rights of the party against whom the relief is sought.” Surely such a party (respondent) must be known and it can only be known through citation as a party to the proceeding(s).

The respondent in casu, as contained in its founding affidavit, knew who it wanted to proceed against but decided to bring into the body of the order the “parties to be searched.” The respondent knew that the premises' belonged to the applicants (see paragraph 1 of the opposing affidavit quoted herein….,.). I am unable to accept that that was the citation expected by the applicants and envisaged in law. I am certain that, prior to the amendment, the respondent knew what the applicants wanted as reflected in one its letters.

On 3 May 2012, the respondent's legal practitioners wrote to Hungwe J in the following terms:

“At the hearing of the urgent application held on the 4^th of April 2012, our Mr Samkange advised your Lordship that an application to amend the Anton Pillar Order had been made before Justice Patel. Justice Patel had issued the original Provisional Anton Pillar Order. It has not been amended. A copy of the Amended Provisional Order is attached hereto.

Our appreciation of the Applicant complained against the original order is that they had not been cited in the Provisional Order. This has since been rectified.

1. Consequently, the basis of the complaint has since been attended to by the amendment. We are copying this letter to all the parties affected.”…,.

HH58-14 : MICHAEL P. HITSCHMAN and PESCA (PVT) LTD vs COMMISSIONER - GENERAL OF POLICE and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and ATTORNEY GENERAL and SUPERINTENDENT ARNOLD DHLIWAYO
Ruled By: NDEWERE J

The applicant was arrested in March 2006 for unlawful possession of firearms. He was convicted for contravening the Public Order and Security Act [Chapter 11:17] and sentenced. At the time of arrest, the police recovered several firearms and other property from the applicants' premises. The recovered property was not returned to the applicants after the ...

On 4 July, 2012, the applicants filed a court application for the return of the seized property. The applicants' prayer was for the watch, Trace Mod S3001B, a Hewlett Packard laptop, restoration to the second applicant of property listed in Annexure B by handing over the property to a firearms dealer designated by the applicants, return of the radio equipment in Annexure C and return of the applicant's files containing his documents. Alternatively, in relation to property in Annexure B and C the respondents were to pay the applicants US$23,345= and US$2,825= being the replacement value of the property in Annexure B and C respectively. The applicant also wanted the respondents to pay the costs of the suit….,.

On the date of the hearing, there was no appearance for the respondents.

Such conduct from the respondents' legal representatives is shocking to say the least. An applicant who was convicted for contravening the Public Order and Security Act was applying to have, among other things, the firearms seized from him at the time of arrest returned to him. One would have expected the respondents' legal representatives to be very alert and ensure that they complied with every court Rule to ensure a proper defence in the matter.

This was not the case….,.

The applicants presented their application and the court sought clarifications from counsel. When the applicant's counsel was presenting his last clarification to the court, following a query, that is when an officer from the Attorney General's office walked in and tried to interject. The court did not give him audience because he was already barred and proceedings were almost over….,.

In the Draft Order, the first applicant seeks the return of his watch Trade Mod S3001B and a Hewlett Packard laptop. During the hearing, the applicant's counsel abandoned the claims for the return of the wrist watch and laptop. On the wrist watch, he said in view of the dispute that it was never recovered and in view of the fact that the applicant had no evidence to prove that indeed it was recovered, the applicant had no option but to abandon the claim. Regarding the laptop, the applicant's counsel conceded that the first applicant did not know its serial number and that he had no other identifying features for it.

The claims for the wrist watch and laptop therefore fell by the wayside.

The applicants sought the return of the property listed in Annexure B which comprised a list of mainly different types of firearms from 1 to 29.

In their opposing affidavits, the first and fifth respondents averred that some of the firearms on Annexure B were never recovered. During the hearing, the applicants' counsel abandoned his clients claim to the firearms whose recovery was disputed but said those which were recovered should be returned to the applicants. The applicants' argument was that at the time the firearms were seized by the police, the second applicant lawfully possessed them as it had a license. However, in paragraph 17 of the founding affidavit, the applicants concede that the license which the second applicant had at the time of arrest expired and was not renewed. Paragraph 17 actually states the following;

“I am aware that second applicant cannot be in lawful possession of the firearms at this stage.”

The above concession means the court cannot make a decision to return the firearms in Annexure B to the applicants because the second applicant cannot lawfully possess them anymore.

In terms of section 59(1)(iii) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07], referred to by the applicants, if the person the article was seized from cannot lawfully possess the article and the police officer concerned does not know a person who may lawfully possess the article, the article shall be forfeited to the State. There is no provision in section 59 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07], or in any other relevant section, which provides for a sale as suggested by the applicants in paragraph 17 of their founding affidavit. The only option, if the officer does not know of a person who may lawfully possess the seized article, is forfeiture to the State. Sections 61 and 62 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] are similarly worded and they too provide for forfeiture to the State - without notice to any other person.

Consequently, the applicants' prayer that the seized firearms should be sold on their behalf or a replacement value paid to them cannot succeed.

The applicant's prayer was also for the return of some radio communication equipment which they say belonged to the second applicant and was licensed by the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ). However, the applicant failed to produce the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ) license to show that the second applicant still has a valid license for the radio equipment.

Proof that a person may lawfully possess a seized article is a requirement before the seized article can be returned to them. Consequently, in the absence of proof that the second applicant still has a valid licence for the radio equipment, the court cannot order its return to the applicants.

The applicant is also seeking the return of his several files containing his documents. During the application hearing, the applicants' counsel conceded that there were no identifying features on the files neither could the first applicant provide the number of the files.

It is not possible for the court to order the release of unknown files without any identifying features.

The application is therefore dismissed with costs.

HH475-18 : ETHEL TSITSI MPEZENI vs ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZHOU J

Section 57 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides as follows: “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have – (a) Their home, premises or property entered without their permission; (b) Their person, home, premises or property searched; (c) Their possessions seized; (d) The privacy of their communications infringed; or (e) Their health condition disclosed.” The use of the word “includes” ...

HHH185-15 : ITAI MOTSI vs THE STATE
Ruled By: HUNGWE J and BERE J

On 18 May 2012, a team of detectives, led by Detective Inspector Alexander Jachi of the Criminal Investigating Department's Vehicle Theft Squad, investigating some other offences, received a report concerning the appellant and others. That report gave them reasonable cause to believe that they might be able to recover firearms from the appellant. Acting on this piece ...

That report gave them reasonable cause to believe that they might be able to recover firearms from the appellant. Acting on this piece of information the team proceeded to Dema. They found the appellant at his uncle's homestead and placed him under arrest. They asked him to take him to his residence which was a single flat-roofed room some 200m away. In the presence of his uncle, a search of the appellant's room yielded a CZ pistol from between the mattress and base-bed.

There is dispute as to whether the appellant and his uncle voluntarily signed an acknowledgement of the recovery of the firearm.

This is the pistol handed to Assistant Inspector Innocent Dube on 21 May 2012 by Detective Sergeant Nhokwara. This information was relayed to Detective Sergeant Maigeta (“Maigeta”) who is the investigating officer for the Christon Bank attempted murder report. The appellant and his co-accused were then charged for attempted murder and unlawful possession of firearms….,.

As for the second Count, I am not persuaded by the argument put forward by the appellant. In short, the argument is that he was convicted on the basis of inadmissible evidence.

I disagree.

The evidence shows that the police detectives, upon arresting the appellant, decided to conduct a search of his premises. He indicated the house which was subject of the search. They had no search warrant, but, in terms of section 51(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07], the police details were entitled to conduct the search. That section states:

“51 Search and seizure without warrant

(1) A police officer may, without warrant, search any person or container or premises for the purposes of seizing any article referred to in section forty-nine, and, additionally, or alternatively, seize any such article —

(a) If the person concerned consents to the search for, and, additionally, or alternatively, the seizure of the article in question or if a person who may consent to the search of the container or premises consents to such search, and, additionally, or alternatively, the seizure of the article in question; or

(b) If he, on reasonable grounds, believes that —

(i) A warrant would be issued to him in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section fifty if he applied for one; and

(ii) The delay in obtaining a warrant would prevent the seizure or defeat the object of the search, as the case may be.”

See also section 54 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07].

HH229-15 : IZAYI PARK HOUSING SCHEME (represented by ELINAS GUMBO) vs SHADRECK GWENA and OTHERS
Ruled By: TAGU J

The applicant seeks a spoliation order against all the 18 respondents on the following terms:“A. TERMS OF THE FINAL ORDER SOUGHTIt is ordered that:(1) The Respondents are interdicted from interfering with the Applicant's project and business in whatever manner.(2) The Respondents' behaviour and conduct is hereby declared wrongful and unlawful.(3) ...

The applicant seeks a spoliation order against all the 18 respondents on the following terms:

“A. TERMS OF THE FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

It is ordered that:

(1) The Respondents are interdicted from interfering with the Applicant's project and business in whatever manner.

(2) The Respondents' behaviour and conduct is hereby declared wrongful and unlawful.

(3) The Respondents are ordered to pay costs of suit on a client–attorney scale.

B. PROVISIONAL ORDER GRANTED

Pending the confirmation of the provisional order;

It is ordered that;

(1) The Respondents be and are hereby ordered to release and return all documents, and office keys to the Applicant forthwith or at least not later than 48 hours from the date of this order.

(2) The Respondents are ordered to vacate the Applicant's offices at No.6 Kataza Road, Zvishavane and allow the Applicant to take occupation of its offices forthwith.

(3) The Respondents are barred from interfering with the Applicant's affairs, business or/and project in whatsoever manner unless with the Applicant's consent.

(4) The Respondents are barred from going to Izayi Park project site unless with the consent of the Applicant.

(5) The Respondents are interdicted from harassing and threatening the Applicant's executive members or the Applicant's general members in whatever manner.

C. SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

Service of this order shall be effected by the Applicant's legal practitioners.”...,.

I will now deal with the merits of the application.

Mr Elinas Gumbo stated, in his founding affidavit, that the applicant operates as a housing co-operative, a scheme established in 2007 and managed by the Ministry of Local Government and Housing Development, doing business in Zvishavane in conjunction with Zvishavane Town Council. It has been operating smoothly to date and run by an executive committee of six members who are himself, Elinos Gumbo, Engineer Chiraya, Ngara Phiri, Benson Farai, Rufaro Nyoni, and Maxwell Mubaiwa.

He said recently, and on 7 February 2015, the respondents, most of whom are defaulters, ganged and decided to oust the executive committee in a coup style.

What happened was that the applicant called for a meeting on 7 February 2015 at Izayi Park for all its members so that they could appraise them on the state of progress and the respondents planned their meeting on the same day and time with the applicant. When the meeting started, at 09:00am, the respondents chased the applicant away claiming that they were war veterans and the 14th respondent claimed he was a police officer who could arrest the applicant's executives if they refuse to leave the meeting.

The applicant's executive members complied and left the meeting, but after dissolving the meeting. The respondents proceeded with an illegal meeting when most of the members had left with the applicant's executive members. The applicant then reported the matter to the relevant Ministry which is currently seized with the matter.

Whilst waiting for the Ministry to finalise the matter and resolve the dispute, the respondents teamed up, and, on 16 February 2015, besieged the applicant's offices at No.6 Kataza Road, Zvishavane. They forcibly entered the offices and took the office keys and books and proceeded to unlawfully evict all office bearers and threw their belongings outside.

The applicant reported the matter to the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Zvishavane, but, the fourth respondent, who is a police officer, influenced the police who then told the applicant that the matter was a civil matter.

This prompted the applicant to approach this court on an urgent basis as there is no alternative relief in the circumstances.

The applicant felt that it will suffer irreparable harm as the respondents' conduct was unlawful and a cash box with US$23,500 was taken away. Furthermore, he said the respondents threatened to kill the applicant's executive members should they dare challenge them hence the members are now living in fear of the respondents' barbaric behaviour.

The respondents, through an affidavit deposed to by one Shadreck Gwena, the first respondent, denied the allegations.

They admitted that the project was established in 2007, but claimed that it has not been functioning smoothly to date. They submitted that the project was terminated in May 2013 and the beneficiaries held a meeting on 3 January 2015 and voted out the old committee. A new committee, comprising of the following members, was voted into office. These are Stephen Chipembere, Noel Muremba, Munashe Chikwekwe, Tendayi Sibanda, Erina Chipungu, Kennedy Shumba, Captain Chipwanyira, Panyika Ndlovu, and Virginia Sithole.

The respondents, further, claimed that at the meeting of the 7th of February 2015 they did not chase away the old committee members, but, rather, challenged them on why they were calling the meeting when they had been ousted, and at a time they were being investigated.

They confirmed that the 14th respondent is a member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police and is also the investigating officer in the case involving the old committee members.

It is their contention that they did not besiege the office or acted in the manner described. They claimed that the receipt books and all documentations pertaining to the scheme were taken by the police pending investigations.

They denied taking a cash box containing US$23,500. They said by involving the police they did not take the law into their hands. On the contrary, they accused the applicant of taking the law into his hands by approaching this court thereby hampering investigations.

From the submissions, it is apparent that Elinas Gumbo was all along the authorized representative of Izayi Park Housing Scheme. He was a member of the old executive running the offices and affairs of the housing scheme. It is clear that some items were taken out of the offices of Izayi Park Housing Scheme following a meeting held by the beneficiaries on 7 February 2015. The taking was done without the consent of the old executive members. It was also taken without an order of the court.

The respondents managed to file two relevant documents in their opposing papers to support the existence of a new executive committee. They did not file anything to prove that the purported new executive committee was voted into office on 3 January 2015. This they could have done by way of filing the minutes of the 3rd of January 2015 or at least a copy of the agenda of the 3rd of January 2015.

What is attached are minutes of the meeting of the 7th of February 2015. In that minute, it is clear that the old executive members had been given the police clearance by the Dispol to hold the meeting at the same venue. Further, the minutes showed, in clear terms, that the old executive was asked to leave and when some members of the old committee refused to leave a group of male beneficiaries told a Mr Chireya that if he did not leave they could push him to leave. Some ladies, who had umbrellas, threatened to use them to force one Mr Mukura to leave.

This gives credence to Mr Elinas Gumbo's claim that they were threatened with assault and they left the meeting.

The other document is a letter of confirmation of the new executive written by one Arch. P S. Mukura, a Provincial Public Works Director - Midlands dated 9th February 2015 which is addressed “TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN”.

It is not clear why and at whose instance the letter was written after the meeting of the 7th February 2015. Assuming that a new committee was elected into office on 3 January 2015, that is neither here nor there.

The issue is whether or not the new executive despoiled the old executive.

In my view, the issue to be decided is whether or not the applicant has made a case for spoliation orders. In order to obtain a mandament van spolie the applicant must show that:

(a) He was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the things; and

(b) He was unlawfully deprived of such possession.

Nino Bonino v De lange 1906 TS 120…,; Burger v Van Rooyen 1961 (1) SA 159 (O); and Scholtz v Faifer 1910 TPD 243…,.

In casu, the applicant had factual control of the project, the offices, office keys, books, and all other belongings with the intention to derive some benefit from them. He was deprived of his possession. The deprivation was done without a court order or other lawful means.

It is trite law that the person who has been deprived of his possession must first be restored to his former position before the merits of the case can be considered. The main purpose of the mandament is to preserve public order by restraining persons from taking the law into their own hands and by inducing them to submit the matter to the jurisdiction of the courts. Peace in a community could not be maintained if every person who asserted that he had a claim to a particular thing were entitled to resort to self-help to gain possession of the thing.

C.G. Van De MERWE and M. J. de WALL – 'The Law of Things and Servitudes'…,.; Curatoren Van “Pioneer Lodge NO1” v C Champion 1879 OFS 51…,; Muller v Muller 1915 TPD 28…,.

In this case, the respondents argued that the things were taken by the police for purposes of investigations and that Izayi Park offices have not been taken over.

I do not agree with that submission.

The mere fact that a police officer “unofficially” sanctions dispossession is not sufficient to legalise an otherwise unlawful act. The police can only search and seize property on the strength of a Warrant of Seizure or other lawful instructions.

In this case, it has not been submitted that the police officer, or officers, who took away the items from the offices did so on the strength of such warrant or court order. Their actions were illegal on the authorities of Potgieter v Du Plessis 1978 (1) SA 751 (NC)…,; Coetzee v Coetzee 1982 (1) SA 933.

As regards both requirements, I am satisfied that the applicant has satisfied them.

The respondents dispossessed the applicant forcibly and wrongfully against his consent. The court, in such a case, will summarily restore the status quo ante, and will do that as a preliminary to any inquiry or investigation into the merits of the dispute.

In acting as they did, whether as principles or agents, all the respondents took the law into their own hands. They are guilty of what is called self help. This court must insist on observance of the principle that a person in possession of property, however unlawful his possession may be, and however exposed he may be to ejectment proceedings, cannot be interfered with in his possession except by due process of law. If interfered with unlawfully the court will not condone such interference. It will redress the situation pending the taking of lawful action for ejectment.

In the result, the provisional order is granted in terms of the draft.

HH710-16 : TENDAI MANGWIRO vs DR IGNATIUS CHOMBO
Ruled By: TSANGA J

A court application for contempt of court was brought before me on 9 November 2016 in motion court. I granted the application and herein I give my reasons for so doing against the backdrop of a brief narrative of the history of the matter which puts the order in context.Contextual ...

Contextual Background

1. The Default Judgment

The order for contempt has its genesis in a default judgment obtained by the applicant, Mr Mangwiro (as plaintiff), under HC4766/13 on the 18th of February 2015, against the respondent (“the Minister”) and others (as defendants), jointly and severally.

The import of the judgment was that the applicant was to be paid the sum of US$78,000 as well as interest and costs of suit for money that had been taken from him by the State in a matter in which he had finally been acquitted in 2012. The State had failed to return the money to him.

2. The Application for Rescission

An application for rescission of the above judgment was lodged on behalf of the defendants by the Attorney General's Office, Civil Division, on the 1st of April 2015 under HC3001/15. Despite the lodging of this application for rescission, it was, however, not prosecuted to finality leading the applicant to file an application for its dismissal for want of prosecution.

3. Dismissal for Want of Prosecution

The application for dismissal of the defendants' application for rescission had been served on the 1st of June at the Attorney General's Office–Civil Division. Again, the lawyer handling the matter remained in slumber and no response was received to the application for dismissal. Accordingly, the order dismissing the application for rescission for want of prosecution was granted under HC4942/15 on the 30th of June 2015.

4. Order to comply with Statutory Duty to Effect Payment

On the 16th of May 2016, under HC4261/16, the respondent, as Minister of Home Affairs, was ordered to comply with the statutory duty cast upon him in terms of section 5(2) of the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14] to pay, from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, the money awarded to the applicant by the court on the 18th of February 2016. In particular, the order also stated as follows:

“The respondent is ordered and directed to comply with the order in the above paragraph (1) within 14 days of this order having been served on him, or his (permanent) secretary, or any responsible person in his Ministry, failing which, the respondent be and is hereby declared to be in contempt of this order.”

The order was sent directly to the Minister with a letter on the 19th of May 2016. It is endorsed as having been received by Madakufa T on behalf of the Minister. Another letter was written on the 7th of June, again directly to the Minister, following up the letter of the 19th of May and reminding him that the court order would lapse on the 9th of June.

It is date stamped as having been received by one G Mahlunge on his behalf on the 7th of June.

There was no compliance by the Minister, and a court application for contempt was filed on the 13th of June 2016.

5. The Court Application for Contempt

Having initially attempted personal service of the order for contempt on the 15th of June, without success, the record shows, through the return of service, that, the application for contempt, being HC5970/16, was finally served, successfully and personally, on the Minister on the 24th of June 2016 by Mr Benhura, the Additional Sheriff of the High Court.

6. Motion Court Directive to further serve the AG's Office - Civil Division

On the 20th of July 2016, the judge sitting in Motion Court further directed that the application for contempt of court be served on the Attorney General-Civil Division. This was done on the 13th of October with the application being received by Ms E Manjokoto of the Attorney General's Office.

The accompanying letter clearly stated, that, upon expiry of the prescribed period, the matter would be set down again, in Motion Court, as the Minister remained barred, having taken no action.

Again, there was no action on their part.

Having complied fully the with requirement to serve the Minister personally as well as on the Attorney General - Civil Division, the applicant then reset this matter for contempt on the 9th of November 2016.

What emerges from a reading of the files, leading to the application for contempt, is an underlying lackadaisical approach to court processes and orders on the part of the Minister's counsel handling the matter and ultimately by the Minister himself.

It was against the above background that the matter for contempt was on the unopposed roll on 9 November 2016.

On 8 November 2016, the Minister had filed an “opposing” affidavit in which he raised a point in limine that he was never served personally nor were any of his officers.

Personal service is indeed required by Rule 39(1) of the High Court Rules, 1971 in any application which affects a person's freedom: see Mutyambizi v Goncalves & Anor 2013 (2) 375.

Counsel from the Civil Division appeared to oppose the matter in Motion Court on the day and he was given audience in light of the assertion by the Minister that he had not been served personally.

In other words, the court did not stand resolute on the ground that the Minister was barred but accorded his counsel a hearing.

Counsel from the Civil Division spoke to the content of the affidavit; the gist of his point being that the order for contempt would be improper in view of lack of personal service.

However, as the court pointed out to him, there were fundamental problems with the Minister's affidavit which was before the court regarding his averment.

In his affidavit, the Minister was categorically clear, that, the application he had not been served with was HC942/16. The Minister's point in limine, in his sworn affidavit, was couched as follows:

“1. It is my humble submission that I was never served personally, or any of my officers, with the court application HC4942/16 for contempt of court.

2. Notwithstanding the above, I am willing to respond to the applicant's founding affidavit if I am served with it.

3. Wherefore, I pray that the court be pleased to postpone this application with costs pending the applicant's founding affidavit being properly served to me.”

First of all, there was no application HC4942/16. There was court application HC4942/15.

Materially, HC4942/15 was not a court application for contempt of court but for dismissal for want of prosecution. It was rightly served on the Attorney General's Office - Civil Division and not on the Minister personally because the Civil Division were the ones representing him and others in the application for rescission.

The application for contempt is HC5970/16.

It was not the Minister's assertion, in his affidavit, that he had not been served with this particular application.

If the file reference was an error, there was no application to amend.

Furthermore, the assertion of non-receipt of the court application for contempt was a bare denial.

If all a party opposing an application for contempt has to do in order to stay proceedings, is to allege, without any substantiation whatsoever, that they never received the application personally, in the face of a return of service to the contrary, then justice would be hampered.

Where a return of service clearly indicates that proper service has been effected, then the onus is on the person alleging otherwise to prove their assertion.

To counter counsel for the Civil Division's assertion, that there was no service despite the return of service clearly indicating that there was, the applicant's counsel drew attention to the Supreme Court case of Gundani v Kanyemba 1988 (1) ZLR 226 (SC).

It was stated therein, that, the return of service by an officer of court, be they the Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff or Messenger, is to be accepted as prima facie proof of what is stated therein - albeit it can be rebutted by clear and satisfactory evidence.

In casu, there was nothing remotely equating to clear or satisfactory evidence rebutting the Additional Sheriff's return of service that he had served the court application for contempt, in HC5970/16, personally on the Minister, Dr Ignatius Chombo himself.

Having read the Minister's affidavit, and having heard his counsel, the court's conclusion was that there was no averment that the relevant application had not been served, and, equally, there was lack of proof to substantiate the claim on non-service that had been made.

The Minister, Dr Ignatius Chombo, is a well-known public figure who is unlikely to be mistaken. The Additional Sheriff would have no reason, as an officer of the court, to lie that he had served him personally.

I therefore had no reason to disbelieve his return of service which indicated that he had served him, personally, at his offices at 11th Floor Mukwati Building in 4th Street on 24 June 2016.

The application had been served on him personally for the reason that the court order compelling him to pay within 14 days, under HC4261/16, had been unequivocal that failure to pay would render him personally, Dr Ignatius Chombo, as being in contempt of the order of court.

I was equally content that there was a valid court order entitling the applicant to the sum paid which the respondent was fully aware of.

I was also satisfied, from the record, that, the order under HC4261/16, for Dr Ignatius Chombo, as Minister of Home Affairs, to comply with his statutory duty to pay had been brought to his attention.

I was further satisfied that there had been non-compliance with that order leading to the application for contempt under HC5970/16 which had been served personally on Dr Ignatious Chombo.

Besides the factual realities, the legal basis for granting the order for contempt was fundamentally constitutionally rooted.

In Karnec Investments (Private) Limited & Anor v Econet Wireless (Private) Limited HH261-16, I emphasized as follows regarding the applicable constitutional provisions:

“In terms of section 3 of our Constitution, Amendment (No.20) Act 2013 one of the founding values and principles upon which Zimbabwe is founded is respect for the rule of law.

If the court's authority is not respected there can be no fostering of respect for the rule of law.

Furthermore, in terms of section 164(3), an order of a court binds the State and all persons and governmental institutions and agencies to which it applies and must be obeyed by them. Contempt of court has clear bearings on legal proceedings in that if it is not addressed, the jurisdictional power of the courts would be illusionary. It is regarded as an act of disrespect and insult to the court and an obstruction to justice.”

Section 3(1)(a) and (b) of our Constitution states as follows:

“(1) Zimbabwe is founded on respect for the following values and principles -

(a) Supremacy of the Constitution.

(b) The rule of law.”

In simple terms, the rule of law has been defined as follows:

“Rule of law denotes a government of laws and not of men. Individuals working within the State machinery are expected to exercise their official duties and responsibilities in accordance with the law. In other words, rule of law represents the supremacy of law:” see MARU BAZEZEW, Constitutionalism, Mizan Law Review, Vol 3, No.2, 2009…,.

Central to the rule of law is that no person is above the law.

The rule of law binds Government and all officials to its precepts and also preserves the equality and dignity of all persons. In essence, equality before the law is not a hollow concept. Everyone, regardless of factors such as their economic or social status, or political affiliation is subject to the law: see section 56 of the Constitution as regards equality and non-discrimination.

Accordingly, the courts play a vital role in protecting the rights of all individuals.

Effectiveness of the courts is central to the rule of law and democratic governance. Section 164(1) to (3), which deals with independence of the judiciary, provides as follows:

“164 Independence of judiciary

(1) The courts are independent and are subject only to this Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially, expeditiously, and without fear, favour, or prejudice.

(2) The independence, impartiality, and effectiveness of the courts are central to the rule of law and democratic governance, and, therefore —

(a) Neither the State nor any institution or agency of the Government, at any level, and no other person, may interfere with the functioning of the courts;

(b) The State, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility, and effectiveness and to ensure that they comply with the principles set out in section 165.

(3) An order or decision of a court binds the State and all persons and governmental institutions and agencies to which it applies, and must be obeyed by them.”

In summary, the Constitution is clear, that, the courts are subject only to the Constitution and to the law.

However, this does not mean that constitutional principles are applied using abstract rationality. Proper interpretation of constitutional principles is never divorced from the facts. Additionally, courts are enjoined to apply the law without fear or favour. Furthermore, an order or decision of the court is binding on the State and all persons and institutions to which it applies.

The facts herein, as captured in the various court applications regarding this matter which I have outlined, spoke for themselves in terms of equities that underlay the application for contempt.

Respect for the rule of law would be ferociously eroded were courts to permit a Government official to send a message to a litigant, who has successfully sued, that the State does not value court orders.

For the avoidance of doubt, what the Minister was directed to do in HC4261/16 was as follows:

“1. The respondent is ordered and directed to comply with statutory duty cast upon him, in terms of section 5(2) of the State Liabilities Act (Chapter 8:14), that is, to cause to be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, the sums of money awarded to the applicant by order of this Honourable Court, dated 18 February 2015, in case number HC4766/13, judgement number HH147-15.

2. The respondent is ordered and directed to comply with the order in the above paragraph (1) within 14 days of this order having been served on him, or his (permanent) secretary or any responsible person in his Ministry, failing which, the respondent be and is hereby declared to be in contempt of this order.

3. The respondent is to pay the applicant's costs of suit on a legal practitioner and client scale.”

In terms of section 5(2) of the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14], his duty in his nominal capacity, is to cause payment to be made out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

Section 5(2) of the State Liabilities Act provides as follows:

“Subject to this section, no execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof shall be issued against the defendant or respondent in any action or proceedings referred to in section two or against any property of the State, but the nominal defendant or respondent may cause to be paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund such sum of money as may, by a judgment or order of the court, be awarded to the plaintiff, the applicant, or the petitioner, as the case may be.”

This is what he had seemingly failed to direct up to the time that application for contempt was made.

In order to facilitate the process of payment, he must give the directive, or authority to pay as the catalyst for payment.

That is his role.

In other words, the order sought was that he be declared to be in contempt until he had taken the necessary measures to cause payment to be made. He evidently does not make the actual payment himself as there are Government channels that ultimately make the payment upon his request or directive that payment be made.

Having been satisfied, from the return of service, that the relevant Minister was served personally with the application for contempt, the finding of contempt of court against Dr Ignatious Chombo, as Minister of Home Affairs, was accordingly made in this context.

HH147-15 : TENDAI MANGWIRO vs CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER-GENRAL OF POLICE and OFFICER IN CHARGE CID SUSPECTS HARARE CENTRAL POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKAMBI
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

In this application for default judgment, the plaintiff seeks an order to the effect that -

“1. The respondents, jointly and severally, pay the applicant the sum of US$78,900.

2. The respondents, jointly and severally, pay the applicant the sum of US$1,537,833=33 being the United States Dollar equivalent of ZW$46,135,000,000.

3. Interest at the prescribed rate (from the 25th January 2013) being the date applicant demanded return of exhibits.

4. Costs of suit on the legal practitioner and client scale.”

The claim by the plaintiff arises from his prosecution before the Regional Court on a charge of theft. He was acquitted on 18 January 2013. He gave notice, in terms of the State Liabilities Act [Chapter 8:14], on 18 March 2013.

Following the acquittal, it is contended that police unlawfully, and unprocedurally released US$78,900 and ZW$46,135,000,000 which had been seized from the applicant to one Andre Nsaka Nsaka.

It is evident that the cash in question, together with some motor vehicles, were not exhibits before the Regional Court.

It is common cause that the plaintiff was arrested on 16 February 2008 on allegations of theft of US$3,000,000 from Andre Nsaka Nsaka. The following items were seized from the plaintiff -

1. US$78,900.

2. ZW$46,135,000,000.

3. Isuzu double cab LX300 vehicle, registration number ABD 4926.

4. Toyota Vista vehicle, registration number ABC 0347.

The two motor vehicles were subsequently released. Trial commenced in November 2008 and was finalised on 25 April 2012.

It is also common cause that although the defendants filed a special plea to the claim they were subsequently barred for not pleading over to the merits.

It is surprising that those who legally represent the State, and those personnel presiding over State institutions, are lax when it comes to litigation. A simple act of filing a defence to a claim that has serious financial implications to the fiscus went begging by failure to adhere to court rules.

The money being claimed was booked under entry 09/08 (Exhibit Book 34) with CID Suspects. As stated previously, it was never booked with the trial court.

When demand was made for its release, the defendants claimed prescription.

The plaintiff sought confirmation, from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, to the effect, that, as at 11 February 2008, the rate of exchange between the US$ and the ZW$ was US$1 to ZW$30,000. The ZW$46,135,000,000 amounts to US$1,537,833=33.

Although the plaintiff's counsel, in his heads of argument, submits this is vindicatory action, this is essentially a claim for damages.

This is because, in his supporting affidavit, the plaintiff claims that the money seized from him was wrongfully released to Andre Nsaka Nsaka - the complainant in the criminal matter. Essentially, the plaintiff is seeking to be placed in the same position he would have been had the money not been released.

He cannot and is not seeking to recover the exact money seized from him because that money is no longer available. Hence the computation of the US$ equivalent of the ZW$46,135,000,000.

The claim for US$78,900 poses no problem. That is the loss the plaintiff suffered when the money was seized from him.

It is the claim for the US$1,537,833=33 that I find a problem with.

In the first place, it does not follow that when an article is seized by police, it is inevitably going to be used as an exhibit at the intended trial. Even the legality of the seizure, just like an arrest, may be challenged. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of the seized money was not dependent on the outcome of a criminal prosecution.

Having made those observations, this does not excuse the police from conducting themselves in an unacceptable manner. Section 59(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] provides that -

“Subject to subsection (2), if in connection with any article referred to in paragraph (c) of section fifty eight —

(a) No criminal proceedings are instituted; or

(b) It appears that such article is not required at the trial for purposes of evidence or for
purposes of an order of court; or

(c) Criminal proceedings are instituted and the accused admits his guilt in accordance with section three hundred and fifty-six; the article shall —

(i) If the person from whom it was seized may lawfully possess the article, be returned to that person; or

(ii) If the person from whom it was seized may not lawfully possess the article, be delivered to the person who may lawfully possess it; or

(iii) If no person may lawfully possess the article, or if the police officer concerned does not know of any person who may lawfully possess the article, be forfeited to the State.”

There is nothing to show how it was determined who may lawfully possess the seized cash.

It looks like an arbitrary decision to release the money to Andre Nsaka Nsaka was made. It is not clear if this was motivated by the fact that the plaintiff acknowledged owing Andre Nsaka Nsaka US$145,000.

During the criminal proceedings, there was an indication that the police officer who released the money had criminal charges preferred against him. It was not indicated what the outcome of that process was.

It is also not clear why the plaintiff did not join Andre Nsaka Nsaka in the present suit.

It is well established that delictual damages are calculated as at the date of the delict. In this respect see Parish v King 1992 (1) ZLR 216 (S).

The plaintiff justifies his second claim on the conversion of the economy to multi-currency due to the diminution in value of the local currency.

I have already pointed out that there was no legal impediment to the plaintiff challenging the seizure of his money at the earliest opportunity. It seems the plaintiff chose to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings in order to demand the release of the money.

What if he had been convicted?

Commenting on currency nominalism, GROSSKOPF JA, in S.A. Eagle Insurance Co. Ltd. v Hartley 1990 (4) SA 833, had this to say…, -

“This result seems to me to be in conflict with the principle of nominalism of currency which underlies all aspects of South African law - including the law of obligations. Its essence, in the field of obligations, is that a debt sounding in money has to be paid in terms of its nominal value irrespective of any fluctuations in the purchasing power of currency. This places the risk of a depreciation of the currency on the creditor and saddles the debtor with the risk of appreciation. See FARLON and HARTHAWAY Contract: Cases Material and Commentary, 3rd ed, at 719, note 2; HJ DELPORT, Inflation and South African Law (1982) 4 Modern Business Law 115 and A SPANDAU, Inflation and the Law 1975 SALJ 31.”

Nominalism is the norm in the common law of Western States with similar systems to our own. Thus, in Humphrey (1962) 272 US 517…, the United States Supreme Court said:

“An obligation in terms of the currency of a country takes the risk of currency fluctuations and whether creditor or debtor profits by the change the law takes no account of it. Obviously, in fact, a dollar or a mark may have different values at different times, but, to the law that established it is always the same. If the debt had been due here and the value of dollars had dropped before suit was brought, the plaintiff could recover no more dollars on that account.”

A person claiming damages, in whatever form, must prove that they suffered loss in the amount claimed: see Kwindima v Mvundura 2009 (1) ZLR 168 (H).

In so awarding such damages, the court exercises its discretion. In deserving cases, the courts have made awards in foreign currency notwithstanding the cause of action having arisen during the era of the local currency.

I am therefore satisfied that the plaintiff's claim cannot be granted in its entirety. In the result, it is ordered as follows -

(a) That the defendants, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, pay the plaintiff the sum of US$78,900.

(b) That the defendants jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, pay interest at the prescribed rate from the 25th of January 2013.

(c) That the defendants, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, pay the costs of suit.

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Subpoena re: Warrant of Entry, Search and Seizure, Claim for Return of Seized Property and the Anton Piller Order

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI
Ruled By: UCHENA J

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI
Ruled By: UCHENA J

HH156-11 : TENDAI BITI vs SUPERINTENDENT MAJUTA and ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER NYATHI and COMMISSIONER GENERAL CHIHURI and ECONET WIRELESS ZIMBABWE LIMITED
Ruled By: BHUNU J

HB87-11 : WOMEN OF ZIMBABWE ARISE TRUST vs THE OFFICER IN CHARGE C.I.D. LAW AND ORDER and THE OFFICER COMMANDING C.I.D LAW AND ORDER CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT P.R. MOYO and ANOTHER
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HH354-13 : STANBIC NOMINEES PRIVATE LIMITED and STANBIC BANK ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs REMO INVESTMENT BROKERS (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

HH58-14 : MICHAEL P. HITSCHMAN and PESCA (PVT) LTD vs COMMISSIONER - GENERAL OF POLICE and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and ATTORNEY GENERAL and SUPERINTENDENT ARNOLD DHLIWAYO
Ruled By: NDEWERE J

HH475-18 : ETHEL TSITSI MPEZENI vs ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZHOU J

HHH185-15 : ITAI MOTSI vs THE STATE
Ruled By: HUNGWE J and BERE J

HH229-15 : IZAYI PARK HOUSING SCHEME (represented by ELINAS GUMBO) vs SHADRECK GWENA and OTHERS
Ruled By: TAGU J

HH710-16 : TENDAI MANGWIRO vs DR IGNATIUS CHOMBO
Ruled By: TSANGA J

HH147-15 : TENDAI MANGWIRO vs CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER-GENRAL OF POLICE and OFFICER IN CHARGE CID SUSPECTS HARARE CENTRAL POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKAMBI
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

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Law Portal Zimbabwe

Subpoena re: Warrant of Entry, Search and Seizure, Claim for Return of Seized Property and the Anton Piller Order

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI Ruled By: UCHENA J

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI Ruled By: UCHENA J

HH156-11 : TENDAI BITI vs SUPERINTENDENT MAJUTA and ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER NYATHI and COMMISSIONER GENERAL CHIHURI and ECONET WIRELESS ZIMBABWE LIMITED Ruled By: BHUNU J

HB87-11 : WOMEN OF ZIMBABWE ARISE TRUST vs THE OFFICER IN CHARGE C.I.D. LAW AND ORDER and THE OFFICER COMMANDING C.I.D LAW AND ORDER CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT P.R. MOYO and ANOTHER Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HH354-13 : STANBIC NOMINEES PRIVATE LIMITED and STANBIC BANK ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs REMO INVESTMENT BROKERS (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

HH58-14 : MICHAEL P. HITSCHMAN and PESCA (PVT) LTD vs COMMISSIONER - GENERAL OF POLICE and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and ATTORNEY GENERAL and SUPERINTENDENT ARNOLD DHLIWAYO Ruled By: NDEWERE J

HH475-18 : ETHEL TSITSI MPEZENI vs ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION and OTHERS Ruled By: ZHOU J

HHH185-15 : ITAI MOTSI vs THE STATE Ruled By: HUNGWE J and BERE J

HH229-15 : IZAYI PARK HOUSING SCHEME (represented by ELINAS GUMBO) vs SHADRECK GWENA and OTHERS Ruled By: TAGU J

HH710-16 : TENDAI MANGWIRO vs DR IGNATIUS CHOMBO Ruled By: TSANGA J

HH147-15 : TENDAI MANGWIRO vs CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER-GENRAL OF POLICE and OFFICER IN CHARGE CID SUSPECTS HARARE CENTRAL POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKAMBI Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

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Law Portal
Zimbabwe

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI
Ruled By: UCHENA J

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI
Ruled By: UCHENA J

HH156-11 : TENDAI BITI vs SUPERINTENDENT MAJUTA and ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER NYATHI and COMMISSIONER GENERAL CHIHURI and ECONET WIRELESS ZIMBABWE LIMITED
Ruled By: BHUNU J

HB87-11 : WOMEN OF ZIMBABWE ARISE TRUST vs THE OFFICER IN CHARGE C.I.D. LAW AND ORDER and THE OFFICER COMMANDING C.I.D LAW AND ORDER CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT P.R. MOYO and ANOTHER
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HH354-13 : STANBIC NOMINEES PRIVATE LIMITED and STANBIC BANK ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs REMO INVESTMENT BROKERS (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

HH58-14 : MICHAEL P. HITSCHMAN and PESCA (PVT) LTD vs COMMISSIONER - GENERAL OF POLICE and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and ATTORNEY GENERAL and SUPERINTENDENT ARNOLD DHLIWAYO
Ruled By: NDEWERE J

HH475-18 : ETHEL TSITSI MPEZENI vs ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZHOU J

HHH185-15 : ITAI MOTSI vs THE STATE
Ruled By: HUNGWE J and BERE J

HH229-15 : IZAYI PARK HOUSING SCHEME (represented by ELINAS GUMBO) vs SHADRECK GWENA and OTHERS
Ruled By: TAGU J

HH710-16 : TENDAI MANGWIRO vs DR IGNATIUS CHOMBO
Ruled By: TSANGA J

HH147-15 : TENDAI MANGWIRO vs CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER-GENRAL OF POLICE and OFFICER IN CHARGE CID SUSPECTS HARARE CENTRAL POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKAMBI
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J